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 Global climate change (GCC) is among the most important issues of the 21st cen-
tury. Adaptation to and mitigation of climate change are some of the salient local and re-
gional challenges scientists, decision makers, and the general public face today and will 
be  in the near future. However, designed adaptation and mitigation strategies do not 
guarantee success in coping with global climate change. Despite the robust and convinc-
ing body for anthropogenic global climate change research and science there is still a sig-
nificant gap between the recommendations provided by the scientific community and the 
actual actions by the public and policy makers.  
 In order to design, implement, and generate sufficient public support for policies 
and planning interventions at the national and international level, it is necessary to have a 
good understanding of the public's perceptions regarding GCC. Based on survey research 
in nine countries, the purpose of this study is two-fold: First, to understand the nature of 
public perceptions of global climate change in different countries; and secondly to identi-
fy perception factors which have a significant impact on the public’s willingness to sup-
port GCC policies or commit to behavioral changes to reduce GHG emissions. Factors 
such as trust in GCC information which need to be considered in future climate change 
communication efforts are also dealt with in this dissertation. 
  This study has identified several aspects that need to be considered in future 
communication programs. GCC is characterized by high uncertainties, unfamiliar risks, 
and other characteristics of hazards which make personal connections, responsibility and 
engagement difficult. Communication efforts need to acknowledge these obstacles, build 
up trust and motivate the public to be more engaged in reducing GCC by emphasizing the 
ii 
multiple benefits of many policies outside of just reducing GCC. Levels of skepticism 
among the public towards the reality of GCC as well as the trustworthiness and sufficien-
cy of the scientific findings varies by country. Thus, communicators need to be aware of 
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Problem Statement & Identification of Study Variables 
Global climate change (GCC) is among the most important issues of the 21st cen-
tury and has become a significant policy topic at United Nations recent conferences. In 
addition, there is no question that activities in the form of Climate Action Planning are 
occurring at local levels in the U.S.  Adaptation to and mitigation of climate change are 
some of the salient local and regional challenges scientists, decision makers, and the gen-
eral public face today and will be  in the near future. The list of possible negative effects 
of climate change is long and several impacts of GCC can already be observed in indi-
vidual countries or regions as well at a global scale. Measurable today are an increase in 
air and water temperature, reduced frost days, a higher rate and magnitude of heavy rain 
in some areas and yet drought in other regions, a rise in sea level, and reduced snow cov-
er, glaciers, permafrost, and sea ice (IPCC, 2007). The indirect impacts of these changes 
will most likely affect human health, water supply, agriculture, coastal areas, and numer-
ous other aspects of society and the natural environment.  
The existing body of knowledge already presents an important amount of possible 
information on planning interventions and policies needed to respond to and cope with 
global warming and climate change (TRB, 2009; IPCC, 2007; Newman et al., 2009). 
Nevertheless certainly more experience and understanding is needed on institutional ca-
pacities and public attitudes as well as dealing with uncertainties for more effective re-
sponses. Designed adaptation and mitigation strategies, however, do not guarantee suc-
cess in the fight against global climate change (Handmer, 2003) and we do not know 
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what needs will be, as major challenges approach highly vulnerable zones in the future. 
Despite the robust and convincing body for anthropogenic global climate change research 
and science (IPCC, 2007) there is still a significant gap between the recommendations 
provided by the scientific community and the actual actions by the public and policy 
makers (Blake, 1999; Kollmuss & Agyman, 2002; Arvai et al., 2006; Abbasi, 2006). 
Since the World Metropolitan Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Envi-
ronment Programme (UNEP) established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) in 1988 the scientific efforts to understand GCC grew significantly. So 
far, with the help of thousands of scientists, the IPCC has released four “Climate Change 
Assessment Reports” which asses the available scientific information relevant for im-
proving the understanding of climate change and its possible environmental and socioec-
onomic impacts. As a result, the IPCC is considered the leading institution for the as-
sessment of climate change and for monitoring the scientific work done worldwide re-
garding climate change. The fourth and latest report released in 2007 finally states clearly 
that (with a likelihood of 90-99%) that global climate change is driven by human emis-
sions of heat-trapping gases and that greater environmental damages can be expected in 
the future. 
Nevertheless, the strong findings presented by the scientific community have not 
transferred into long-term, comprehensive, and legally binding policy commitments es-
pecially on the national and international level. So far scientists and the media have failed 
to communicate the urgency of the situation successfully to policy makers and the lay 
public (McBean & Hengeveld, 2000; Summerville & Hassol, 2011). Simultaneously, the 
way governments operate in most democratic societies is another reason for the gap be-
3 
tween the scientific evidence for anthropogenic climate change and the actual actions by 
the public and policy makers (Held &Hervey, 2009; Meadowcraft, 2009; Wheeler, 2009). 
For instance, the short-term electoral cycles make it very difficult for the existing forms 
of governance to take actions against GCC. Due to the short-term electoral cycles, politi-
cians are constantly concerned with their own career, which impacts their ability to make 
tough policy decisions that require a large amount of political capital (Held & Hervey, 
2009). Global climate change, however, is a very complex issue that is characterized by 
high uncertainties requiring long-term policies and measurements (IPCC, 2007). Mitiga-
tion strategies such as higher energy taxes or fuel prizes and costly adaptation measure-
ments such as flood barriers are hard to communicate to the public without losing poten-
tial voters (Meadowcraft, 2009). As result and due to the pressure on governments to pre-
sent results that can be evaluate every 4 to 5 years, policy debates tend to focus more on 
topics and policies that can be implemented in a short amount of time, do not require ad-
ditional taxes, and can be witnessed by the public (Held & Hervey, 2009). Another con-
strain for the existing forms of governance to achieve substantial reductions of GHG 
emissions is that the short-term electoral cycles are changing the political landscape con-
stantly. New elections might result in new leadership from a party which has a different 
agenda regarding climate change than the previous party (Wheeler, 2009). This empha-
sizes the importance of the public perception of climate change. Only if the public be-
lieves strongly in the need for mitigating climate change and is willing to commit to the 
required behavioral changes, elected officials will address this long-term challenge effec-
tively. 
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 The way the public processes information, how they perceive threats and other 
perceptional issues has a significant effect on how and to what degree mitigation and ad-
aptation strategies are supported. Nonetheless, very little is known about public opinion 
and perceptions about climate change, especially at the international level (Leiserowitz, 
2010; Schneider et al., 2010). One of the primary reasons for this phenomenon is the lim-
ited number of multinational surveys addressing public perceptions of global climate 
change and its threats (Brechin, 2003; Leiserowitz, 2005). However, public risk percep-
tions and the understanding of climate change and public beliefs play a vital role for suc-
cessfully overcoming the challenges of global climate change in the next decades. In or-
der to design, implement, and generate sufficient public support for policies and planning 
interventions at the national and international level, it is necessary to have a good under-
standing of the public's perceptions regarding GCC (Read, 1994; Bord et al., 1998; 
Moser, 2006, Moench, 2007).  
The public's perceptions of GCC and the resulting behavior and degree of policy 
support for various mitigation options can be linked to the way the threats of GCC are 
communicated. This is one aspect of this study. Establishing accurate knowledge among 
the public regarding the risks, threats and other aspects of GGC is very important and a 
key challenge for decision-makers and communicators. Without effective communica-
tion, the public may become distrustful of the science and may not be willing to support 
the necessary policies to reduce greenhouse gasses and support adaptation investments. 
Yet, the field of climate change communication research, especially as a tool to 
change public behavior and foster public acceptance of adaptation and mitigation strate-
gies, is still relatively young (NRC, 2010a). Nevertheless, risk communication is already 
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acknowledged as an important tool in climate change policy and research (Wardekker, 
2004). We know from prior studies that when people have better understanding of GCC 
science, they tend to be more supportive of mitigation efforts (Read et al., 1994; Bord et 
al., 1998). The purpose of this study is two-fold: First, to understand the nature of public 
perceptions of global climate change in different countries; and secondly to identify per-
ception factors which have a significant impact on the public’s willingness to support 
GCC policies or commit to behavioral changes to reduce GHG emissions. Factors such as 
trust in GCC information which need to be considered in future climate change commu-
nication efforts will also be dealt with in this dissertation. 
Research Questions, Theories, & Hypotheses  
Research questions. This study has four underlying central research questions, of 
which the answers provide the necessary insights for improving the understanding of the 
public’s perceptions of GCC and behavioral attitudes in different countries as well as for 
providing recommendations to enhance GCC communication. The research questions are 
as follows: 
1. What are the public’s perceptions of GCC in terms of threat and risk, saliency of 
 the issue, trust in GCC information, and acceptable public strategies? 
2. What importance do GCC risk perceptions and attitudes play in the public’s will-
ingness to support mitigation and adaptation strategies 
3. How do the public perceptions regarding climate change and attitudes toward 
mitigation and adaptation strategies vary by socioeconomic factors?   
4. What role do level of knowledge and perceptions of trust and responsibility play 
in the public’s level of support for adaptation and mitigation policies? 
6 
This research contributes to the existing body of knowledge in the areas of risk 
perception and risk communication as well as their interrelationships, directed at global 
climate change and strategies. GCC is characterized by high levels of risk but also high 
levels of uncertainties. The data collected here and the insights gained will permit deci-
sion-makers to make better informed decisions in terms of developing, communicating, 
and implementing the appropriate climate change policies and strategies to successfully 
mitigate and adapt to the impacts of global climate change.  
Foundational theory supporting the research. As a scholarly endeavor we do 
not know very much about what risk perception factors influence the public's perceptions 
of GCC and if these perceptions differ from other natural threats of disasters. Therefore, 
this research is based on the psychometric paradigm (Fischhoff et al., 1978, & Slovic et 
al.,1984) and seeks to advance the theories of "bounded rationality" (Simon, 1956 & 
1959) and  "cultural cognition" of natural phenomenon (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). 
The psychometric paradigm presents a theoretical framework that implies that risk means 
different things to different people due to the influence of different psychological, social, 
institutional, and cultural factors (Slovic, 2000). This paradigm assumes through appro-
priate survey design, different scaling methods, and multivariate analysis to capture pub-
lic risk attitudes and perceptions that are relevant to improve climate change communica-
tion programs but fundamentally see how risk perceptions are associated with public pol-
icies on mitigation and adaptation. 
The theory of bounded rationality asserts that the decision making process of in-
dividuals is limited due to incomplete information available, cognitive limitations, and 
restricted amount of time to make decisions (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001). As a result, 
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these constraints force individuals to construct a simplified model of the world to deal 
with. Within the framework of bounded rationality the key principle is the concept of 'sat-
isficing' (Slovic, 2000), which means that a person strives to attain a satisfactory solution 
and not necessarily an optimal level of achievement. For this research, knowledge of the 
workings of the public's bounded rationality regarding the complex issue of GCC allows 
decision-makers and communicators to improve climate change communication pro-
grams and strategies. Thus, fostering behavioral change and improving the support for 
policies addressing the causes and potential negative impacts of GCC. Therefore, this 
study will test different variables that impact risk perception and risk communication. 
Based on the cultural theory of risk (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982), the theory of 
cultural cognition implies that individuals perceive risks according to their sense of 
commitment to one or another idealized form of social ordering (Thompson et al., 1990; 
Kahan 2011 &2012). According to this theory, the individual's perception of the risk and 
threats regarding GCC is derived from and reinforced by the values they have in common 
with the people they are connected with. Therefore, compared to the theory of bounded 
rationality, the theory of cultural cognition argues that differences among the public's 
GCC perception are mostly caused by conflicts between opposing groups whose mem-
bers' cultural outlooks dispose them to form particular perceptions (Kahan, 2010; Doug-
las et al., 2006). 
Based on these concepts the study will test different aspects that impact risk per-
ceptions and the effects of these perceptions to policy predispositions and attitudes. In 
particular, this study examines the relationships between impacts of heuristics, trust, val-
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ues and social amplification on GCC perception and the support for various mitigation 
and adaptation strategies to improve risk communication efforts.  
 Heuristics. When laypeople are faced with the task to determine risks, they usu-
ally do not have statistical evidence on hand to base their decision on. Instead they rely 
on assumptions based on what they remember hearing or observing about the risk they 
are confronted with (Slovic, 1987). As pointed out by Short (1984), social influences im-
pacting the response to hazards are mainly transmitted by friends, family, fellow workers 
and respected public officials media. Moreover, since the 1980s, researchers, especially 
in the field of psychology, were able to identify various general rules that guide people in 
forming their perception. Known as heuristics, these judgment rules are applied by lay-
people to reduce difficult mental tasks to simpler ones (Kahneman et al., 1982; Makofske 
& Edelstein, 1988).  
 The heuristic known as the 'availability heuristic' is very important for the for-
mation of risk perceptions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). By applying this heuristic, 
people judge an event as probable or frequent if instances of it are easy to imagine or re-
member. Since events that happen more often are usually easier to imagine and recall 
than unusual, rare, events, the availability heuristic is often an appropriate cue. However, 
other factors such as a recent disaster can affect 'availability’ and thus distort risk judg-
ments. Several studies identified errors caused by using this heuristic (Lichtenstein et al., 
1978). Research demonstrates that the people's judgments are moderately accurate in a 
global sense but there is also evidence that shows serious misjudgments reflecting the 
availability bias. For example, rare causes of death are often overestimated by lay people 
and common causes of death are underestimated. Another example, discussed in the study 
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by Lichtenstein et al. (1978), is that homicides were perceived more frequent than diabe-
tes or stomach cancer. These biasing effects of memorability and imaginability present a 
barrier to open, objective discussion of risk (Slovic, 2000). 
Other significant heuristics are the 'confirmation heuristic' and the 'overconfi-
dence heuristic'. Once a person forms an opinion, the 'confirmation heuristic' can result in 
a situation where new evidence is misinterpreted or altered in order to support the initial 
conclusion. For people who apply the 'confirmation heuristic', new evidence regarding 
the issue of GCC only will appear reliable if it is consistent with one's initial beliefs 
(Slovic et al., 1984; Department of Health (UK), 1997). For example ambiguous data 
may be interpreted as a confirmation. Furthermore, contrary evidence may be filtered out 
because they are perceived as unreliable, erroneous, or unrepresentative.  The 'overconfi-
dence heuristic', on the other hand, suggests that people often have too much confidence 
in their own judgments (Slovic et al., 1981; Department of Health (UK), 1997). Research 
suggests that overconfidence can prevent the public to realize how little they know about 
GCC and how much additional information they need regarding the risks, threats, and 
possible adaptation and mitigation strategies (Slovic, 2000).  
Thus, if the heuristics are invalid for the risk faced they can lead to large and per-
sistent biases, thus impacting public risk assessment, judgment and policy preferences. 
This study will advance this theory by examining those perceptual factors that influence 
the public's risk perception of GCC and affect the level of awareness and concern, per-
sonal behavior, and climate policy support. Another theory scrutinized is that lay people 
dealing with uncertainties tend to over- or underrate the risks and threats (Slovic, 2000). 
In the case of nuclear power risk perception research shows that the public tends to over-
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rate the risks of radiation leading to large social amplification effects and behavior. This 
research will test if the lay public also over- or underrates the risks and possible impacts 
of GCC. The overrating of GCC risks may result in a pattern of policy preferences differ-
ent than responses for underrated hazard risks. The study will test these relationships. 
Trust. The role of trust is another important aspect that influences risk perception 
(Van de Vusse, 1993; Slovic, 1997; Department of Health (UK), 1997). Trust is a multi-
faceted concept that includes cognitive, affective, and behavioral dimensions (Bradbury 
et al., 1999). Moreover, trust is also a dynamic process taking place at the individual, the 
institutional, and the ideological level (Tait, 2011). Besides building trust through inter-
personal relations, people can also hold trust in organizations and institutions (Hardin, 
2006), or in ideological values and norms (Luhmann, 1979, Blackburn & Simon, 1998). 
These layers in which trust operates are not mutually exclusive (Tait, 2011).  
To date various risk communication programs in Europe and the US only show 
limited effectiveness (Cvetkovich & Loefstedt, 1999). Research shows that the failure of 
risk communication are significantly influenced by the public's trust in the communicator 
and in the ability of certain individuals, industries , or institutions responsible for risk 
management  (Renn & Levine, 1991; Kasperson et al., 1992; Nye, 1997). In most cir-
cumstances, new information is first judged based on the credibility of its source (De-
partment of Health (UK), 1997). If there is no trust in the source, any message is likely to 
be disregarded, no matter how well intentioned and well delivered. Impacting the level of 
trust towards risk communicators and risk managers are factors such as perceived compe-
tence, objectivity, fairness, consistency, and goodwill. Especially in areas characterized 
by high uncertainties, as in GCC, trust plays a vital role in the success if risk communica-
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tion and implementation of policies. Moreover, trust is not only a necessary precondition 
for successful GCC communication but it can also be improved by well-developed com-
munication strategies (Misztal, 1996). Trust in organizations whose risk management pol-
icies impact communities and the environment is vital in order to reduce complexity and 
generate social cooperation (Cvetkovich & Loefstedt, 1999). Therefore, the theory tested 
in the context of GCC is that distrust of certain individuals, industries, scientists, or insti-
tutions responsible for GCC risk management is strongly linked to the level of risk per-
ceived (Bord & O'Connor, 1990; Slovic et al., 1991; Mushkatel & Pijawka, 1992). 
Social values. Social values are another aspect that impacts risk perception as 
well as risk acceptance (Slovic, 1987). The important role of social values became appar-
ent when studies of risk perception showed that exaggerated public concern was not just a 
result of the public's ignorance or irrationality (Slovic, 2000). Instead, the public's reac-
tion to risk could be linked to sensitivity to technical, social and psychological qualities 
of hazards that were not well or at all communicated in technical risk assessments. For 
example, qualities such as uncertainty in risk assessments, perceived inequity in the dis-
tribution of risks and benefits, and aversion to being exposed to risk that were involun-
tary, not under one's control, or dreaded. Cultural theorists argue that our world-views 
and our values play an important role in public risk perception and behavior (Douglas, 
1966 & 1970; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Douglas et al., 1998). Thus, worldviews and 
values have a strong impact on how the risk and threats of GGC are perceived and to 
what degree different strategies are supported (Hulme, 2009; Kahan et al., 2011). For in-
stance, members of the Republican Party tend to hold more conservative values com-
pared to their counterparts in the Democratic Party. As a result, republicans are often 
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more skeptical towards the concept of human induced climate change and view policy 
measures as regulatory burdens and thus are less likely to support any  GCC policies.  
Social amplification. Another aspect complicating how people perceive, evaluate 
and act on GCC risk is 'the social amplification of risk' concept (Hulme, 2009). ' Social 
amplification of risk'  (Kasperson et al., 1988) implies that risks are communicated 
through different signals such as images, signs, and symbols. By interacting with psycho-
logical, institutional or cultural processes in society, these signals can amplify or attenu-
ate the perception of risks and their manageability. The public is embedded in this com-
plex web of interactions where risks are symbolized, translated and interpreted in numer-
ous ways and by multiple actors. This study will advance the theory of social amplifica-
tion by determining where GGC is positioned on the hierarchy of environmental hazards 
in terms of its potential for social amplification. 
Underlying hypotheses. The discussed theories test different hypotheses guiding 
the research of this study. The hypotheses are based on the existing body of knowledge in 
the areas of risk communication and risk perception. Chapter 2 provides a detailed dis-
cussion of the existing literature in these two areas. These hypotheses guide the complex 
data analysis necessary for most of the research questions. Furthermore the insights 
gained, provide the means for answering these research questions and to accomplish the 
overall purpose of this study. The underlying hypotheses of the research questions are as 
follows: 
1. The public’s perceptions of GCC in terms of threat and risk, saliency of the issue, 
trust in GCC information, and acceptable public strategies vary among countries 
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2. The public’s general support for mitigation and adaption policies is linked to  the 
way they perceive 1) the level of consequences from possible environmental 
changes and 2) the general level of threat resulting from GCC 
3. The general attitude and public risk perceptions of GCC can be largely explained 
by socio-economic variables 
4. The public’s perception towards climate change is the main reason for the 1) low 
policy support, 2) willingness to pay for GCC policies, and 3)willingness to 
change their behavior related to mitigation and adaptation     
Research Justification  
Existing research suggests that many people do not have a full understanding of 
the issues inherent in global climate change. A significant part of the public is not aware 
of the precise nature, causes, and possible negative impacts of global climate change. De-
spite its widespread media coverage (Bostrom et al., 1994), lay mental models of global 
climate change suffer from several basic misconceptions (Bostrom et al., 1994; Kempton 
et al., 1995; Bord et al., 1998; Lorenzoni et al., 2005; Leiserowitz, 2010). Misconcep-
tions, such as that GHG emissions are just a form of air pollution (Kempton 1991; 
Brenchin, 2003; Lorenzoni et al., 2005), result in the public support for the wrong poli-
cies. For example, many people believe and support traditional pollution controls are the 
solution to decrease GHG emissions. However, actions such as filters and strengthening 
pollution controls do not stop GHG emissions leading to global climate change (Prinn et 
al., 2005). Climate change communication can help to advance public understanding of 
the issue of global climate change, inform them about possible solutions, emphasize the 
impact of personal choices and behavior, and encourage public deliberation resulting in 
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support for adaptation and mitigation policies and measurements (Leiserowitz, 2005; 
Smith, 2005; Moser, 2006; Frumkin & McMichael, 2008; Ockwell et al., 2009).  Howev-
er, for improved or enhanced communication broader and deeper knowledge of the pub-
lic's risk perception and cultural values are needed.  
Today, only a limited number of risk and GCC communication programs exist and 
past efforts have not been successful (Kempton 1997, Moser, 2006, Lorenzoni, 2007). To 
this point no trustworthy communication strategies exists, which functions as a basis for 
developing GCC communication programs. More research is needed!  So far, communi-
cation strategies and programs are not very effective in creating a better and widely 
shared understanding of the climate change issue among the public, increasing the public 
support for climate policies, establishing a sense of urgency, or fostering behavioral 
changes (Wardekker, 2004). One important shortcoming of past climate change commu-
nication efforts was the fact that they were not tailored towards particular audiences, thus 
disregarding aspects such as social values  or cultural characteristics (Kahan et al., 2011). 
Instead, past communication efforts mostly focused only on the science and overall im-
pacts of GCC (Moser, 2006). Research also shows that GCC communication programs 
fail due to the lack of incorporating knowledge about risk perceptions including questions 
on trust, how science is converged, moral issues, uncertainties, the nature of the threat, 
and other factors (Wardekker, 2004). 
Therefore, this study looks at the public risk perception of GCC in different coun-
tries while focusing on various key topics important to the design and implementation of 
communication programs. Furthermore this research will test various theories discussed 
earlier in the field of heuristics, trust, social and cultural factors, social amplification, and 
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risk communication. Thus, add to the body of knowledge regarding the psychometric 
paradigm and the theory of bounded rationality. This will enable the development of 
communication programs which are tailored to the particular audience acknowledging 
their level of awareness, actual knowledge, degree of concern, perceived risk, and other 
central factors.  
Theoretical Framework 
Based on the existing literature a theoretical framework was developed (Figure1) 
to answer the research questions as well as to test the underlying hypotheses. The frame-
work centers on the importance of psychometric and other factors that impact the public's 
risk perceptions of GGC and its role in behavior and policy. 
As shown in Figure 1, global climate change forces policy makers to continuously 
develop and implement adaptation and mitigation policies. In order to implement these 
strategies successfully the risks of GCC and the responding policies need to be communi-
cated to a public in a way that ensures their support. As noted before, it is crucial for the 
success of any GCC policy that the public supports is and is willing to commit to behav-
ioral and policy changes. Nevertheless, communication efforts can only be successful if 
they incorporate the factors in public risk perceptions. Therefore, the theoretical frame-
work in this study supports the argument that different mediating factors impact the pub-
lic's perceptions towards GGC communication and risk. These factors are categorized 
into the three different groups - 'GGC Events', 'Psychometric Factors', and 'Uncertainty of 
GGC' and are displayed in the center of Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Theoretical Framework of this Dissertation Research             Own Illustration 
As illustrated in the upper right corner of the theoretical framework, in addition to 
the mediating factors individuals' own risk assessment is also a factor that impacts the 
personal perception of GCC risks and the successfulness of communication programs. 
Based on the perceived risk the public assesses the personal risk resulting from GCC and 
decides whether or not they are willing to support important climate policies and change 
their behavior. Nevertheless, even the best-designed communication programs, based on 
the strongest social and decision science produce only best guesses about how to formu-
late messages (Pidgeon & Fischhoff, 2011). Thus, empirical testing is always needed on 
order to determine how effective the current communication strategy is (Moser, 2010). 
This is represented by the feedback loop shown at the bottom of Figure 1. Yet, despite the 
critical importance of climate change communication, such evaluations are remarkably 
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rare. Instead, most communications rely on intuitive notions of what to say and how to 
say it. A scientific approach to communication science, however, requires the systematic 
feedback provided by empirical evaluation (Moser, 2010).  
In order to test the mediating factors and support the validity of the proposed the-
oretical framework the study has completed an international public survey of nine coun-
tries. The 9 countries include: the United States, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Spain, Germa-
ny, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Japan. The collected survey data allows 
analyzing the public's risk perceptions of GCC, their willingness to support climate poli-
cies, and their readiness to commit to behavioral changes. This provides vital information 
for the feedback loop, which supports policy makers and communicators to evaluate 
whether or not implemented policies and communication programs are successful or need 
to be improved. The survey instruments as well as the other research methods applied are 




The following literature review is divided into four main sections with various 
thematic subsections providing an overview of the body of knowledge in the areas of risk 
perception and communication relevant to the issues of global climate change in the con-
text of the study’s questions. The literature review first provides an overview of the histo-
ry and key foundational literature on risk perception and risk communication research. 
The second part focuses specifically on the public’s risk perception of and attitudes to-
wards global climate change. This section is followed by an in depth discussion of the 
gap between the science and recommendations provided by the scientific community on 
the one hand, and the still strong public dissension over climate change on the other. The 
final part addresses the existing body of knowledge in terms of how existing climate 
change communication efforts, especially by the mass media, have enforced misconcep-
tions, skepticism, and reluctance to act among the lay public. 
Literature Background  
Since the beginning of the 1980s the body of knowledge has grown considerably 
in the fields of risk perception and risk communication (Slovic et al., 1981; Slovic, 1987 
& 2000; Wardekker, 2004). A major reason for this increase in knowledge was due to in-
dustrialists and regulators who recognized that the public believes that they are faced 
with more risk today than in the past and that levels of risk will continue to increase in 
the future (Slovic, 1997). 
Studies done in the fields of geography, sociology, political science, anthropology, 
and psychology contributed significantly to the current understanding of risk perception 
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(Slovic, 2000).  Whereas geographical research first focused on examining the human 
behavior faced by natural hazards, studies addressing risk perception and behavior later 
included technological hazards as well (Burton et al., 1978). Sociologists (Short, 1984) 
and anthropologists (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) discovered that perceptions and ac-
ceptance of risk are embedded in social and cultural factors. Short (1984) pointed out that 
the social influences impacting the response to hazards are mainly transmitted by friends, 
family, fellow workers and respected public officials. Research within the field of psy-
chology regarding risk assessment and perception started with empirical studies address-
ing probability assessment, utility assessment and decision-making processes (Edwards, 
1961). 
Risk communication first focused on public misconceptions regarding risk 
(Wardekker, 2004). Initially not much attention was paid towards the public's perceptions, 
instead only the expert's estimates were acknowledged (Department of health (UK), 
1997).  During this time, the typical method for risk communication was to 'put risk into 
perspective' and long lists of numerous risk comparisons were created (Slovic, 1987; De-
partment of Health (UK), 1997; Wardekker, 2004). These comparisons, however, can be 
misleading, dissatisfying, and are difficult to use responsibly and effectively. Therefore, 
such comparative lists can be counterproductive (Freudenberg & Rursch, 1994) and even 
threaten the credibility of the risk communicator (Slovic, 2000). In time, researchers 
started to acknowledge the importance of lay risk perception and studies began to exam-
ine what actually does cause public concern and why (Slovic, 1987; Department of 
Health (UK), 1997). 
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 Since the 1980s, the growing body of knowledge shows that perceived risk is 
both quantifiable and predictable ( Slovic, 1987; Gaerling & Golledge, 1993) and that 
psychometric techniques are applicable to identify similarities as well as differences re-
garding risk perceptions and attitudes among groups (Slovic, 2000; Simmons, 2007).  
Moreover, research shows that the concept of 'risk' means different things to different 
people. 
Risk Communication efforts are often needed to present and simplify complex 
technical material, influenced by uncertainty, and difficult for laypersons to understand 
(Slovic, 1986). Thus, in order to enhance successful programs, communicators must gain 
a good understanding of the limitations of current scientific risk assessment and the idio-
syncrasies of the human mind. In particular, it is important to realize that the public's risk 
perceptions are rooted in theoretical models based on assumptions and subjective judg-
ments.  Thus, incomplete assumptions and judgments most likely result in inaccurate risk 
assessments or perceptions. 
Furthermore, even when faced with solid evidence through information and edu-
cational programs, research shows that people's beliefs change slowly and disagreements 
about risk do not automatically disappear (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Strong initial views are 
resistant to change; because once they are formed they influence how subsequent infor-
mation is interpreted. Thus, new evidence appears reliable and informative if it is con-
sistent with one's initial beliefs; contrary evidence on the other hand, is likely to be 
viewed as unreliable, erroneous, or unrepresentative (Wardekker, 2004).  
However, if people do not have strong prior opinions the situation is quite differ-
ent. In that case, these persons are deeply influenced by the way the risk is formulated 
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and presented to them (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). The fact that subtle differences in 
how risks are presented can have marked effects suggests that those responsible for in-
formation programs have considerable ability to manipulate perceptions and behavior. 
This possibility raises ethical problems that must be addressed by any responsible risk-
information program (Wardekker, 2004). 
Taken as a whole, insights gained by researching public risk perception have im-
portant implications for communication efforts (Slovic, 1987). The public's basic concep-
tualization of risk does reveal important concerns to communicators, which experts tend 
to overlook in their risk assessment (Renn, 1991). Relying on statistics alone is not 
enough for guiding personal or public decision policies. Instead,  risk perception is not 
only determined by accident  probabilities, annual mortality rates, or mean loses of life 
expectancy, but also by numerous other characteristics of hazards such as uncertainty, 
controllability, catastrophic potential, equity and threat to future generations (Wardekker, 
2004). The classic risk perception factors (Slovic et al., 1981; Slovic, 1987) can be orga-
nized into different dimensions and are as follows: 
 Dread Risk 
o Controllability, Dread, Global/not-global catastrophic, Fatal/not-fatal con-
sequences, Equity, Catastrophic/individual High/low risk to future genera-
tions, Easily/not-easily reduced, Risk increasing/decreasing, Volun-
tary/involuntary, Clarity and importance of expected benefits, Harmful in-
tentionality, Inescapable by taking personal precautions, Man-made rather 
than natural sources 
 Unknown Risk 
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o Observable/not-observable, Known/unknown to those exposed, Effects 
immediate/delayed, Old/new risk, Risks known/unknown to science, Con-
tradictory statements from responsible sources 
 Exposure 
o Number of people exposed to the risk, Personal exposure, Identifiable ra-
ther than anonymous victims 
 Other 
o Probability of undesired consequences 
Research suggests that risk perception factors belonging to the area of  'Dread 
Risk' have the biggest impact on what risks are considered as high, why people want a 
risk reduced, and why they call for strict regulation (Slovic, 1987). For example the loca-
tion of nuclear facilities falls into this category, whereas GCC can be considered to most 
people as an unknown risk.   
Public Perceptions of GCC  
The existing body of knowledge in the field of public perception regarding global 
climate change has been growing considerably. Research shows that risk perception has a 
significant impact on individual and group behavior and thus needs to be considered 
when developing global climate change policies and strategies (Slovic, 2000). Neverthe-
less, global climate change perception is still a relatively new survey topic. The existing 
body of literature also suggests that perceptions change over time due to factors such as 
extreme events, amount of media coverage or level of reporting, economic conditions, 
scientific information, values and worldviews, among other factors.  
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In contrast to the very limited number of studies on climate change perceptions at 
the international level there is a significant body of knowledge available for the United 
States. Although no formal national assessment exists in terms of the public perception of 
global climate change, numerous representative scientific studies and different opinion 
polls do provide important insights. The first surveys in the United States were conducted 
in the early 1980s, but strong public interest did not emerge before 1988 (Bord et al., 
1998).  The key year was 1988 for the development of public concern for global climate 
change for two reasons. First, at that time, the United States was hit by a severe drought 
and heat wave. Second, and even more important, James Hansen, who at the time was the 
director of NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies, gave testimony before Congress 
that global climate change had begun. As a result, more empirical studies were conducted 
and media coverage as well as public interest increased in the United States. 
Overall, the existing body of GCC research and the perception surveys supports 
the argument that the American public is aware of global climate change, believes that it 
is real, and is highly concerned about it (Leiserowitz et al., 2005 & 2010; Ockwell et al., 
2009; DEFRA, 2002 &2007; Dessai et al., 2004; Seacrast et al., 2000; Henry, 2000; Bord 
et al., 1998; Read et al., 1994; Bostrom et al., 1994). However, research also identified 
contradictions in American climate change risk perception and policy preferences 
(Rosenstone et al., 1997; O'Connor, 1999; Moser, 2006; Leiserowitz et al., 2010). On the 
one hand, the US public strongly supports a range of national and international policies to 
mitigate global climate change; on the other hand, several carbon tax proposals are 
strongly opposed. Thus, the public indeed largely supports policy action at the national 
and international scale, but resists tax policies that directly affect them.  At this juncture, 
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very little is known about the level of public acceptance and willingness to support cli-
mate change policies and possible international differences. However, having such 
knowledge would point out key areas communication programs would need in order to 
increase public support for GGC policies developed in their own country and internation-
ally. Therefore this study will test, public support and acceptance for a set of adaptation 
and mitigation strategies in different countries as well as their willingness to commit to 
behavioral changes. 
Furthermore existing data suggests that that current public engagement with glob-
al climate change is low. Despite the clear implication of mitigation strategies for indi-
vidual values, choices, and behaviors the demand for energy for domestic use and trans-
portation is increasing in many developed countries (DEFRA, 2008). Moreover, pro-
environmental behavior as a response to the causes and possible negative impacts are 
even more limited (Maibach et al., 2009; O’Neil & Hulme, 2009; Whitmarsh 2009). We 
now know that only a limited number of people are willing to do more than advance do-
mestic energy conservation and even less are prepared to take actions to adapt to climate 
change.  
Risk perception literature draws from the concept 'locus of control', which refers 
to the extent to which individuals believe that they control events that affect them (Rotter, 
1966). For many hazards the public feels that applicable strategies exist in which they can 
be engaged in. However, GCC is characterized by high uncertainties, unfamiliar risks, 
and other characteristics of hazards which make personal connections and engagement 
difficult. This if further emphasized by the fact that GCC is more and more  considered as 
a ‘Black Swan’  (Taleb, 2010; Winston, 2010, Curry 2011a). According to Nassim Nicho-
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las Taleb (2007) Black Swan rare events are characterized by high uncertainties, are un-
anticipated, and lead to misconceptions among the lay public. The theory was developed 
to explain “1) the disproportionate role of high impact, hard to predict, and rare events 
that are beyond the realm of normal expectations in history, science, finance and technol-
ogy, 2) the non-computability of the probability of the consequential rare events using 
scientific methods, 3) the psychological biases that make people individually and collec-
tively blind to uncertainty and unaware of the massive role of the rare event in historical 
affairs (Curry, 2011b).  
In fact the argument can be made that the issue of  GCC includes two Black 
Swans (Winston, 2010). The first Black Swan is GCC climate change itself with all its 
uncertainties, misconceptions, and the clear gab between the recommendations provided 
by the scientific community and public attitude and behavior. The second Black Swan is 
the global effort necessary to successfully mitigate and adapt to GCC. The policies need-
ed and behavioral changes required to reduce GCC will require a fundament shift away 
from today’s business-,policies, and lifestyle-models. If and how the necessary policies 
will ever developed and implemented is very uncertain, especially since past global GCC 
treaties have mostly failed. Many hope that effective communication efforts can foster a 
personal connection to GCC, raise the level of concern, and thus increase the level of 
support for mitigation and adaptation policies as well as the willingness among the public 
to engage in a more sustainable behavior.  
In the case of the United States,  existing surveys show that although concern 
about climate change has increased over the past two decades, climate change is still con-
sidered a low priority in the context of other issues American society is confronted with 
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today  (Leiserowitz et al., 2005 & 2010;  Ockwell et al., 2009; DEFRA, 2002 &2007;  
Dessai et al., 2004; Seacrast et al., 2000; Henry, 2000; Bord et al., 1998; Read et al., 
1994; Bostrom et al., 1994) . Americans regard both the environment and climate change 
as relatively low national priorities (Dunlap & Scarcce, 1991; Bord et al., 1998; Leiser-
owitz et al., 2005, 2010, Ockwell et al., 2009). For example, in a 2000 Gallup poll, the 
environment ranked 16th on Americans' list of most important problems facing the coun-
try today (Dunlap & Saad, 2001). Moreover, global climate change ranked 12th out of 13 
environmental issues, just below urban sprawl. Thus, Americans seem to be highly con-
cerned about global climate change as an individual issue, yet think it is less important 
than nearly all other national or environmental issues comparatively. Leiserowitz (2005) 
states that the low standing of global climate change as a public concern reflects a wide-
spread public perception that the issue is removed in space and time. Ockwell et al. 
(2009) adhere to the same conclusion, arguing that the American public believes global 
climate change will primarily affect future generations and less developed countries. Fur-
thermore, public concern for global climate change is influenced by various and serious 
uncertainties, public misconceptions, miscommunication, and by  competition for agenda 
seeking attention on an overwhelming socio-environmental agenda (Seacrest et al., 2000; 
Leiserowitz, 2005; Smith, 2005; Moser 2006; Kempton, 1991; Lorenzoni et al., 2005). As 
a result, the concept of "dangerous" global climate change is not only contested among 
scientists and policy makers but among the American public as well.  
Gaps between Scientific & Public Understanding of GCC 
The existing literature presents different explanations for the public dissensus 
over climate change, especially considering the broad consensus among the scientific 
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community regarding the reality and risks of GCC. The predominant ways in which the 
public tends to think about the issue of global climate change increases the likelihood of 
systematic misunderstandings (Weber & Stern, 2011). For example, people who rely on 
personal experience to determine the likelihood and level of threat of global climate 
change can easily underestimate or overstate the real risks (Weber, 1997). Furthermore, 
due to the complexity and uncertainties of climate change, mental models are often incor-
rectly applied in the context of global climate change (Bostrom, 1994). Instead of making 
judgments based on scientific evidence, decision making processes are often driven by 
affect, values, or worldviews (Slovic, 1987). 
The different reasons for the controversy over GCC and the gap between scien-
tific and public understanding, relevant to this study, can be categorized into two different 
groups. These two groups are ‘lay mental models and misconceptions’ and ‘worldviews 
and cultural values’. The following paragraphs provide an in-depth discussion of the ex-
isting body of knowledge in these two areas.  
Lay mental models & misconceptions. According to several studies, the public 
may not be totally aware of the causes of GCC and have misconceptions of what GCC is, 
many distrust the science of GCC,  or believe it is not an urgent topic, but distant in time 
and space (Hartley et al., 2011; Pidgeon & Fischoff 2011; Unger 2000). Surveys show 
that many Americans believe the GCC impacts other populations in other countries but 
not in the United States. Furthermore, only a small number among the US public con-
nects GCC to direct health impacts. This demonstrates a clear gap between lay modes and 
expert assessments illustrated in the current IPCC reports (2007) or the report published 
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by the U.S. Global Change Research Program (Thomas et al., 2009) which focuses spe-
cifically on GCC impacts in the United States. 
The existing body of knowledge, for the United States, shows that lay mental 
models of global climate change suffer from numerous misconceptions. This can be ex-
plained by misunderstandings of the science underlying global climate change (Lorenzoni 
et al., 2005). According to Kempton (1991), new information on global climate change is 
categorized by the public into four concepts or mental models. The most popular misbe-
lieve is that global climate change is caused by increased ultraviolet light entering the at-
mosphere due to stratospheric ozone depletion. Although some interdependencies exist, 
these are only secondary, tertiary, or lesser effects. In addition, many public beliefs about 
ozone depletion are false or incomplete. For example, survey participants blamed aerosol 
for GCC despite the fact that they have been banned in the USA for decades. Whereas the 
ozone hole is a well-established concept in the American public consciousness, the 
greenhouse effect is only being recognized as a subset of the ozone hole phenomenon. 
Another popular misconception is that GHG emissions are just a form of air pollution 
(Kempton 1991; Brenchin, 2003; Lorenzoni et al., 2005). As a result, many people be-
lieve and support traditional pollution controls as the solution to increasing GHG emis-
sions. However, actions such as filters and strengthening pollution controls alone do not 
stop global climate change. The air pollution model focuses on industrial smokestacks 
and vehicle sources, which are a major source of GHG emissions.  
However, by applying this mental model to global climate change, the public does 
not recognize the negative impact from seemingly nonpolluting sources such as farming, 
ranching, or leaking refrigeration (Kempton 1991). The third concept, plant photosynthe-
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sis, also plays an important role in the public's misconception of global climate change. 
The majority of survey participants in several studies (Bostrom et al., 1994; Read et al., 
1994 Kempton 1991, 1997; Henry, 2000) showed a sufficient understanding of the con-
cept that trees absorb CO2 and produce oxygen. This knowledge, combined with increas-
ing media reports of forest destruction, led to the misconception that all atmospheric oxy-
gen could be exhausted due to deforestation. Consequently, fighting deforestation is 
among the most popular policy responses to mitigate and adapt to global climate change 
(Henry, 2000; Leiserowitz, 2006; DEFRA 2007).  
However, the contribution of growing plants to atmospheric oxygen is almost en-
tirely offset by the decay of plants after their death. To increase atmospheric oxygen, dead 
plants would have to be buried before decomposing (Kempton, 1991). The fourth im-
portant misconception is that people underestimate the temperature change required for 
severe climate induced effects (Kempton, 1991, 1997; Seacrest et al., 2000; Dessai et al., 
2004; Leiserowitz, 2006). To many Americans, an average temperature rise of less than 
10°F does not seem very harmful, because they are familiar with high winter to summer 
temperature swings and major geographical differences in temperature. Because climate 
change impacts occur with small temperature changes, the public may not feel a high ur-
gency to develop and support mitigation or adaptation strategies for global climate 
change. Knowledge of the misconceptions and public imagery within a country is im-
portant in order to develop effective communication programs on an international and 
national scale.  
Worldviews & cultural values. Worldviews and values can have a strong impact 
on how the risks and threats of global climate change are perceived by the public (Slovic, 
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2000; Hulme, 2009; Kahan et al., 2011) and thus influence policy support and the will-
ingness to commit to behavioral changes. Research in this field, however, is still very 
theoretical based and not many studies providing empirical data for validation are availa-
ble at this point. The existing literature argues that perceptions of risks, such as those re-
lated to GCC, are socially constructed and can vary by culture, human development, af-
fluence, national experience with risks, and demographics (Slovic, 2000). Furthermore, 
cultural theorists argue that our world-views and our values play an important role in 
public risk perception and behavior (Douglas, 1966 & 1970; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; 
Douglas et al., 1998).   
More recently, several studies support the argument that an insufficient level of 
knowledge, the inability to asses technical information by the lay public, or the resulting 
reliance on inappropriate cognitive heuristics, do not explain the gap between  the science 
and the public (Weber & Stern, 2011; Kahan et al., 2011; Kahan, 2010; Verwij et al., 
2006). These studies acknowledge that public understanding of GCC needs improvement, 
but emphasize that the issue is not illiteracy among the lay public. Instead, people who 
doubt the reality of human induced climate change and its negative impacts don’t lack 
knowledge but have a different understanding of the topic and thus interpret scientific 
results differently.   
Worldwide, awareness of GCC is growing and is penetrating further into sociopo-
litical and cultural life. As a result, understanding how belief systems and perceptions 
impact public discussions of global climate change and possible responses become in-
creasingly important. Research suggests that disagreements about the issue of GCC exist 
because people view their responsibilities to future generations differently, value humans 
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and nature in different ways, have different attitudes to climate risk, and are influenced 
by cultural cognition (Douglas & Wildavski, 1982). The theory of cultural cognition im-
plies that the individual’s risk perception of GCC is formed and reinforced by values that 
they have in common with others. Thus, proponents of this school of thought argue that 
the disagreements over GCC are in fact a conflict between groups that are separated by 
more general opposing perceptions of environmental and technological risks based on 
their members cultural outlooks (Verweij et al., 2006; Kahan, 2010).  
A recent empirical study by Kahan et al. (2011) shows that high scientific literacy 
and numeracy among the lay public can enforce cultural polarization and widen the gap 
between  social groups with opposing worldviews and values. The data suggest that peo-
ple who dismiss the reality or dangers of GCC based on their values become even more 
dismissive. On the other hand, people who already believed in human-induced GCC and 
were concerned about possible negative impacts became even more concerned after being 
exposed to scientific literature. Overall, the study participants with high levels of scien-
tific literacy were somewhat more likely to dismiss the seriousness of GCC compared to 
people with lower levels. Thus, instead of believing in GGC and supporting adaptation 
and mitigation policies, public misconceptions of GGC risks are most likely enforced as 
they become more knowledgeable. In order to improve the public’s attitude towards GCC 
policies and their willingness to commit to behavioral changes, communication efforts 
cannot focus on presenting knowledge alone (National Research Council, 2005; Weber & 
Stern, 2011) 
This study aims to advance the theory, through empirical evidence, that we disa-
gree about climate change because we have different belief systems (Hulme, 2009) medi-
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ated through culture. Furthermore, the insights gained will improve the understanding to 
what degree mental models, scientific illiteracy and misconception, and cultural values 
effect GGC risk perception, behavior, and policy support.  
Climate Change Communication 
Although, the field of climate change communication research is still relatively 
young (NRC, 2010a), studies have already identified key aspects, guiding principles and 
barriers to improving communication and education efforts (Leiserowitz, 2005; Smith, 
2005; Moser, 2006; Frumkin & McMichael, 2008; Ockwell et al., 2009). 
Guiding principles & barriers. The so-called ‘information deficit model’, as-
sumes that the people are ‘empty vessels’ waiting to be filled with information which will 
propel them into rational action, has impacted much communication efforts (Irwin & 
Wynne, 1996). Current research, however, criticizes this approach as inappropriate and 
ineffective (Whitmarsh et al., 2009).  These communication efforts do not take into ac-
count the heterogeneous nature of the public. As discussed above, public groups can dif-
fer in their values and have diverse resources which make them interpret and use infor-
mation differently (Kahan et al., 2011; Weber & Stern, 2011). Therefore, an important 
reason why people disagree about climate change is not that they do not understand cur-
rent communication programs. Instead, communication programs fail to acknowledge 
that an individual’s position to climate change represents certain values and worldviews 
that separate different cultural groups from one another (Kahan et al., 2011).  
This is not to say that education is not part of an effective public communication 
effort but rather that it should be based on elements such as an understanding of individu-
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als’ existing knowledge, their concerns, worldviews and values, and their abilities to react 
to the challenges of global climate change. Moreover, disregarding these elements can 
increase the public dissensus over climate change and decrease support for climate 
change policies. Communication strategies should be designed with great caution since 
people tend to dismiss information which is contrary to their worldview as a direct assault 
on their values and the competence of the persons they trust (Kahan et al., 2011).    
In her study,  "Talk of the city: engaging urbanities on climate change" Susanne 
Moser (2006) addresses questions about key audiences, appropriate messengers, framings 
and messages, reception of climate change information, and the choice of communication 
mediums and formats to achieve different communication and engagement goals. The 
author argues that past global climate change communication efforts were not tailored 
towards a particular audience, but only focused on the science and overall impacts. Moser 
explains that editors, scientists, and policy makers alike always have to ask themselves 
who the audience is they are trying to communicate with. Moser shows that it is im-
portant to choose appropriate language and frames to talk about the issue of global cli-
mate change and possible mitigation or adaptation policies and strategies. Moser defines 
effective climate change communication as "any form of public engagement that actually 
facilitates an intended behavioral, organizational, political and other social change con-
sistent with identified mitigation and adaptation goals". Moser (2006) concludes that in-
formation or knowledge is not enough to change someone's behavior. Instead, the key 
challenge of effective communication is to motivate the public to begin and sustain the 
required behavioral changes. 
34 
The role of the mass media & the scientific community. The existing body of 
knowledge points to the mass media as a significant contributor to the current dissensus 
over global climate change, especially in the United States (Antilla, 2005 & 2010; 
Leiserowitz, 2005; Nelkin 1995; Boykoff, 2004; Smith, 2005). Mass Media, however, is 
simultaneously also considered a key part of successfully communicating GCC and in-
crease public policy support. Research shows that the way the public perceives GGC is 
strongly influenced by how and to what degree the media communicates the existing sci-
entific knowledge (Wilkins, 1993; Mazur and Lee, 1993; Mormont and Dasnoy, 1995; 
Trumbo, 1996; Brulle et al., 2010). 
Leiserowitz (2005) links the recent decline of public concern over GCC to the 
way global climate change is presented in the mass media. His and similar studies point 
out that since 1988, when global climate change was a front-page story, television net-
work coverage declined by 50% and national newspaper coverage dropped by 25% 
(Frame Works Institute, 2001). The severe drought, the heat wave, and James Hansen's 
testimony before Congress in 1988 led to a dramatization and amplification of the topic 
by the media and environmental groups, and concern peaked in 1998 (Bord et al., 1998). 
Simultaneously, scientific journals increasingly emphasize the uncertainty in global cli-
mate change predictions and public interest faded with the onset of cooler, wetter sum-
mers (Unger, 1992; Smith, 2005). 
Not only the amount of media coverage is important, however, but the way global 
climate change is presented is significant as well. The different sources for potential 
shortcomings of GCC communication by the media can be traced back to the actual pro-
fessional norms journalists rely on (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2007). These norms can be 
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grouped into first- and second-order journalistic norms and can lead to the misrepresenta-
tion of the science behind GCC and thus spark an informational bias regarding anthropo-
genic climate change. First-order journalistic norms include personalization, dramatiza-
tion and novelty, whereas secondary norms consist of authority-order and balance. 
According to Gans (1979), due to the first-order journalistic norm of personaliza-
tion the media tends to focus on individuals instead on group dynamics or social process-
es. Therefore, in the context of GCC, the focus on individuals affected by impacts of 
GCC the media shifts the public attention only to a small part of GCC enforcing the gen-
eral public’s believe that climate change is an issue removed in time and space.  Further-
more, by focusing on short-term events and often disregarding the causes or long-term 
trends the media encourages public misconceptions and skepticism towards anthropogen-
ic GCC (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2007).  
The second first-order norm, dramatization, is also very important for understand-
ing the media’s reporting on GCC. In order to increase reader- or viewership the media 
tends to focus on only current and highly visible crisis instead of providing a broader and 
complete representation of the issue, the causes, or the solutions (Wilkins & Paterson, 
1987, Sheppard, 2012). As previously discussed in chapter 4 the survey data show that 
people tend to believe that GCC is in general a serious threat but not necessarily to them-
selves, but to plants and animals as well as to people in other countries. The media often 
disregards GCC impacts that are less visible or dramatic because of the lack of excite-
ment or controversy. Simultaneously, the limited media coverage addressing potential 
solutions is often rather simplistic focusing on high profile policies such as wind turbines 
or electric vehicles, while disregarding lesser known solutions with similar or even higher 
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benefits. In addition the often complicated scientific language behind GCC and high de-
grees on uncertainties makes it very difficult for journalists to report on global climate 
change while conforming to the dramatization norm (Ungar, 2000). As a result, the in-
complete coverage of GCC makes it difficult for the public to recognize the connections 
between the impacts and causes, as well as positive solutions they should be considering. 
Instead, GCC is often perceived as an issue removed in time and space which does not 
require immediate action.  
The final first-order norm, novelty, also represents significant barrier to adequate 
and comprehensive GCC communication by the media (Leornard, 1990; Wilson, 2000). 
Journalists are always looking for the new and breaking story which results in a prefer-
ence for covering crisis instead of chronic social or environmental problems such as 
GCC. Thus, the actual causes or long term consequences are often disregarded in today’s 
24 hour news cycle. Furthermore, since GCC is a slowly evolving trend of which many 
of the impacts are not visible yet, it seldom is considered prime-time news material 
(Boykoff, 2011).  
All three of these first-order norms enforce the second-order journalistic norms, 
authority-order and balance, which also pose significant barriers to unbiased reporting on 
GCC. When dealing with complex issues, journalists often rely on the opinions of high-
profile figures such as government officials, business leaders, scientists, and others 
(McManus, 2000; Boykoff & Boykoff, 2007). This can lead to a so called authority-order 
bias where journalist may be relying on experts with their own agendas or even conflict-
ing point of views. In the context of GCC this can result in the unjustified diffusion or 
amplification of public concern influencing public trust in authority figures and policy 
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decision making (Lorenzoni and Pidgeon, 2006; Pidgeon and Gregory, 2004). Therefore, 
journalists need to be cautious when dealing with their sources that they don’t become 
agenda-builders for different interest groups who are trying to use the media as a delivery 
vehicle for their own communication objectives (Driedger, 2008). 
Probably the most influential norm that determines the type of GCC coverage by 
the media is balanced reporting. Unfortunately, this second-order journalistic norm has a 
significant impact on the public’s perception of GCC (Franklin & Blyton, 2011) and en-
forces the public misconception that the reality and dangers of climate change is still 
highly debated within the scientific community (Boykoff, 2008). In general, the goal of 
balanced reporting is to ensure unbiased reporting by giving equal attention to the argu-
ments of all conflicting parties involved (Entman 1989). However, in the context of GCC 
this norm can be a substantial barrier to successful and objective GCC communication. 
By focusing on a balanced coverage of GCC the media gives even consideration to the 
arguments of GGC critiques as to the overwhelming scientific body of evidence that sup-
ports anthropogenic climate change (Nelkin, 1995; Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004).For exam-
ple, a study conducted in the United States (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004) shows that over a 
15 year period the majority of the media reports about GCC gave roughly equal attention 
to the two opposing arguments that a) GCC is caused by human behavior and b) that nat-
ural functions alone can explain the rise in the average global temperature. 
As a result, the media enforces the public misconception that the reality and dan-
gers of climate change is still highly debated within the scientific community (Boykoff, 
2008). This presents a significant barrier to public’s willingness to fully commit to behav-
38 
ioral changes or support climate change policies (Antilla, 2010) and thus needs to be ad-
dressed in future communication efforts. 
 Furthermore, Smith (2005) points out that the notions of danger caused by global 
climate change are significantly mediated by news and other broadcast and published 
sources. Smith argues that the scientific community and policy-makers need to be more 
aware and critical of how global climate change is portrayed in the media. The author 
criticizes that scientists and policy specialists are seemingly concerned and reluctant to 
present their arguments in a news context. Smith believes that scientists are afraid of los-
ing credibility through simplification by the news stations, giving up control of statement 
to editors, and the fear that their amount of work is not being recognized in a short two 
minute news segments. Furthermore, Smith points out an important shortcoming for pre-
senting global climate change in the way news stories are ordered during a broadcast. The 
author states that the organization of topics from local to national to global scales and by 
subject categories makes it difficult for editors to place global climate change. As global 
climate change is characterized by impacting and interacting on and between all spatial 
scales and various categories, the topic is usually placed by editors at a global scale.  
As a result of declining, and inappropriately balanced and conceptualized media 
coverage, the American public is inclined to underestimate possible negative impacts on 
the local scale and therefore do not support adaptation and mitigation strategies to the de-
gree necessary. Furthermore the scientific community has failed as well to communicate 
the effects of GCC in a comprehensive and easy to understand manner to the public or the 
media (Sheppard, 2012). Scientists publish their work in scientific journals which are full 
of terminology the public is unfamiliar with and heavy with information that is often ab-
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stract, complex, remote, depressing, and at times overwhelming. Moreover the way scien-
tists communicate their findings, for example through journal articles, conferences, or 
reports do usually not allow interaction or querying by the lay public. For the public this 
makes personal connections and engagement difficult. As a result the public perceive. 
This study aims, through thematic literature review and survey analysis to identify per-
ceptional factors which need to be considered in future communication efforts to reduce 

















In addition to various thematic literature reviews the methods utilized in this re-
search also consist of survey research and analysis at the national and international level 
to answer the four research questions central to the dissertation topic of GCC public per-
ceptions, policy support, and behavior. The insights gained from the following research 
questions allow for identifying the factors which help to understand the nature of public 
perceptions of global climate change in different countries as well as to identify percep-
tion factors which have a significant impact on the public’s level of support for mitigation 
and adaptation policies, the willingness to commit to behavioral changes, and on the suc-
cess of future communication efforts.  
1. What are the public’s perceptions of GCC in terms of threat and risk, saliency of 
the issue, trust in GCC information, and acceptable public strategies? 
2. What importance do GCC risk perceptions and attitudes play in the public’s will-
ingness to support mitigation and adaptation strategies 
3. How do the public perceptions regarding climate change and attitudes toward 
mitigation and adaptation strategies vary by socioeconomic factors?   
4. What role do levels of knowledge and perceptions of trust and responsibility play 
in the public’s level of support for adaptation and mitigation policies? 
Based on the data that will be collected, this research will identify common 
themes among the nine studied countries in terms of GCC risk perception, attitudes, and 
behavior that can inform and improve communication efforts on the international scale. 
Furthermore, the study will also show differences between countries related to the public 
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perceptions of GCC and its inherent issues. These country specific characteristics need to 
be acknowledged and addressed by communication efforts at the national scale.  
Analytical Framework 
The following describes the study’s analytical framework for the research as 
shown in Figure 2. The study is divided into 4 different phases. Phase 1 includes a com-
prehensive literature review which provides the foundation for the research objectives 
and the rationale for risk perception research on GCC, and it certainly informs us of the 
importance of working with the key variables and questions during the development of 
the survey instrument. Phase 1 also includes the development and of the survey instru-
ment. Phase 2 consists of the data collection by launching the survey in 9 countries. The 
survey instrument and the process of the data collection are discussed in detail in the fol-
lowing sections. After the all data has been collected Phase 3 focuses on the analysis of 
the survey data guided by the four research questions of this study. The statistical meth-
ods applies consist of frequency analysis, cross tabulation, as well as different regressions 
and are discussed in depth together with the underlying hypotheses in last two sections of 
this chapter. The final Phase consists of the discussion and conclusions focusing on the 
goals of this dissertation; identifying the factors which help to understand the nature of 
public perceptions of global climate change in different countries as well as to identify 
perception factors which have a significant impact on the public’s level of support for 
mitigation and adaptation policies, the willingness to commit to behavioral changes, and 
on the success of future communication efforts. Moreover, the newly gained knowledge 
is put into perspective with the existing body of literature and the underlying theories dis-
cussed in chapter 1. 
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Figure 2. Analytical Framework of this Dissertation Research                   Own Illustration 
Literature Analysis  
Throughout this study only literature from scientific books, peer reviewed journal 
articles and reports published by research institutes or governmental organizations are 
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considered. The literature review examines and discusses the underlying theories of risk 
perception and communication related to natural threats and hazards, past climate percep-
tion studies and surveys, and specific climate change literature including issues related to 
hazards perceptions, mitigation, adaptation, and national policies. The purpose of this re-
view is to identify the key areas and questions the survey instrument addresses, such as 
the level of public awareness, knowledge regarding GCC science and impacts, level of 
public concern, perceived risk, trust perceptions, willingness to pay or sacrifice to miti-
gate and adapt to potential negative impacts of global climate change, and sociodemo-
graphic factors. The literature review also provides the theoretical basis for answering the 
six research questions of this study and justifies the research. 
The literature analysis also focuses on risk communication, relevant to the pur-
pose of this study identifying barriers and shortcomings in exiting communication efforts 
impacting GCC public risk perception, attitudes, and behavior. 
Survey Research 
The second phase of the study starts with the implementation of the international 
survey, followed by the analysis of the retrieved data in Phase 3. Survey instruments pre-
sent a valuable tool to capture the public's perceptions towards global climate change 
and, as illustrated in Figure 3, is a key component of this study.  
In this study nine countries are surveyed using internet panels, ensuring a demo-
graphically representative sample for each country. This allows sampling a large popula-
tion, while asking the same questions, thus establishing consistency and collecting stand-
ardized, quantifiable, and empirical comparative data. The internet panels present a cross-
section of all age groups of 18 years and above, gender, income groups, different regions 
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Figure 3. Risk Perception and Survey Research Framework                                Own Illustration 
of the country, and level of education. Relying on internet panels as sampling frames has 
several advantages over other survey methods, such as telephone, mail, or personally ad-
ministered surveys (Fowler, 2008). Email or web based surveys allow coverage of a wide 
geographical area with relatively low costs. In addition, internet surveys allow the partic-
ipants to choose their own time to answer the questions, which can increase the response 
rates (Babbie, 2007). Furthermore, the responding panel members know that they will 
remain anonymous throughout the entire process. It is impossible to link certain answers 
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to certain people since the database only assigns an ID number to each person without 
their name or address. This is very important, since the survey addresses personal feel-
ings, behavior, and knowledge regarding the issue of GCC.  
Nevertheless, there are also some pitfalls which need to be avoided when using 
this internet survey method (O'Leary, 2004, Dillman et al., 2009; Fowler, 2009). The sur-
vey questions have to be well designed and easy to understand, because the respondents 
do not have the opportunity to clarify questions. Furthermore, it is very likely that follow-
up emails need to be sent out; otherwise the response rate can be low. The survey instru-
ment itself needs to avoid complex terms and language or double negatives. Both can 
confuse the participants of the survey. Other pitfalls are created by poorly wording are 
ambiguous and double-barreled questions. Ambiguous questions can happen easily, be-
cause frames of reference can be highly divergent. Double-barreled questions address 
more than one issue, but only ask for one response. In both cases, the answer cannot be 
analyzed beyond doubt. Biased, leading or loaded questions and statements, present an-
other common pitfall in survey research. So-called 'ring true' statements are phrases peo-
ple are likely to agree with because of the tone.  
There is also the danger of placing statements in surveys to which in general the 
respondent agrees but not without elaborating. Instead, the respondent is forced to either 
agree or disagree. Formulating leading questions can happen quite easily and is often 
done for political purposes. However, questions and statements which are not unbiased or 
specific will lead to viable results. Other aspects being problematic for the respondent are 
recall dependent questions, offensive questions, questions which assume certain 
knowledge, and questions with unwarranted assumptions (Fowler, 2008; O'Leary, 2004). 
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The questions should be relevant, and the respondents must be willing to answer to gen-
erate trustworthy data leading to credible results and conclusions. 
 Survey instrument. The survey instrument developed for this study is divided 
into 8 sections with questions grouped together according to specific themes. The first 
part of the survey asks the participants about the importance they place on government to 
reduce, prevent, or improve upon various societal problems. Questions in this section 
provide the data necessary to determine how important the issue of global climate change 
is to the public compared to other societal challenges. The second section asks several 
questions about the level of awareness of various aspects of global climate change. 
Therefore, questions focus on what GCC means to the participants and whether or not 
they feel informed in terms of the causes, impacts, and existing mitigation or adaptation 
measurements. Another segment of the survey addresses the public's perceptions about 
the risks and threats of a number of global environmental problems. The aim of this sec-
tion is to determine if the public believes in the reality of GGC and what they believe the 
level of consequences will be in the near future compared to other environmental im-
pacts. The fourth part of the questionnaire focuses specifically on the public's level of 
concern over global climate change. The participants are questioned about their level of 
concern regarding various possible impacts of global climate change.  
Furthermore, this section also has questions regarding the risk of GCC causing 
various natural disasters worldwide and within the countries participating in this study. 
The next section confronts the survey participants with scientific facts and other state-
ments surrounding GCC to determine the public's attitude and beliefs regarding the exist-
ing scientific data, the scientific community, causes of GCC, renewable energy, and other 
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aspects important to the development of successful communication programs. The sixth 
part focuses on the issue of public trust and responsibility regarding GCC. Questions in 
this section will provide the data necessary to determine which source of information the 
public trusts as a potential communicator of climate change policies. The next section 
introduces possible climate change mitigation and adaptation policies and examines the 
level public of support regarding different GCC mitigation and adaptation strategies. Fur-
thermore, the participants are asked how much they are willing to change their behavior 
or pay extra money to reduce the main causes of GCC.  
Finally, the last part of the survey asks about the participant's general level of 
concern about the environment. In addition to these questions each survey participant al-
so provides his or her age, gender, household income, level of education, and the region 
they live in. The resulting comprehensive database also provides an opportunity to com-
pare the study's results to related studies, especially in the United States. Although, there 
is very little information available on how the public perceives the risks and threats of 
Global Climate Change at local and national levels although the Center for Climate 
Change Communication at Yale University provides annual data for the United States 
(Leiserowitz, 2012). 
 Criteria for selection of surveyed countries. To ensure credibility, the countries 
selected for this study must establish validity or authenticity within the surveyed popula-
tion sample (Yin, 1994). This means that the findings can directly be assumed to a larger 
population. The use of internet panels requires that people from all social groups must 
have access to the internet and the skills necessary to participate. In the case of Africa this 
cannot be guaranteed and thus no countries representing the African continent are sur-
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veyed in this study. The internet is not as available in rural developing areas as it is in de-
veloped countries and the limited amount of time and funding disallows face-to-face sur-
veys for these countries. Therefore, the countries participating in this study are the United 
States, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Spain, Germany, UK, Netherlands, and Japan.  
The Unites States (US) is an obvious choice being a Superpower, the second 
highest GHG emitter, the richest country in the world, and there have been significant 
political debates over GCC (IPCC, 2007). Global agreements to reduce GHG emissions 
and adapt to global climate change stand and fall with the involvement of the US. Mexico 
is among the top 20 largest economies in the world and former President Calderon ranked 
the environment and global climate change very high on his priority list (Booth, 2010). 
Mexico is the only developing country that has developed complete inventories of all its 
greenhouse gas emissions in order to reduce GHG emissions significantly. However this 
goal can only be achieved if the public supports climate change policies and measure-
ments. Moreover, with the outcome of the latest 2012 Mexican presidential elections the 
public’s support and demand for climate change policies becomes even more important.  
Without public pressure the newly elected president Enrique Peña Nieto will most likely 
not focus on environmental issues (Reuters, 2012) nor achieve the goal set by the past 
legislation to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 30 percent from business-as-usual levels 
by 2020 and by 50 percent by 2050. Canada is confronted with an annual temperature 
increase of 1.2 degrees Celsius recorded between 1948 and 2005. This increase is signifi-
cantly higher than the global average of 0.74 degrees Celsius (IPCC, 2007). As a result, 
sea level rise could become a serious threat to coastal communities requiring adaptive 
measurements supported by the public (WWF-Canada, 2011). Including the US, Mexico 
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and Canada into this research also allows an examination of a representative population 
sample of the North American continent.  
Germany is located in the center of the European Union (EU) and is among the 
G8 countries with one of the strongest economies worldwide. Within the EU, Germany is 
one of the driving forces for achieving a global climate treaty (Weidner & Mez, 2008). 
Furthermore, during the current economic downturn, Germany is much less affected 
compared to the rest of the EU, and as a result, the country will most likely have even 
bigger political capital in the near future impacting European climate change policy (Hill, 
2011). Spain on the other hand is among the countries in Europe heavily impacted by the 
worldwide economic crisis. The country's tourism industry was estimated in 2006 to be 
the second largest in the world, and since then, declined (Bank of Spain, 2010). Although 
Spain is among the leading countries in terms of solar power and renewable energy pro-
duction, declining tourism and high unemployment rates will most likely dominate politi-
cal discussions and policies likely reducing support for environmental or climate change 
initiatives. As a result the country already decreased its investments in renewable energy 
significantly (PEW Center, 2010). Nevertheless, the large shore line and the resulting 
tourism make successful climate change adaptation to sea level rise and possible floods 
necessary in the near future. The Netherlands are widely considered as trend-setting when 
it comes to successful planning policies and strategies. Furthermore, one third of the 
country is below sea level facing the North Sea to the north and west. As a result, the 
Netherlands already successfully cope with weather extremes such as storm floods and 
sea level rise. In the future other countries will increasingly face these challenges as well 
due to global climate change. The 4th European country surveyed in this study is the UK. 
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Together with Germany and France, the UK is a very influential country within the Euro-
pean Union and also worldwide. In terms of global climate change its national govern-
ment launched a campaign in 1991 for energy conservation with the goal to educate the 
public about the global implications of local actions (Hinchliffe, 1996). 
Japan is chosen because it is an insular state, an economic driving force of the re-
gion, and part of the world's largest and most populous continent, Asia. Similar to Canada 
one of the major impacts of global climate change will be ocean related disasters. The 
final country to be surveyed is South America's largest economy, Brazil (Worldbank, 
2010). The country is home to the Amazon, one of the greatest ecosystems and forests of 
the planet. This fragile and biologically diverse ecosystem makes Brazil very vulnerable 
to global climate change, increasing the risks of wildfires releasing even more green-
house gases (SciDevNet, 2007). Moreover, the likely change of rainfall patterns due to 
global climate change will result in less water resources and supply, especially in the al-
ready drought-affected northeastern part of Brazil. 
Statistical analysis. The majority of the questions in the survey are closed-ended 
multiple choice questions, which are usually easy to code and to analyze statistically 
(Henerson et al., 1987). They mainly consist of 'Likert-type scaling' which are balanced 
equally. This means that in order to prevent biases, in balanced Likert-scales the number 
of favorable and unfavorable answer categories is equal. The Likert-scales used in the 
survey instrument are mostly 5 to 7 point scales with the answers for example ranging 
from strongly disagree to strongly agree with a neutral answer possibility in-between. The 
survey instrument was tested and reviewed by different researchers experienced in survey 
research to ensure the validity of the Likert-scales and other multiple choice questions.  
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The data gathered from the survey is mostly analyzed using a wide range of statis-
tical methods.  This study applied basic statistical methods such as frequency distribu-
tions and descriptive statistics, as well as advanced methods including standard multiple 
regression, stepwise regression, and ANOVA (Field, 2009). In addition, based on the col-
lected survey data, new variables were coded and indexes were created to gain further 
insight and a more holistic understanding of the interrelationships of risk perception and 
risk communication as well as the barriers to successful public climate change communi-
cation. For example, the survey instrument does not directly ask if the participants belong 
to one of the three groups: those who do not believe climate change is happening at all, 
those who think climate change is happening but is a natural event and not human caused, 
those that believe it is happening and is human caused. However, answers to different 
survey questions were used to determine to what degree the participant believes climate 
change is real and allows the creation of a new "GGC believer" variable based on these 
specific answers. This new variable coded allows categorizing the survey participants in-
to different groups based on their attitudes towards the reality of GCC and if it is natural 
or human caused. These types of additionally created variables were used as independent 
and dependent variables in different regressions in order to analyze the research questions 
and underlying hypotheses.  
Within the scientific literature there is an ongoing debate about using Likert-type 
data and scales for standard multiple regression analysis (Jamison, 2004; Brown, 2011). 
The debate focuses on the question if Likert-scales can be treated as interval data, which 
is a key assumption that has to be met for multiple regression analysis (Field, 2009).  
Skeptics argue that data is lost if Likert-scales are treated as interval data resulting in un-
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derestimating the actual strength of the relationship (correlation coefficient (R)) between 
the predictor ant outcome variables (Owuor, 2001).  
However, a study by Labovitz, (1975) tested the differences between using ordi-
nal categorized data and continuous variables in regression analyses and concluded that 
categorical data, such as Likert-type scaling, can be analyzed as continuous data. This 
finding was further supported by James & Wan (1996) whose statistical tests show that 
not using “true” interval data does not greatly affect Type 1 or Type 2 errors. This means 
that is highly unlikely that standard regressions based on Likert-type data would show 
false relationships between variables that do not exist in reality. In addition,  different 
quantitative studies in the field of medical and psychology research (Baggaley & Hull, 
1983; Maurer & Pierce, 1998, Vickers, 1999) proved that Liker-scales can indeed be ana-
lyzed effectively as interval scales and fulfill all the assumptions needed for the standard 
and stepwise regression methods applied in this dissertation. 
Despite the ongoing discussion among scientists and statisticians, especially in the 
field of social sciences, in which this dissertation is situated as well, Likert-type data is 
consistently treated as interval data and used for regression analysis (Johnson & Slovic, 
1995; Peters et al.. 1997; Sjoeberg, 1998; Leiserowitz, 2006). For example, in their pub-
lished study “Presenting Uncertainty in Health Risk Assessment: Initial Studies of Its Ef-
fect on Risk Perception and Trust” Branden B.Johsnon and Paul Slovic (1995) showed 
through multiple regression analysis based on Likert-type survey questions that public 
reactions to environmental problems are less impacted by the presentation in the media 
compared to general factors of risk attitudes and perceptions. Peters et al. (1997) focused 
on the role of the perception factors trust and credibility as key elements in environmental 
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risk communication. The study applied standard multiple regressions to test the hypothe-
sis that trust and credibility are strongly impacted by three independent factors - percep-
tions of knowledge and expertise, perceptions of openness and honesty, and perceptions 
of concern. The majority of these factors were measured through survey questions using 
four-point, Likert-type scaling. Based on the psychometric paradigm, which is also the 
methodological foundation of this dissertation research, Sjoeberg (1998) examined the 
relationships between world views, political attitudes, and risk perceptions using multiple 
regressions with scores provided by Likert-type data. The study showed that approxi-
mately 10 percent of the variance in one factor could be explained by the remaining two.  
Another study, specifically in the context of GGC, used survey data from the United 
States used multiple regressions to test if GCC risk perceptions and policy support are 
influenced by experiential factors (Leiserowitz, 2006). The details of this study were al-
ready discussed in chapter 2, but the study did use a similar analytical framework as this 
dissertation research. These studies are well known and their findings are considered as 
important contributions to the existing body of knowledge 
Nevertheless, additional steps were taken to further decrease the likelihood of in-
formation loss and wrong results as well as to acknowledge the arguments by skeptics, 
who caution the use of Likert-type scales as interval data. Research suggests that when 
Likert-type data is used is multiple regression analysis the estimates improve if the an-
swer scales have more than three points and a sample size of 300 participants (Owuar, 
2001). Both points are considered in this study, as no Likert-scale used has less than 4 
points and the smallest country sample consists of over 500 people. Furthermore, Brown 
(2001) argues that indexes created from Likert-type data not only further reduce the like-
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lihood for errors (Wan, 1996; Jamison 2004), but are actually “true” interval data. As a 
result, the vast majority of regressions performed in this dissertation use different addi-
tive indexes from Likert-type survey questions as dependent variables.  
The additive indexes created from the survey data focus on the areas of the pub-
lic’s general support for mitigation and adaptation policies in general, their preparedness 
to change their behavior, as well as their willingness to pay more for GCC policies. Fur-
thermore, indexes are also created for specific themes. For example, in addition to the 
general indexes for the public’s support for mitigation or adaption strategies, indexes are 
also created for the public support regarding energy efficiency policies, economic incen-
tives, and planning strategies.  These different indexes are created based on different sub-
questions which have in common an overarching theme such as general support for miti-
gation polices or general willingness to commit to behavioral changes. Similar as the new 
variables mentioned above, the different indexes will be used in various regressions as 
dependent and independent variables. The main indexes created for this study are the fol-
lowing: 
 Index 1: Overall support for mitigation polices 
 Index 2: Overall support for adaption polices 
 Index 3: Overall public willingness to pay more for GCC strategies 
 Index 4: Overall public willingness to commit to behavioral changes 
 Index 5: Overall level of consequences perceived by the public from environmen-
tal changes 
 Index 6: Overall public's perceived level of threat from GCC 
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The basic analysis consists of frequencies and various cross-tabs for all 9 coun-
tries combined and for each country separate. The basic analysis of the frequencies and 
percentages of the survey answers allowed comparing the countries and identifying the 
significant differences between countries in various areas that are addressed in the survey 
instrument. Together with the results from various crosstabs between indexes, differences 
and possible correlations identified were explored through advanced statistical methods 
such as different regressions and ANOVA. The descriptive analysis also prepared the 
large amount of survey data into a manageable size.  
Standard multiple regressions were used to illustrate how independent variables 
(such as demographics, attitudes toward climate change, or trust in climate science) are 
related to the dependent variables (such as willingness to pay, policy support, or person 
connection towards climate change). These relationships were further explored through 
stepwise regressions to determine the subset of independent variables that has the strong-
est relationship to each dependent variable.  It is important to note, that throughout the 
statistical analysis, depending on the underlying hypothesis, numerous variables were 
used as independent as well as dependent variables in different regressions.  
The results from the survey research and from the previously conducted literature 
review provided the insights necessary to address the research questions of this study. 
Furthermore, this analysis points out possible  misconceptions among the lay public, 
identify trusted communication channels and identify the key areas communication ef-
forts need to focus on to improve the success of current and future GCC policies.  
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Underlying hypotheses & main variables. The following section provides an 
overview and justification of the main hypotheses, variables and statistical methods used 
to address the research questions during the 4th phase of this study.  
Hypothesis 1. "The public's perceptions of GCC in terms of threat and risk, salien-
cy of the issue, trust in GCC information, and acceptable public strategies vary among 
countries" 
This research is based on the psychometric paradigm, (Fischhoff et al., 1978, & 
Slovic et al.,1984)  that implies that risk means different things for different people. 
Therefore, we can assume that public perceptions in the context of GCC vary among 
countries with different cultural and economic backgrounds. 
This hypothesis was tested by comparing the basic frequencies and means of the 
relevant survey questions and determining statistically differences among the answers 
provided by the surveyed population within the nine countries.  In addition to these ques-
tions the results of 4 different indexes were compared as well. The indexes present the 
overall support for mitigation and adaptation policies, the public's general readiness to 
change their behavior, as well as their willingness to pay more for GCC strategies. This 
basic analysis relying on descriptive statistics helped identifying patterns between coun-
tries and provided the foundation for the more complex statistical analytical methods, 




Hypothesis 2. “The public’s general support for mitigation and adaptation poli-
cies is linked to the way they perceive 1) the level of consequences from possible envi-
ronmental changes and 2) the general level of threat resulting from GCC" 
Research shows that risk perception has a significant impact on individual and 
group behavior and thus needs to be considered when developing global climate change 
policies and strategies (Slovic, 2000). For example, research linking perceptions of risk to 
acceptance and opposition to specific technologies, such as nuclear power have shown 
that the higher the perceived risk the higher the opposition by the public towards such 
technologies (Slovic et al, 1981).  
Furthermore, recent studies emphasize the important role of emotions, such as 
level of concern and perceived level of threat, in the decision-making process (Finucane 
et al., 2000; Loewenstein et al., 2001, Paton, 2008, NRC, 2010b). This leads to the as-
sumption that such relationships also exist in the context of natural hazards resulting from 
global climate change. Therefore the hypothesis was developed to test if the public's sup-
port of policies and strategies to reduce the causes and impacts of natural hazards result-
ing from GGC also correlate to the public’s risk perception of GCC? 
The hypothesis was tested through frequency distribution analysis and crosstabu-
lations. The frequency analysis focused on survey questions addressing the public’s per-
ceived level of consequences from environmental changes over the next 20 years, the 
level of support for mitigation and adaptation policies, and the perceived level of threat 
resulting from GCC over the next 50 years. In a second analytical step crosstabs were 
created to test for relationships between mitigation and adaptation attitudes (support) and 
the public’s perceived level of consequences from different environmental changes such 
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as global climate change and level of threat resulting from global climate change in par-
ticular. The crosstabs were used to identify differences among the nine countries in terms 
of the significance of these relationships.  
Hypothesis 3. “The public’s perception towards climate change is the main rea-
son for the 1) low policy support, 2) willingness to pay for GCC policies, and 3) willing-
ness to change their behavior related to mitigation and adaptation” 
As pointed out by the literature (Rotter, 1966), if the public believes that they can 
control the events that affect them, they also are likely to feel that applicable strategies 
exist in which they can be engaged in (locus of control concept). However, GCC is char-
acterized by high uncertainties, unfamiliar risks, and other characteristics of hazards 
which make a personal connection and engagement more difficult (Maibach et al, 2009; 
O’Neil & Hulme, 2009; Whitmarsh 2009). Research suggests that current public en-
gagement with global climate change is low (Leiserowitz, 2004) impacting public policy 
support and behavior. 
 The hypothesis was tested by conducting various multiple regressions, using six 
independent variables and sixteen dependent variables. The public’s preference towards 
four general climate change strategies and the level of belief in the reality of global cli-
mate change were used to describe a person’s attitude towards GCC. The remaining four 
independent variables focused on the public’s level of concern regarding possible dan-
gerous impacts of GCC on different geographical and personal levels as well as time-
scales. The dependent variables used for the regressions included different additive in-
dexes, based on survey answers from various survey questions, as well as single survey 
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questions addressing the public’s willingness to pay more or commit to behavioral chang-
es to mitigate and adapt to GCC. 
Hypothesis 4."The general attitude and public risk perceptions of GCC can be 
largely explained by socio-economic variables" 
This is another key main hypothesis that needs to be tested. Similar to the previ-
ous hypothesis two main regression analyses types are utilized consisting of standard 
multiple regressions and stepwise regressions. The independent variables include various 
socio-economic characteristics of the surveyed population such as, age, gender, house-
hold income, and level of education. The dependent variables cover the answers to differ-
ent survey questions related to public's GCC perception in terms of its risks, threats, level 
of concern and consequences, timeframe for potential impacts, and behavioral attitudes 
towards specific mitigation and adaptation policies.  
The reason for testing the impact of different socio-economic characters of the 
survey participants on general GCC attitude and public risk perceptions is rooted in past 
perception research in the areas of technological and natural hazards (Burton et al., 1978; 
Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Short, 1984, Slovic, 2001) arguing that perceptions are so-
cially constructed and can vary by culture, human development, affluence, and de-
mographics.  Furthermore, this research is a multinational study including different socio-
economic characteristics. As a result, we can assume that socio-economic characteristics 
are a potential factor impacting public’s risk perception and policy support, 
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Chapter 4 
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 
Relevant social science literature (Krimsky & Golding, 1992; Kasperson et al, 
1995; Slovic 2000 & 2010) shows that threats, whether from natural phenomena and 
from technological origins are perceived differently based on national experience with the 
hazard, geography (coastal areas verses inland territory), stage of economic development, 
and the nature and type of the hazard. There is also evidence that these public perceptions 
of risk may change over time (Loewenstein & Mather, 1990; Gomez et al., 1992; Tate, 
2003). Because the concepts and knowledge of global climate change impacts are rela-
tively new, unlike floods and hurricanes, there are little data on how people perceive the 
causes of GCC to be, the nature of the threats over time and space, and our abilities and 
willingness to resolve the problems through policy support and behavioral changes. The 
existing body of knowledge is also limited regarding the public's predispositions concern-
ing trust in the information about GCC and its sources. This chapter presents the first 
stage of the survey data analysis while answering the first underlying research question of 
this study.  
 What are the public's perceptions of GCC in terms of threat and risk, saliency of 
the issue, trust in GCC information and acceptable public strategies? 
By examining basic frequencies and significant country differences, this section 
of the dissertation addresses how the public perceives the issue of GCC at the interna-
tional level by looking at survey results in nine countries. These include Canada, United 
States, Mexico, Brazil, Spain, Netherlands, Germany, the United Kingdom as a whole, 
and Japan. In particular, using descriptive statistical analysis methods, this section takes a 
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close look at how the survey participants responded to questions dealing with the poten-
tial threats and risks of GCC, the saliency of the issue, trust in GCC information and their 
sources, and possible policies and strategies which require the public’s support.  
This first analysis compares results of key survey questions between countries, 
providing the insights necessary to answer the first research question. Moreover, by iden-
tifying key differences and similarities among countries and relationships between im-
portant variables, the descriptive exploration of the survey data provide the foundation 
for more sophisticated statistical analytical methods necessary for answering many of the 
remaining research questions. In addition, since policy makers do not have a good under-
standing of where various publics stand on climate change strategies, policies, priorities 
and what will be acceptable and supportive. The analyzed survey data in this chapter can 
assist policy-makers in evaluating the appropriate choices to make and what would be 
seen as publically acceptable decision-making. 
The total sample size accounted for 7,261 households. The sample size for each 
country was large enough to provide the ability to generalize to each country with a 99 
percent confidence level and a ± 4% margin of error. As shown in Table 1 the sample size 
per country ranges from 539 for Canada to 947 participants in the United States. The sur-
veys’ household selections were not entirely random, but random within the parameters 
of socio-economic categories and ownership of computers. The sampling process was 
guided by two parameters. First, every respondent has to be at least 18 years old. Second, 
the total population sample for each country represented the country's socioeconomic 




Survey Sample Sizes per Country 
 
Therefore, the nine countries were surveyed using internet panels consisting of 
demographically representative samples for each country. The internet panels were pro-
vided by the company Survey Sampling International (SSI) which also hosted the survey 
and collected the data. The survey instrument was tested and reviewed to validate if the 
English version would correspond to other languages in terminology and meaning. Key 
statistical concepts applied in this chapter on the international and national scale, were 
basic descriptive methods such as frequencies and percentages, means, standard devia-
tions as well as non-parametric tests such as the Kruskal-Wallis Test. 
Frequencies, percentages and means were used to illustrate the public's percep-
tions towards different aspects of GCC relevant to the first research question and the 
study overall as well as to identify response patterns among countries. In order to com-
pare the means of several survey answers between countries, the standard deviations were 
calculated to ensure that the mean is a good representation of the data. Therefore, the 
standard deviation was used to determine whether or not the mean could be used to com-
pare survey questions between different samples. In the cases of the standard deviation 
Country Sample Size 
United States of America (USA) 947 
Netherlands (NET) 866 
Japan (JP) 829 
Mexico (MEX) 826 
Spain (ESP) 821 
Germany (GER) 824 
United Kingdom (UK) 809 
Brazil (BRA) 800 
Canada (CAN) 539 
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confirming the mean as a well representation of the data from a particular survey ques-
tion, the Kruskal-Wallis test was performed to examine if the means are also significantly 
different between the countries. The Kruskal-Wallis test is the non-parametric counterpart 
to one-way independent ANOVA analysis. The collected survey data are not normally 
distributed nor can the homogeneity of variance be assumed throughout the data set.  
Therefore, the Kruskal-Wallis test was used which is free of assumptions about how the 
data is distributed and does not require homogeneity of variance to test if means are sig-
nificantly different between groups (Devore, 2004). The output of this test in SPSS in-
cludes a significance value. As long as this value is below .05 the country means are sig-
nificantly different. The Kruskal-Wallis test also provides mean rank scores which allows 
grouping as well as identifying outliers among the nine countries. 
Analysis 
Saliency. An important aspect of the public perceptions of global climate change 
is where people position that issue in the context of other problem areas the government 
focuses on.  The idea of the relative importance of where GCC is ranked among all the 
other socio-economic problem areas confronting populations is known as political salien-
cy – how important the problem is for government to act on. One question in the survey 
instrument measured political saliency by asking the participants to indicate how im-
portant it is for government to act on nine separate problem areas. One of these nine areas 
was “reducing global climate change”. The participants were asked to rank the nine is-
sues by rating the level of importance for the government to act on a 4-point Likert-scale. 




Global Trends for Political Saliency of GCC  











Lowering the rate of vio-
lent crime  
1.3% 4.1% 32.9% 63.7% 3.56 
Improving the nation’s 
schools 
1.1% 5.2% 34.0% 59.8% 3.52 
Reducing poverty 1.2% 6.1% 36.5% 56.2% 3.48 
Increasing employment 1.1% 2.9% 29.7% 66.4% 3.61 
Reducing global climate 
change 
5.4% 15.1% 41.2% 38.3% 3.12 
Improving air and water 
quality 
1.8% 12.2% 45.1% 40.9% 3.25 
Preventing global terror-
ism 
2.6% 12.8% 39.8% 44.8% 3.27 
Eliminating illegal drugs 3.8% 15.2% 37.0% 44.0% 3.21 
Developing a comprehen-
sive. clean energy policy 
2.9% 13.0% 42.5% 41.5% 3.23 
 
For this purpose each answer was assigned a numerical value from 1 to 4, where 1 
is ‘unimportant’, 2 is ‘low importance’, 3 is ‘important’, and the value 4 represents the 
answer option ‘very important’. The political saliency of the climate change is also used 
as an indicator for the public’s level of concern regarding global climate change 
The results shown in Table 2 illustrate the frequencies, percentages and means for 
all nine countries combined, indicating the global trend in terms of the political saliency 
of global climate change. The total sample size was 7261 participants. With a mean of 
3.12 (Std. Deviation ±.857), the results show that out of the nine societal issues, the least 
salient issue for the government to place importance on is global climate change. The 
mean value suggests that people do believe that climate change is an important problem, 
but certainly not the most pressing issue. Only 38.3 percent the surveyed public of nine 
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selected countries find climate change a ‘very important’ issue for government, far below 
violent crime, schools, employment and poverty. However, when you combine the two 
categories ‘important’ and ‘very important’, almost 80 percent of the participants want 
government to be involved. Nonetheless, the public views this topic as the least important 
issue for governments to act on. 
Looking at the data for each country individually, among the nine issues in the po-
litical saliency question, reducing global climate change ranks in the bottom third. In the 
United Kingdom, United States, and Netherlands the issue of GCC ranks last among all 
listed issues. Based on the same 4 point Likert-scale as the previous table, Table 3 shows 
the percentages, the mean values and. standard deviations, for each of the nine countries 
individually regarding the level of importance the government should place on reducing 
GCC.  The table emphasizes the countries which stand out on either ends of the scale.  
Except for the Brazilian sample, less than 50 percent of the participants in all oth-
er countries indicated that the government should treat GCC as a very important policy 
priority. This is followed by Mexico with 49.8 percent and Spain’s 42.9 percent strongly 
supporting governmental action. The lowest percentile in this category was the Nether-
lands with only 21.2 percent expressing that their government should handle GCC as a 
very important issue. Interestingly, the 15.7 percent of survey respondents in the United 
States characterizing the reduction of GCC as unimportant politically is significantly 
higher compared to all other countries. Furthermore, three countries stand out when com-














Mean Std. Dev. 
BRA 2.4% 7.3% 31.4% 59.0% 3.47 .73 
MEX 3.9% 7.7% 38.6% 49.8% 3.34 .78 
ESP 3.3% 10.5% 43.4% 42.9% 3.26 .77 
GER 3.5% 11.9% 41.7% 42.8% 3.24 .80 
JP 2.3% 7.7% 53.1% 32.9% 3.17 .72 
CAN 3.7% 16.0% 42.3% 38.0% 3.15 .82 
UK 6.3% 19.5% 43.5% 30.7% 2.99 .87 
USA 15.7% 18.9% 35.4% 30.0% 2.80 1.04 
NET 5.2% 31.5% 42.0% 21.2% 2.79 .83 
 
In the Netherland 36.7percent of survey participants believe that GCC should not be ad-
dressed by the government at all or only as a low priority issue, followed by the United 
States with 34.4 percent and the United Kingdom with 25.8 percent.  
The mean values of each country suggest that countries can be grouped together 
based on how the public perceives the political saliency of GCC. As a result the countries 
were divided into three groups. Group 1 consists of the countries Brazil and Mexico. 
With mean scores ranging from 3.34 to 3.47, the data show that the survey participants in 
these two countries take GCC very seriously and want their governments to be strongly 
involved. Spain, Germany, Japan and Canada also seem to want their governments to 
place a high level of importance on reducing GCC. However, the means of these coun-
tries suggest that the participants do not want their government to put as much im-
portance on GCC activities as compared to Brazil and Mexico. The mean scores of the 
second group range from 3.15 (Canada) to 3.26 (Spain).The third group consists of the 
three countries with a mean score below 3.00, United Kingdom, USA and Netherlands.  
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In addition, in all three countries the percentage of people who do not perceive GCC as 
an important issue is above 20 percent. 
This grouping of nine countries is supported by the Kruskal-Wallis test which was 
performed to confirm that the means are significantly different among the nine country 
groups.. The test suggests, with a significance level of p <0.01, that there is a significant 
difference among the nine countries in terms of how the public perceives the political sa-
liency of reducing GCC, thus indicating a relationship between the two variables ‘country 
of origin’ and ‘level of importance for government to be involved in reducing GCC’. 
However, the relationship between socio-economic variables and GCC are discussed in 
the next chapter.  
The mean rating of each country confirms the validity of the country grouping.  
The mean rank of Brazil (4473.02) and Mexico (4153.34) are significantly different from 
the mean ratings of the countries belonging to group 3, United Kingdom (3294.53), Unit-
ed States (3294.53), and Netherlands (2808.80). Japan’s and Canada’s mean scores are 
very similar, confirming the decisions to place them in the same group.  
A different question in the survey asked the participants for their level of agree-
ment with the statement ‘I worry about GCC because there is no strong political will to 
prevent it’.  Similar to the previous question discussed above, this statement was de-
signed to measure how the public perceives their government’s current level of involve-
ment with the issue of GCC. The public’s level of agreement was measured on a 5-point 
Likert-scale, where the value 1 is strongly disagree, 5 is ‘strongly agree’, and the middle 




Public Perceptions regarding the Political Will to Prevent GCC 
 
The frequency distribution for all nine countries shows that over 65% of the pub-
lic either agrees or strongly agrees with the notion that the political will to address GCC 
is insufficient. Close to 21percent are undecided and 13percent of the survey participants 
either disagreed or even strongly disagreed (5.5 percent). The mean score of 3.79 is be-
tween the two answer categories ‘undecided’ and ‘agree’ and  suggests that the public 
tends to agree with the statement ‘I worry about GCC because there is no strong political 
will to prevent it’. Table 4 displays the percentages per answer category, the mean scores, 
and standards deviations for each country separately. In the table the nine countries are 
ranked from largest to smallest according to their mean value. As in the previous table, 
illustrating the survey results of the political saliency of reducing GCC (Table 3), the or-
der of the countries is identical. Populations that indicated that they want their govern-
ment to act on GCC as important also believe that the political will to do so is deficient. 
Again, Mexico and Brazil are at the top with over 80 percent of the participants agreeing 















MEX 2.7% 5.4% 11.1% 35.0% 45.8% 4.16 1.00 
BRA 2.4% 5.0% 10.0% 42.3% 40.4% 4.13 .95 
ESP 3.4% 6.6% 25.7% 38.9% 25.5% 3.76 1.01 
GER 3.9% 10.3% 25.5% 36.7% 23.7% 3.66 1.07 
JP 2.2% 7.2% 34.1% 43.1% 13.4% 3.58 .89 
CAN 5.8% 10.0% 26.7% 35.1% 22.4% 3.58 1.11 
UK 7.9% 11.7% 35.1% 32.1% 13.1% 3.31 1.09 
USA 14.4% 9.9% 28.3% 30.4% 17.0% 3.26 1.26 
NET 5.4% 22.5% 27.4% 33.1% 11.5% 3.23 1.09 
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or strongly agreeing with the statement that they worry about GCC due to the lack of po-
litical will to prevent it.  
On the other hand less than less than 50 percent of the surveyed population in the 
United Kingdom, United States, and Netherlands agree with this sentiment. Furthermore, 
with the exception of Brazil and Mexico, between approximately 25 percent and 35 per-
cent of survey respondents choose the answer category ‘undecided’, indicating that at 
least 1 out of 4 people are not familiar with their government’s position on reducing 
GCC. Nevertheless, the data suggest that in all nine countries the majority of people seem 
to perceive the lack of involvement by their government as a reason to worry about GCC.  
Threat and risk. The survey instrument first asked participants several questions 
regarding the risks and potential threats of a list of negative environmental events, such 
as GCC. The way the public perceives the risk and threats of GCC is important infor-
mation for successful communication efforts. It allows risk communicators to better un-
derstand their audience in terms of their perceptions and experiences regarding GCC and 
its impact and develop effective communication tools. Thus, increasing the likelihood 
that GCC communication programs will enhance the public’s level of awareness and 
sense of urgency as well as increasing their policy support through behavioral changes. 
The following presents the frequency distributions among the nine countries of questions 
which focus on determining how concerned the public is about GCC and how they per-
ceive its levels of threat and risk.  
The first question in the survey instrument’s risk and threat section addresses the 
perceived level of consequences or effects of different environmental changes expected 
over the next 20 years.  
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Table 5 




1 Extensive loss of forest and/or wetlands 4.43 
2 Deterioration of ozone layer 4.34 
3 Increasing frequency of droughts 4.30 
4 Increasing frequency of major hurricanes and/or floods 4.29 
5 Substantial increase in global warming resulting in global climate change 4.26 
6 Worsening of urban air pollution 4.24 
7 Further extinction of endangered animals and plants 4.21 
 
One of the environmental changes listed was ‘Substantial increase in global warming re-
sulting in global climate change’. The participants determined the level of consequences 
of each environmental change based on a 5 point scale, ranging from ‘not likely at all to 
happen’ to ‘serious negative consequences’. The responses provided a first indication on 
whether or not the participants believed in the reality of GCC and how they perceive the 
level of consequences or relative risk compared to other environmental impacts. 
 On the global scale, the data show that only 3.6 percent of the total global sample 
holds the belief that global warming will not result in climate change. However, over 55 
percent of those surveyed indicated that climate change will have ‘very serious negative 
consequences’; another 24.9 percent expect ‘moderate negative consequences’ over the 
next 20 years. Together, this percentage of the global survey represents a significant result 
related to peoples’ beliefs about climate change and the level of negative consequences 
they expect on the global scale. In total, this question listed seven environmental changes 
for which responses in levels of perceived risk was asked for.  
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As shown in Table 5, with a mean score of 4.26 ‘substantial increase in global 
warming resulting in global climate change’ only ranks 5th in terms of the public’s per-
ceived level of risk or consequence. A higher percentage of participants expect greater 
negative consequences from events such as the extensive loss of forests and/or wetlands, 
the deterioration of the ozone layer, the increasing frequency of droughts, and the rising 
number of major hurricanes and /or floods. The two environmental changes ranked 6th 
and 7th on the risk scale were ‘worsening of urban air pollution’ and ‘further extinction of 
endangered animals and plants’. 
 As illustrated in Table 6, examining the frequency distribution for every country 
individually reveals significant differences among the surveyed populations specifically 
on the impacts of global warming. 
With the exception of Netherlands, United Kingdom, and United States the major-
ity of the public seems to expect serious negative consequences from global warming and 
climate change. The data indicates that populations of Mexico and Brazil are most con-
cerned among the nine countries with over 80 percent of the participants believing that 
here will be serious negative consequences.  
On the other end of the spectrum over 10 percent of the survey participants in the 
United States do not believe that global climate change will be happening at all. The data 
suggest that the reality of climate change is much more challenged by the public in the 
U.S. than in any other surveyed country. Overall, based on the mean values, several coun-
tries seem to perceive the future level of consequences quite similar. As mentioned be-
fore, Mexico and Brazil show a very similar frequency distribution and their mean values 
are also close to each other. 
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Table 6 
Public's Perceived Level of Consequences, if any, from Future GCC 
Country 1 
not like-

















MEX 0.2% 0,2% 1,9% 14.4% 83.2% 
BRA 1.4% 1.4% 3.5% 13.0% 80.8% 
ESP 3.4% 2.4% 8.5% 27.0% 58.6% 
JP 1.1% 3.0% 11.6% 29.2% 55.1% 
GER 3.2% 1.6% 13.6% 27.4% 54.2% 
CAN 2.4% 2.0% 13.4% 30.6% 51.6% 
NET 3.7% 6.0% 21.5% 28.1% 40.8% 
UK 4.4% 5.6% 21.1% 29.7% 39.2% 
USA 10.8% 6.4% 16.9% 26.3% 39.6% 
 
Another group of countries with similar percentages and means consists of Spain, 
Japan, Germany, and Canada. Their means range from 4.27 to 4.35 indicating that the 
overall populations of these countries expect moderate to serious consequences. The third 
group includes countries that have a mean score below 4.0 such as the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. For these countries the data suggest that the ma-
jority of people expect slight to moderate negative consequences from global climate 
change.  
In the same segment of the questionnaire another question asked participant’s how 
they perceive the level of threat from GCC over the next 50 years. The previous question 
asked responders about their concern with a time period of 20 years. Participants were 
asked to determine the level of threat for four different groups; 'plants and animals', 'peo-
ple in other countries', people in your country' and 'you and your family'. The level of 
threat was measured using a 4 point Likert-scale ranging from 1 representing 'no threat at 
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all' to 4 being 'a high threat'. In total over 50 percent of the 7,261 survey participants rec-
ognize GCC as a high threat for plants and animals as well as for people living in other 
countries than themselves. However, when asked about the level of threat GCC poses for 
people in their respective countries, to their family, and to themselves the percentage of 
people answering with  ' high threat' is significantly lower. The data show that only 36.8 
percent of surveyed population believes that GCC presents a high threat for other people 
in their country. In terms of the perceived level of threat for their family and themselves 
only 33.4 percent chose the 'a high threat' response category’. Only 9.5 percent of the 
surveyed publics feel that GCC does not pose any danger to themselves or their families 
over the next 50 years. Although, the frequency distributions vary among the nine coun-
tries the results suggest that people tend to believe that GCC is in general a serious threat 
but not necessarily to themselves, but to plants and animals as well as to people in other 
countries.   
 This observation is further supported by the results of two survey questions that 
asked participants to indicate how long it will take until dangerous impacts of GCC will 
be experienced 'somewhere on earth' and 'in their region'. Asking the public to determine 
a timeframe until they expect GCC impacts to become visible also adds another perspec-
tive in terms of the perceived saliency of the issue and level of urgency among the popu-
lation. The participants were asked to choose from six different answer categories; 'im-
pacts are already experienced', 'in 10 years', 'in 25 years', in 50 years', 'in 100 years', or 





Timeframe until the Public Believes GCC Impacts will be Experienced Somewhere on 
Earth and in their Region 





















MEX 81.0% 9.4% 4.7% 3.1% 1.3% 0.4% 1.35 .86 
BRA 83.0% 5.6% 5.9% 3.1% 1.9% 0.5% 1.37 .93 
GER 65.5% 10.4% 11.3% 5.9% 3.5% 3.3% 1.81 1.35 
JP 59.7% 14.1% 12.5% 7.8% 3.7% 2.1% 1.88 1.30 
CAN 64.4% 9.8% 10.2% 5.8% 6.3% 3.5% 1.90 1.45 
ESP 53.0% 9.1% 14.3% 12.4% 7.6% 3.7% 2.23 1.54 
UK 48.1% 10.4% 14.0% 11.0% 8.5% 8.0% 2.46 1.71 
USA 50.5% 8.4% 12.5% 7.3% 7.1% 14.3% 2.55 1.88 
NET 45.0% 8.4% 13.3% 13.3% 11.8% 8.2% 2.63 1.76 






















MEX 72.0% 17.1% 5.8% 3.1% 1.5% 0.5% 1.46 .91 
BRA 70.4% 15.1% 8.0% 4.0% 1.9% 0.6% 1.54 1.00 
GER 46.5% 22.0% 14.3% 8.7% 4.2% 4.2% 2.15 1.41 
CAN 39.9% 24.5% 15.8% 9.3% 6.7% 3.9% 2.30 1.44 
ESP 44.9% 16.4% 14.3% 10.8% 9.4% 4.1% 2.36 1.55 
JP 34.0% 26.7% 18.6% 11.8% 6.0% 2.9% 2.38 1.37 
USA 34.7% 19.9% 13.7% 9.2% 7.4% 15.1% 2.80 1.82 
NET 24.6% 20.3% 15.5% 15.1% 15.0% 9.5% 3.04 1.67 
UK 20.0% 20.6% 19.4% 17.3% 12.9% 9.8% 3.12 1.60 
 
With the exception of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands the data suggest 
that the majority of the nine-country public believes that GCC impacts are already being 
experienced somewhere on earth. In all nine countries no answer category was chosen 
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more often than the one stating that impacts are already being experienced. On the other 
hand, the answer category 'never' received the least level of agreement from eight of the 
nine surveyed countries. In this case, the outlier is the Unites states where 14.3 percent of 
the participants indicated that they believe that no impacts will be experienced anywhere 
on the planet. When asked about a timeframe until GCC impacts will become apparent 
locally, a smaller percentage of people believe that dangerous impacts of climate change 
are occurring within their own region than somewhere on earth. A majority of over 70 
percent in Brazil and Mexico believe that they are personally already experiencing GCC 
impacts. This statistic is much more than the country with the third highest rating Germa-
ny, where 46.5 percent of the participants indicate that they already experience GCC im-
pacts. Based on the total sample size, 42.8 percent of the nine-country population be-
lieves that dangerous impacts are being experienced today in the region they live in. In 
addition just over 20 percent of the global surveyed population believes that they will ex-
perience effects from GCC within 10 years.  
However, the data also suggests that most of the population in the United King-
dom does not believe that they are already experiencing GCC impacts. Only 1 out of 5 
participants believe that GCC impacts are already occurring on the local scale. This is the 
lowest rate among all nine countries. Moreover, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, 
and the United States are the only countries where over 50% of the surveyed populations 
believe that GCC impacts are neither already occurring locally nor will be in the next 10 
years. In the remaining six countries at least 60% of the public either seems to experience 
impacts of GCC already or at least expects them to take place locally within the next 10 
years.  
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Overall, the results suggest that the overwhelming majority of the public either al-
ready experiences impacts or expects GCC impacts to occur globally and locally over the 
next 25 years. In total, 60.7 percent of the 7,261 survey participants hold the belief that 
dangerous impacts of GCC somewhere in the world are already being experienced today. 
In addition 9.5 percent indicate that they expect impacts to be experienced somewhere on 
the planet within the next 10 years and another 11 percent thinks within 25 years. Still, in 
the Unites States 15.3 percent and close to 10 percent of the populations in the United 
Kingdom and in the Netherlands do not think that they will ever experience any impacts 
of GCC in their own region.  
Another question was asked specifically about their level of concern regarding the 
possible impacts of GCC in the nine countries on a 5 point Likert-scale. Responses were 
categorized from ‘not at all concerned’ to ‘highly concerned’. On the global scale with all 
participants combined, 31.3 percent are highly concerned, 33.1 percent concerned, and 
19.3 percent somewhat concerned. Only 6.1 percent of the 7,261 people participating in 
this study indicated that they are not concerned at all. The data suggest that on the global 
level, represented by the nine countries in this study, the majority of the public is con-
cerned about global climate change and its potential impacts. This becomes even more 
apparent when the frequencies of the three answer categories ‘highly concerned’, ‘con-
cerned’, and ‘somewhat concerned’ are combined. As an aggregate, 83.7 percent of the 






Public's Level of Concern regarding the Possible Impacts of GCC by Country 
Country 
1 















MEX 1.0% 0.8% 6.3% 35.0% 56.9% 4.46 .74 
BRA 1.4% 1.8% 7.6% 28.5% 60.8% 4.46 .82 
CAN 4.3% 7.2% 17.8% 39.7% 31.0% 3.86 1.07 
ESP 4.3% 7.7% 20.3% 39.5% 28.3% 3.80 1.07 
GER 4.4% 6.6% 25.4% 37.3% 26.5% 3.75 1.05 
JP 3.0% 20.7% 21.8% 26.2% 28.2% 3.56 1.19 
UK 9.3% 15.6% 24.4% 31.4% 19.4% 3.36 1.22 
USA 14.9% 11.8% 20.1% 30.5% 22.7% 3.34 1.35 
NET 10.4% 16.9% 28.9% 32.9% 11.0% 3.17 1.15 
 
As shown in Table 8, the data suggest that Mexico with 56.9 percent and Brazil 
with 60.8 percent have the largest percentage of people who are highly concerned. In the 
case of Mexico 91.9 percent of the participants indicated that they are either ‘concerned’ 
or ‘highly concerned, closely followed by Brazil with 89.3 percent. The results also show 
that the populations in Canada, Spain, and Germany express a very similar level of con-
cern. In these four countries the percentage of participants who are ‘concerned’ or ‘highly 
concerned’ ranges between 63.8 (Germany) and 67.8 percent (Spain). In the case of Ja-
pan, the percentage of people that are ‘slightly concerned’ (20,7 percent) is larger com-
pared to all other countries. The 14.9 percent of the participants from the United States 
stating that they are ‘not at all concerned’ is significantly different compared to all other 






Possible Reasons for the Public’s Concern about GCC 











MEX 1.7% 2.5% 5.6% 22.3% 67.9% 
BRA 1.8% 3.6% 7.4% 34.5% 52.8% 
ESP 4.3% 3.4% 22.3% 36.4% 33.6% 
CAN 5.8% 8.9% 20.6% 34.7% 30.1% 
GER 4.9% 6.8% 25.6% 39.2% 23.5% 
JP 2.1% 6.2% 30.5% 46.0% 15.3% 
USA 13.5% 7.8% 21.5% 30.9% 26.2% 
UK 8.3% 10.1% 28.3% 34.7% 18.5% 
NET 5.4% 18.4% 25.2% 35.0% 16.1% 











MEX 2.7% 5.4% 11.1% 35.0% 45.8% 
BRA 2.4% 5.0% 10.0% 42.3% 40.4% 
ESP 3.4% 6.6% 25.7% 38.9% 25.5% 
GER 3.9% 10.3% 25.5% 36.7% 23.7% 
JP 2.2% 7.2% 34.1% 43.1% 13.4% 
CAN 5.8% 10.0% 26.7% 35.1% 22.4% 
UK 7.9% 11.7% 35.1% 32.1% 13.1% 
USA 14.4% 9.9% 28.3% 30.4% 17.0% 
NET 5.4% 22.5% 27.4% 33.1% 11.5% 











GER 4.5% 7.8% 22.2% 38.8% 26.7% 
CAN 10.0% 18.4% 17.6% 35.6% 18.4% 
NET 7.4% 21.8% 18.9% 38.8% 13.0% 
UK 8.4% 17.2% 28.6% 35.7% 10.1% 
BRA 17.0% 22.0% 9.9% 28.1% 23.0% 
USA 14.4% 16.4% 23.4% 30.0% 15.8% 
JP 8.1% 22.6% 32.7% 27.7% 8.9% 
ESP 17.8% 21.3% 26.6% 22.8% 11.6% 
MEX 27.7% 21.9% 11.6% 19.1% 19.6% 
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According to the data, the countries that are least concerned are the United King-
dom, the United States, and the Netherlands. In these countries about 25 percent of the 
population is either not at all or only slightly concerned about the possible impacts of 
GCC. The survey instrument probed about why people are concerned about GCC. To 
gain insight into public attitudes the survey asked respondents about three possible rea-
sons for their concerns. The responses were measured on a 5-point Likert-scale ranging 
from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’ and the results are illustrated in Table 9.  
Very strong levels of agreement were observed with the rational that at some point 
GCC cannot be reversed anymore. In total more than 75 percent of the participants 
agreed or strongly agreed with that sentiment. In Mexico 67.9 and in Brazil 52.8 percent 
of all participants strongly agreed with that statement. Almost 60 percent of all survey 
partakers agreed that their worry is based on the lack of political will to prevent GCC. 
Again, the percentage  of people strongly agreeing with that statement is the highest, by a 
significant margin, in Mexico (45.8 percent) and Brazil (40.4 percent) followed by Spain 
with 25.5 percent. The lack of political will as a reason to worry about GCC seems to be 
most strongly contested among the populations of the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States. In these three countries at least 26 percent disagree or strongly dis-
agree with the statement ‘I worry about GCC because there is no strong political will to 
prevent it’.  
In the case of the third justification, approximately 46 percent in total indicated 
that they worry for future generations and not necessarily for themselves. The data sug-
gest that the German population worries the most relative to the other countries about the 
impact of GCC for future generations. Over 65 percent of Germans agree or strongly 
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agree with the notion that GCC is a concern because of  impacts to future generations, 
followed by Canada with 54 percent, Netherlands and Brazil with both 51 percent, United 
States with 45 percent, Mexico with 38.7 percent, Japan with 37 percent, United King-
dom with 36 percent, and Spain with 34 percent.  
Trust in GCC information. Besides building trust through interpersonal relations 
or ideological values and norms, people can also hold trust in organizations and institu-
tions (Hardin, 2006). The role of trust is an important perceptual dimension that influ-
ences the success of policies targeting GCC as well as the public's willingness to commit 
to behavioral changes. We know from prior studies that when people have a better under-
standing of GCC science and trust in the information, they tend to be more supportive of 
mitigation efforts (Read et al, 1994; Bord et al, 1998). Furthermore, research shows that 
the failures of risk communication are significantly influenced by the public's trust in the 
communicator and in the ability of certain individuals, industries, or institutions respon-
sible for risk management (Renn & Levine, 1991; Kasperson et al, 1992; Nye, 1997). If 
there is no trust in the source, any message and policies are likely to be disregarded, no 
matter how well designed and well delivered. Thus, public trust in organizations whose 
risk management addresses adaptation and mitigation strategies is vital in order to gener-
ate social cooperation to increase their likelihood of success. 
 Therefore, the survey questionnaire asked about the public's level of trust towards 
different sources of information that also play a role in the design, communication, and/or 





Public's Trust towards Different Sources of GCC Information 




















5.4% 13.8 19.4% 51.6% 9.7% 3.46 
Corporations 14.1% 24.9% 36.0% 22.0% 3.0% 2.75 
Family and 
friends 
2.6% 7.8% 33.1% 41.6% 14.9% 3.58 
Governmental 
organizations 
16.0% 25.6% 28.8% 25.9% 3.7% 2.76 
Environmental 
organizations 
8.9% 12.5% 22.5% 39.1% 17.0% 3.43 
Mainstream 
news media 
9.4% 18.1% 30.5% 36.0% 6.0% 3.11 
Scientists 3.4% 8.1% 21.7% 45.0% 21.8% 3.74 
Religious lead-
ers 
33.3% 21.3% 27.3% 13.6% 4.6% 2.35 
Teachers 7.8% 13.7% 40.0% 32.2% 6.3% 3.16 
 
The question was measured on a 5-point Likert-scale and asked: "On a scale of 1 
to 5, where 1 is 'strongly distrust' and 5 is 'strongly trust' what is your level of trust to-
wards the following sources of information regarding global climate change?". As shown 
in Table 10, the question included nine different sources of information. In addition, the 
survey participants were also asked attitude questions, on a 5 point Likert-scale, which 
tested their level of agreement with two different statements related to trust in the availa-
ble scientific GCC. 
 We already have enough scientific data and expert knowledge to fully understand 
all aspects of GCC 
 The scientific findings on GCC is trustworthy 
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 As shown in Table 10, the data suggest that corporations, governmental organiza-
tions, and religious leaders are trusted the least as sources for GCC information: less than 
5 percent of the surveyed population expressed strong trust towards any of them. Instead, 
the majority of the population trusts scientists the most. The results show that 66.8 per-
cent of the public seems to somewhat or strongly trust scientists, followed by television 
weather reports (61.3 percent), family and friends (56.5 percent), and environmental or-
ganizations (56.1 percent). The results also show that a significant amount of people 
seem to be undecided in whether or not they should trust certain sources of information. 
Especially, in regards to teachers, 40 percent of all participants chose the answer category 
'undecided' followed by  corporations (36 percent), family and friends (33.1 percent), and 
the mainstream news media (30.5 percent). The groups that the public seems to strongly 
distrust the most are religious leaders. Over 50 percent of the participants strongly or at 
least somewhat distrust them as a valid source for GCC information. 
The analysis of the survey results by country for the two statements mentioned 
above indicates a contradiction between the level of trust towards the scientists and the 
level of agreement with the sufficiency and trustworthiness of scientific data and expert 
knowledge. Table 11 illustrates the percentage of people for each of the nine surveyed 
countries who agreed or strongly agreed with the two statements. Whereas 66.8 percent 
of the total sample size somewhat or strongly trusts scientists as sources for GCC infor-
mation the data also indicate that many people doubt that the scientific community actu-





Level of Agreement with Different Statements related to GCC Information 
'We already have enough scientific data and expert knowledge to fully understand 
all aspects of GCC' (agree or strongly agree) 
BRA CAN GER JP MEX NET ESP UK USA 
55.7% 36.2% 19.9% 15.4% 31% 38.3% 39.3% 26.4% 32.6% 
'The scientific findings on GCC is trustworthy' (agree or strongly agree) 
BRA CAN GER JP MEX NET ESP UK USA 
63.9% 47.3% 31.8% 32.1% 51.7% 26.2% 41.7% 33.2% 39.1% 
 
Especially, the populations of Japan and Germany seem to believe that signifi-
cantly more research needs to be conducted. In both countries less than 20 percent of the 
participants agreed with the statement that the existing body of knowledge is sufficient. 
In fact, 51 percent in Japan and 49 percent in Germany specifically disagreed with that 
attitude, more than in any other of the surveyed countries. Furthermore, less than 50 per-
cent of the public in seven of the nine countries trust the existing scientific findings.  On-
ly in Mexico and Brazil did more than 50 percent of survey respondents consider the sci-
entific findings as trustworthy.  
Acceptable public strategies. As discussed in the introduction of this study, a 
multitude of different planning approaches and climate change policies already exist to 
mitigate and adapt to GCC. However, without the public support these strategies will not 
be successful nor will decision-makers have the political capital to implement them in the 
first place. Many climate change policies and strategies need to be supported by the pub-
lic though often additional financial burdens or behavioral changes. As a result the survey 
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questionnaire included several questions to determine the public's attitudes towards vari-
ous national climate change policies.  
The participants were asked on a 5-point Likert-scale how much they support or 
oppose each of several policies. The 5-point Likert-scale consists of the answers 'strongly 
oppose', 'moderately oppose', 'undecided', 'moderately support', and 'strongly support'. 
For this first basic analysis, additive indexes were created to aggregate the different strat-
egies into the two different groups, 'Overall support for mitigation policies' and 'Overall 
support for adaptation policies'. Mitigation addresses the core cause of human induced 
climate change namely the large amount of energy consumption and the resulting of 
greenhouse gas emissions. The concept of mitigation is clearly understood by scientists 
and decision makers. 
Adaptation strategies focus on avoiding negative impacts caused by global cli-
mate change. They are essentially adjustments with the aim to increase resilience or de-
crease vulnerability to current or expected impacts of climate change. The indexes were 
calculated based on the degree the participants supported the following policies: 
 Index1: Overall support for mitigation policies 
o require higher fuel efficiency for automobiles 
o require higher energy efficiency standards for buildings, household 
appliances, material production, and building methods 
o require higher taxes on electricity 
o require electric utilities to produce at least 20% of their electricity 
from renewable energy sources by the year 2020 
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o provide subsidies to industries to invest in alternative energy develop-
ment 
o require higher road taxes and tolls 
o require installation of solar panels or photovoltaics on buildings 
o require more compacts, higher density, mixed use, and transit oriented  
development 
 Index 2: Overall support for adaptation policies 
o require cities over the next 220 years to invest in coastal flood protec-
tion and barriers 
o the national/federal government should mandate that I personally take 
action to respond to undesirable impacts of GCC 
o the national/federal government should mandate that local govern-
ments take action to respond to undesirable impacts of GCC 
o the national/federal government should encourage action to respond 
to undesirable impacts of GCC 
o the national/federal government should make me aware of how climate 
change may affect me 
Compared to mitigation, adaptation is a local challenge since GCC impacts can vary be-
tween regions. As a result, the adaption questions were designed in a more general way to 
ensure they can be answered by people in different countries facing different impacts. 
Moreover the public's level of support for the different policies, the willingness to com-
mit to behavioral changes, and/or motivation to spend additional money were analyzed in 
great detail using regression analyses and the results are discussed in the next chapter.  
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Table 12 


















Overall support for 
mitigation policies 
2.2% 5.0% 35.3% 42.6% 14.9% 3.63 
Overall support for 
adaptation policies 
3.1% 4.1% 26.8% 40.4% 25.6% 3.81 
 
Table 12 shows the frequency distribution for the complete survey sample of the 
nine countries combined and indicates the global trends in terms of public support for 
GCC policies and strategies. The data suggest that only a small percentage of people op-
pose any actions against the causes or impacts of GCC. Only 7.2 percent of all survey 
participants oppose mitigation policies, 35.3 percent are undecided and the majority of 
57.5 percent moderately to strongly support mitigation policies in general. On the nation-
al scale the strongest opposition to mitigation policies is among the Dutch public and 
among the citizens of the United States with 16 percent of the participants from these two 
countries moderately or strongly opposing such policies in general. In the remaining sev-
en countries the percentage of people opposing policies to address the causes of GCC is 
less than 8 percent. There are a high percentage of people who are undecided among all 
survey participants with 35.3 percent experienced among all nine countries. In Germany; 
Japan, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom 40% and more of the survey participants 
indicated they are undecided whether they should support mitigation policies or not. In 
the remaining surveyed countries the percentage of people being undecided is less but 
still substantial and ranges from 21 percent in Mexico to 36 percent in the United States. 
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At least 45 percent of the public among all nine countries generally supports mitigation 
policies. The data suggest that the public in Brazil, Canada, Germany, Japan, Mexico, and 
Spain support mitigation policies with over 50 percent.   
 In terms of adaptation policies the results are very similar compared to mitigation, 
both on the global and national level. When combining all survey participants 7.2 percent 
oppose supporting adaptation strategies, 26.8% percent are undecided, and 65 percent at 
least moderately support the idea that adapting to GCC through policies and strategies is 
necessary. Nevertheless the results indicate a relative strong opposition to GCC adapta-
tion in the United States compared to all the other countries. About 20 percent of the sur-
vey participants in the United States indicated that they are not planning on supporting 
adaptation policies. In addition the United States and the United Kingdom are the only 
cases where fewer than 50 percent of the survey participants seem to moderately or 
strongly support GCC adaption policies.  
Summary  
The underlying hypothesis of the basic frequency analysis was that the public per-
ception of GCC in terms of threat and risk, saliency of the issue, trust in GCC infor-
mation, and acceptable public strategies vary among countries. The data does confirm 
differences between some countries but also show similarities between others. The popu-
lations of Mexico and Brazil seem to be the most concerned about GCC, perceive it as a 
high risk, and want their respective governments to take stronger action against the im-
pacts and causes of GCC.  Whereas the survey participants of the Netherlands, United 
Kingdom, and the Unites States always were among the countries with the lowest amount 
of concern for GCC impacts, threats, and risks.  
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The data also show that more survey participants in these three countries chal-
lenge the reality and/or danger of GCC than in any other country.  A third group of coun-
tries consisting of Japan, Canada, Germany and Spain also showed similar frequency dis-
tributions in regards to the political saliency, risks, and threats of GCC. According to the 
data, the public of these four countries are not as concerned as people living in Brazil and 
Mexico, but still perceives GCC as a significant issue, supports government involvement 
and only a very small percentage of people doubts the existence of GCC and its potential 
negative impacts. Despite difference between the nine countries in terms of the perceived 
political saliency and the risks and threats of GCC the result show similar trends among 
all nine countries. For example, in all nine countries a significant amount of participants 
indicated that they worry about GCC, are concerned about its possible impacts, and per-
ceive it as a politically salient issue.  
Furthermore, a substantial percentage of people believe climate change impacts 
are already or soon will be experienced somewhere on earth. Simultaneously less people, 
nut still a substantial percentage believe that their own regions are experiencing danger-
ous impacts or will within the next 10 years. Generally, the survey shows that harms from 
GCC are usually seen as impacting other places more severely, more often and  sooner 
than in one’s own region. In regards to the public's level of trust towards different sources 
of information, scientists seem to be most trusted in all nine countries, followed by family 
and friends.  On the contrary, the public in all nine countries seem to share high levels of 
distrust towards religious leaders, governmental organizations, and corporations. Another 
significant finding is that the high percentages of people in all nine countries who indi-
cated that they are undecided or uncertain towards all the listed sources of information. 
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This indicates a high level of general uncertainty towards the issue of GCC. This notion 
is further supported by seemingly contradicting survey results from similar questions or 
rather statements.  Although scientists are highly trusted and the most trusted source in all 
nine countries results also indicates a significant amount of people doubting the validity 
and sufficiency of the existing body of knowledge. This contradiction is another indica-
tion for the uncertainty the public seems to experience when being confronted with the 
issue of GCC.  
The last segment of questions discussed in this chapter focused on the public's 
support for adaptation and mitigation policies in general without looking at specific strat-
egies. Based on the data, the majority of the public seems to support efforts to reduce the 
causes and impacts of GCC. In fact, among the nine countries the Netherlands were the 
only country were less than 50 percent, but still a significant amount supported mitigation 
policies. However, similar to the public's level of trust towards sources of GCC infor-
mation a large number of people indicated that they are undecided to whether or not sup-
port any GCC strategy. With GCC being still a controversial topic in the political arena 
and among some groups of the population, the people who are undecided today could 
make the difference in the future success of various GCC policies.  
 Therefore, it is crucial to gain a better understanding what factors influence the 
public in their decision process. At this point the public's attitudes towards GCC policies 
was only analyzed and discussed in a preliminary form to illustrate basic trends among 
the total sample size and among the nine countries separately. The interrelationships be-
tween socio-demographic characteristics, perceptions and attitudes towards GCC, and 
support for general and specific GCC policies among the survey participants in the nine 
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countries is the focus of the next two chapters. The next chapter discusses the results of 
different regression analyses with the aim to answer the following research question. 
 What importance do GCC risk perceptions and attitudes play in the public’s will-
ingness to support mitigation and adaptation strategies? 
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Chapter 5 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GCC RISK PERCEPTIONS, POLICY SUP-
PORT, AND BEHAVIOR 
The following section addresses one research question underlying this study, 
which focuses on the relationships between GCC perceptions and attitudes towards GGC 
policies (adaptation and mitigation) among the nine countries.  The central research ques-
tion of this chapter is: 
 What importance do GCC risk perceptions and attitudes play in the public’s will-
ingness to support mitigation and adaptation strategies? 
In order to answer the research questions hypotheses were tested using various 
statistical methods. Four different analytical tools were applied to the data, such as fre-
quency distributions, crosstabs, standard multiple regressions, and stepwise regressions.  
Frequency distributions were used to show differences between countries for key varia-
bles used in the regression analyses and to provide a basis for interpreting the regression 
results. Crosstabs were used to explore relationships between different categorical index-
es or relevant to the first research question. Similar to the analysis of frequencies, the 
crosstabs also provide helpful insights to interpret the results of different regression anal-
yses. For each crosstab two tests were performed to ensure statistical significant relation-
ships between the variables and between particular cells of the crosstab table. In particu-
lar, the chi square test is used to determine if there is a relationship between the two cate-
gorical variables.  This study only considered a relationship between variables if the chi 
square test resulted in at least p< .05 because the value of .05 is the conventionally con-
sidered threshold of statistical significance (Field, 2009). 
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Standard linear regressions were used, for example, to explicate the relationships 
between independent variables such as risk perceptions, attitudes, and socio-economic 
characteristics and dependent variables such as the public’s level of support for GCC pol-
icies and their willingness to commit to behavioral changes.  Regression analysis not only 
allows the confirmation of relationship between predictor variables (independent varia-
ble) and an outcome variable (dependent variable), but also enables the determination of 
the strength of the relationship and the amount of variability in one variable that is shared 
by the other. 
Three outputs of the regression analysis are important in this research. First, the 
multiple correlation coefficient (R) measures the strength of the correlation between the 
predictor variables and the outcome variables.  In general an R score of 0.5 and higher 
indicates that the independent variables have strong effects on the dependent variables, 
whereas a value of less than 0.3 suggests a weak relationship (Field, 2009). Second, the 
coefficient of determination (R2) illustrates how much the independent variables can ex-
plain variation in the dependent variables. Since multiple independent variables per re-
gression can raise the R2 and be a potential source for error, this study reports on the ad-
justed R2 in cases with more than two predictor variables in a regression model. The ad-
justed R2 compensates for the use of more predictors and adjusts the value downwards 
(Field, 2009). Third, the analysis of variance (ANOVA) test has two important purposes. 
First, ANOVA test was used to determine whether or not a regression model predicts an 
outcome variable well and secondly, confirms that the results are statistically significant 
and can be generalized for the countries' entire population. This was considered the case 
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when the calculated F-ratio was significant at p>.001, which means that there is less than 
a 0.1% chance that the particular F-ratio would happen if the null hypothesis were true. 
Stepwise regressions were conducted in cases where the standard multiple regres-
sions showed a large effect between predictor variables and outcome variables.  The aim 
of the stepwise regression was to determine the subset of independent variables that have 
the strongest relationship to a dependent variable. In stepwise regressions the predictor 
variables are entered into the model based on their statistical contribution in explaining 
the variance in the dependent variable. First, the predictor that has the highest simple cor-
relation with the outcome variable is entered into the model. If this predictor significantly 
improves the ability of the model to predict the outcome, then this predictor is retained in 
the model and the computer searches for a second predictor. The criterion used for select-
ing this second predictor is that it is the variable that explains most of the remaining vari-
ation of the outcome variable. Each time a predictor is added to the equation, a removal 
test is made of the least useful predictor, thus identifying the single independent variable 
that has the strongest relationship to the dependent variable  
Risk Perception, Attitudes, & Support for GCC Policies 
The following discussion explores the role GCC risk perceptions and attitudes 
play in the public’s willingness to support mitigation and adaptation policies. 
 What importance do GCC risk perceptions and attitudes play in the public’s will-
ingness to support mitigation and adaptation policies? 
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In this analysis two hypotheses were tested to structure the analysis and to discover the 
insights necessary to answer the research question. The hypotheses were tested through 
frequency distributions, crosstabs and regression analyses and are as follows; 
 The public’s general support for mitigation and adaptation policies is linked to 
the way the public perceives 1) the level of consequences from possible environ-
mental consequences and 2) the level of threat resulting from global climate 
change 
 The public’s position towards climate change is the main reason for the 1) low 
policy support, 2) willingness to pay for GCC policies, and 3) willingness to 
change their behavior related to mitigation and adaptation. 
Relationships between perceived GCC threats, consequences from environ-
mental changes & public policy support. Discussed in the previous chapter, the fre-
quency distribution of the survey data suggest that the majority of people moderately to 
strongly support adaptation and mitigation policies in general. However, a considerable 
number of people still seem to be undecided. The data show that 35.3 percent of all sur-
vey participants are undecided on whether to oppose or support mitigation policies.  In 
regards to adaptation policies 26.8 percent are still undecided.   
The survey instrument asked participants what would be the severity of conse-
quences they would expect over the next 20 years from different environmental changes. 
The surveyed population was asked to respond to seven potential environmental changes 
which included: further extinction of endangered animals and plants, deterioration of the 
ozone layer, worsening of urban air pollution, extensive loss of forests and/or wetlands, 
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increasing frequency of major hurricanes and/or floods, increasing frequency of droughts, 
and substantial increase in global warming resulting in global climate change. Based on 
these results, an additive and categorical index for the overall perceived level of conse-
quences was developed for these environmental changes. In turn this index was used to 
test the relationships between the public’s perceived level of consequences from envi-
ronmental changes in general and the degree of support for mitigation and adaptation pol-
icies. These relationships are the focus of the next section. As shown in Table 13, the ma-
jority of the population in every country expects ‘serious negative consequences’ from 
environmental changes over the next 20 years.  
However, in the Netherlands with 55.5 percent, in the UK with 53 percent, and in 
the United States with 54.3%, the majorities are rather narrow compared to the remaining 
six countries, such as Canada with 70.5 percent, Brazil with 87.8 percent, or Mexico with 
94.7 percent.  If you combine the two answer categories ‘moderate negative consequenc-
es’ and ‘serious negative consequences’, at least 80 percent of the population in each of 
the nine countries expect moderate to serious negative consequences from changes in the 
environment within the next 20 years.  
Only very small percentages of the survey participants question whether that envi-
ronmental changes will happen or that they won't result in negative consequences. The 
data indicate that is the U.S. population that expresses the most skepticism regarding 
GCC. In the case of U.S. close to 8 percent of the surveyed population either does not 
believe that any environmental changes will occur or these will not have any negative 

























MEX 0.1% 0.1% 1.0% 4.1% 94.7% 
BRA 0.6% 0.8% 2.9% 8.0% 87.8% 
ESP 1.2% 1.1% 7.1% 14.7% 75.9% 
CAN 0.9% 2.0% 4.8% 21.7% 70.5% 
JP 0.1% 1.0% 6.4% 29.3% 63.2% 
GER 1.8% 1.0% 6.9% 22.7% 67.6% 
NET 0.9% 2.7% 11.2% 29.7% 55.5% 
UK 0.7% 2.8% 15.3% 28.1% 53.0% 
USA 2.6% 5.3% 13.1% 24.7% 54.3% 
 
Another categorical index created specifically from responses to the survey is 
based on how the public perceives the level of threat of global climate change over the 
next 50 years for  'plants and animals', 'people in other countries', 'people in your coun-
try', and 'you  and your family'. The participants were asked to rank the level of treat for 
each area on a 4-point Likert-scale ranging from to 'no threat at all' to 'a very high threat'. 
Table 14 illustrates the results of this index for each of the nine countries. The mean val-
ues and frequencies suggest that the public perceives GCC as a potential threat over the 
next 50 years. In terms of posing a high threat the data show significant differences 
among the countries. In Mexico and Brazil over 80 percent indicate that they believe 
GCC will be a high threat over the next 50 years. In contrast only 19.2 percent in the 




Public's Perception of Threat resulting from GCC over the Next 50 Years 
Country 1 
no threat at all 
2 




a high threat 
Mean Std. Dev. 
MEX 0.2% 0.8% 11.0% 87.9% 3.87 .38 
BRA 0.3% 1.4% 14.3% 84.1% 3.82 .43 
GER 1.8% 4.5% 33.5% 60.2% 3.52 .67 
CAN 1.5% 5.4% 32.8% 60.3% 3.52 .67 
ESP 2.7% 8.6% 32.0% 56.6% 3.43 .76 
JP 1.0% 9.8% 42.5% 46.8% 3.35 .69 
UK 3.5% 11.7% 43.3% 41.5% 3.23 .79 
USA 8.2% 12.5% 30.0% 49.3% 3.20 .95 
NET 2.8% 20.1% 58.0% 19.2% 2.94 .71 
 
On the other end of the spectrum, over 15 percent of the participants in the United 
Kingdom (15.2 percent), the United States (20.7 percent), and the Netherlands (22.9 per-
cent) perceive GCC as not a threat or a slight threat. Nevertheless, the overwhelming ma-
jority in each country acknowledges that GCC will pose at least some threat if not a high 
threat over the next 50 years. 
Policy support & perceived levels of consequences from future environmental 
changes. Table 15 shows the results of the first cross tabulation that tests the relation-
ships between degree of support for GCC mitigation and adaption policies and perceive 
level of consequences from environmental changes for all nine countries combined. On 
the global scale with the data of all nine countries combined, the chi-square test was 
found to be p<0.0005. This suggests a statistical significant relationship between support 
for mitigation and adaptation strategies and perceived level of consequences from future 
environmental changes. For example, 49.2 percent of the people who strongly oppose 
mitigation policies and 44.6 percent who strongly oppose adaptation policies also believe 
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that GCC and other environmental changes are either not happening at all or do not result 
in any negative consequences. Furthermore, 48.8 percent of the participants who strongly 
or moderately oppose mitigation policies and 57.9 percent who strongly or moderately 
oppose adaptation policies also expect slight negative consequences from environmental 
changes over the next 20 years. On the other end of the scale, 91.7 percent of the people 
who strongly support mitigation policies and 92.1 percent who strongly support adapta-
tion polices also expect serious negative consequences. This means that if people believe 
that future changes to the environment have serious negative consequences they are more 
likely to support mitigation and adaption strategies. This global trend is supported by the 
data for the individual nine countries as well. Over 80 percent of the participants in Bra-
zil, Canada, Germany, Japan, Mexico the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States who strongly support mitigation or adaptation policies also expect seri-
ous negative consequences from environment changes. 
For Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom the data indicate approximately 
70% of the public moderately supporting mitigation or adaptation policies also expects 
serious negative consequences from GCC and other environmental changes. In addition, 
in the cases of the public in Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States the data 
show strong relationships between opposing any type of GCC policy and not expecting 
any environmental changes in the foreseeable future. For example, in Germany 46.2 per-
cent, in the Netherlands, 15.4 percent, and in the United States 22.5 percent who strongly 
opposed mitigation policies also do not expect any environmental changes, including 




Relationship between Public Support of GCC Policies and the Perceived Level of Conse-
quences from Environmental Changes 





































not likely at all to 
happen  
Column%                                        23.5% 2.5% 0.8% 0.1% 0.5% 
no neg. cons.  
Column %                                              25.9% 9.6% 2.1% 0.1% 0.4% 
slightly neg. cons.    
Column %                                           23.5% 25.3% 13.8% 2.5% 1.0% 
moderate neg. cons.  
Column % 18.5% 36.3% 28.5% 16.9% 6.5% 
serious neg. cons.  
Column % 8.6% 26.4% 54.9% 80.4% 91.7% 
 











not likely at all to 
happen  
Column%                                        18.9% 1.4% 1.0% 0.1% 0.4% 
no neg. cons.  
Column %                                              25.7% 9.5% 2.3% 0.2% 0.2% 
slightly neg. cons.  
                  Column %                                           26.1% 31.8% 16.4% 2.6% 1.3% 
moderate neg. cons.  
Column % 20.3% 35.5% 33.3% 19.5% 6.1% 
serious neg. cons.  
Column % 9.0% 22.0% 47.0% 77.6% 92.1% 
 
Furthermore, 42.9 percent of the respondents in Germany and 18.2 percent in the United 
States who strongly oppose adaption policies do not anticipate any environmental chang-
es at all. 
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Overall, the analysis identified several significant relationships for the nine sur-
veyed countries. The data finds strong correlations between the public’s support for GCC 
mitigation and adaptation policies and their perceived level of consequences from envi-
ronmental changes. People who strongly oppose GCC policies are also less likely to be-
lieve in negative consequences from environmental changes, whereas someone who is 
very supportive of mitigation and adaptation measures also tends to take changes to the 
environment very serious.  
Policy support & perceived levels of GCC threat. Using the same methodology a 
second crosstabulation was performed to test the relationship between mitigation/ adap-
tion policy support and perceived level of threat resulting from climate change and fur-
ther test the underlying hypotheses:  
 The public’s general support for mitigation and adaptation policies is linked to 1) 
the way the public perceives the level of consequences from possible environmen-
tal consequences and 2) the level of threat resulting from global climate change 
Table 16 illustrates the relationships on the global scale using data from all nine 
countries combined into one sample. Similar to the contingency table discussed above, 
the chi-square test with p<0.0005 suggests a statistical significant relationship between 
the two.  The data show that about 46 percent of the population who strongly opposes 
mitigation and adaptation policies also perceives GCC as no threat at all. Also, over 60 
percent who strongly or moderately oppose GCC policies also stated that they only few 
GCC as a slight threat. In terms of the people who are undecided in whether or not to 




Relationship between Public Support of GCC Policies and the Perceived Level of Threat 
from GCC 
All Countries Combined 



































no threat at all 
Column%                                        46.3% 11.3% 2.5% 0.2% 0.1% 
a slight threat 
Column %                                              30.2% 31.6% 13.5% 3.4% 0.7% 
some threat 
Column %                                           13.0% 34.3% 43.2% 31.8% 15.9% 
a high threat  
Column % 10.5% 22.8% 40.8% 64.6% 83.2% 
 











no threat at all 
Column%                                        46.4% 11.5% 2.1% 0.2% 0.2% 
a slight threat 
Column %                                              31.1% 29.4% 17.2% 3.8% 1.0% 
some threat  
                 Column %                                           13.1% 42.6% 46.7% 35.5% 16.3% 
a high threat 
Column % 9.5% 16.6% 34.0% 60.5% 82.5% 
 
Another significant relationship that was observed was between level of support 
for GCC policies and the belief that GCC poses a high level of threat. For this case, 83.2 
percent of people who strongly support mitigation policies and 82.5% that strongly sup-
port adaptation polices perceive GCC as a high threat. On the international scale five out 
of the nine countries show significant relationships between strong public support for 
mitigation policies and perceptions of GGC as a high threat. For Canada the data found 
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that over 90 percent of the people who strongly support mitigation policies also perceive 
GCC as a high threat to plants and animals, people in other countries, people in their own 
country, or to themselves and their family. This is followed by the United States with 85.4 
percent, Spain with 84.3 percent, and Germany with 82.6 percent. The fifth and last coun-
try where this relationship was statistical significant was the Netherlands where 45 per-
cent of the participants strongly supporting mitigation policies perceived GCC as a high 
threat. As shown in chapter 4, within these five countries between 45 percent (Nether-
lands) to 65 percent (Spain) of the populations moderately or strongly support mitigation 
policies in general. Furthermore, 20 percent of the Spanish, 18 percent of the Canadian, 
13 percent of United States, 12 percent of the Dutch, and 11 percent of the German popu-
lation in general strongly supports mitigation policies. 
All nine countries confirm significant relationships between strong support for the 
study’s adaptation policies and perceiving GCC as a large threat. The data suggest that in 
Mexico 93.7 percent, in Brazil 91.1 percent, in the United States 86.6 percent, in Germa-
ny 85.9 percent, in Canada 84.7 percent, in Japan 80.8 percent, in Spain 79.6 percent, in 
the United Kingdom 75.3 percent, and in the Netherlands 38.1 percent of the public who 
strongly support adaptation policies also perceive GCC as a high threat. According to the 
frequency distributions between 48 percent (United States) and 86 percent (Mexico) of 
the public ‘moderately’ or ‘strongly’ support adaption policies in general. Moreover, over 
40 percent in Brazil (45%) and Mexico (42%) show strong support for adaptation poli-
cies, compared to less than 30 percent in Canada (29%), Germany (25%), and Spain 
(23%). In the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States less than 20 per-
cent of the public seems to strongly support adaptation policies. 
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Furthermore, the performed tests for statistical significance also showed that in 
Germany 61.5 percent of the participants who strongly opposed mitigation policies and 
50 percent who strongly opposed adaptation policies also do not perceive GCC as a threat 
at all.  The survey data from the Netherlands also shows similar relationships. Within the 
Dutch population results indicate that 33.3 percent who strongly oppose mitigation poli-
cies and 40.6 percent who strongly oppose adaptation policies do not feel threatened by 
GCC.  For the populations in Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States the data 
only show a relationship between strong opposition to adaptation policies and perceiving 
GCC as no threat at all.  In Spain 70 percent who strongly opposed adaptation policies 
also perceived GCC as no threat followed by the United Stated with 49.1 percent and the 
United Kingdom with 48 percent. 
The data finds strong positive correlations between the public’s support for GCC 
mitigation and adaptation policies and their perceived overall level of threat from GCC. 
People who strongly oppose GCC policies are also very likely to perceive GCC as ‘no 
threat’ or only ‘slight threat’, whereas someone who is very supportive of mitigation and 
adaptation measures also tends to view GCC as a significant threat. This suggests as more 
people support mitigation and adaption policies more people will also consider GCC a 
significant threat. Overall, the analysis confirmed the hypotheses and identified several 
significant relationships for the nine surveyed countries between the public’s general 
support for adaption and mitigation polices on the one hand and the perceived level of 
consequences from environmental changes and the level of threat resulting from GCC on 
the other.  
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Relationships between attitude, levels of concern, public support for GCC 
policies, & willingness to commit to behavioral changes. The following discussion of 
the regression analysis is divided into different parts based on three groups of dependent 
variables which were all tested with the same dependent variables presenting public’s at-
titudes towards climate change and levels of concern. In particular, the second hypothesis 
underlying the above research question (see 5.2) tested to what degree the public’s lack of 
policy support, unwillingness to pay and commitment to behavioral changes can be ex-
plained by public attitudes and levels of concern towards global climate change. The pub-
lic’s preference towards four general climate change strategies and the level of belief in 
the reality of global climate change were used to describe a person’s attitude towards 
GCC. The remaining independent variables focused on the public’s level of concern re-
garding possible dangerous impacts of GCC on different geographical and personal levels 
as well as timescales.  
For the first attitude variable the survey respondents were asked to choose one out 
of four possible general strategies on global climate change that comes closest to their 
opinion. These strategies and the frequency distribution by country are displayed in Table 
17. By asking the participants to choose one particular basic strategy the person’s attitude 
in terms of the general long-term policy approach become apparent. Together with the 
public’s level of belief in the reality of GCC (Table 18) it is possible to draw conclusions 
regarding someone’s general attitude towards GCC. With the exception of Japan the 
strategy chosen most often by the participants was that ‘GCC is a serious problem and we 




Public's Attitude towards taking Political Action against GCC 
a) we should not take any steps that would have economic costs until we are certain that 
GCC is really a problem 
BRA CAN GER JP MEX NET ESP UK USA 
1.4% 11.9% 6.8% 5.1% 1.2% 12.2% 7.1% 14.2% 23.5% 
b) we should take some steps just in case GCC is real 
BRA CAN GER JP MEX NET ESP UK USA 
9.0% 19.3% 10.7% 51.5% 4.7% 25.6% 16.1% 28.8% 22.0% 
c) we only should take steps to address GCC which are low in costs 
BRA CAN GER JP MEX NET ESP UK USA 
1.6% 8.2% 14.3% 3.9% 4.1% 14.7% 7.2% 13.7% 10.7% 
d) GCC is a serious problem and we should begin taking steps now even if this involves 
significant costs 
BRA CAN GER JP MEX NET ESP UK USA 
88.0% 60.7% 68.2% 39.6% 90.0% 47.5% 69.7% 43.3% 43.8% 
 
With regards to Japan the data indicate that the majority of the population prefers 
the option of taking ‘some steps just in case GCC is real’. However, when combining two 
answer categories, the data generally indicate that a significant number of people in Can-
ada (21.1 percent), Germany (21.3 percent), the Netherlands (26.9 percent), the United 
Kingdom (27.9 percent), and in the United States (34.3 percent) either oppose any poli-
cies that might hurt the economy or only support policies which are low in costs.  The 
second attitudinal variable is an index which was created from the responses of several 
questions, based on level of belief in the reality of global climate change. As shown in 
Table 18, the overwhelming majority of the population strongly believes that GCC is real. 
Nevertheless, a small percentage of 10.2 percent in the United States are still not con-
vinced that GCC is occurring. The participant’s answers to the following survey ques-
tions provided the remaining four independent variables focusing on concern towards 
GCC:  
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 How long, if ever, will it take until dangerous impacts of GCC will be experienced 
somewhere on Earth? 
 How long, if ever, will it take until dangerous impacts of GCC will be experienced 
in your region? 
 How concerned are you about the possible impacts of GCC? 
 How concerned are you about the level of threat resulting from GCC to you and 
your family? 
As already discussed in the previous chapter, the data suggest that the majority of the 
population believes that GCC is already happening somewhere on Earth, but is less con-
vinced that it is already occurring in their own region.  Based on the frequency distribu-
tion for all nine countries combined 60.7 percent believe that GCC is already being expe-
rienced somewhere, but only 42.8 percent stated that they already experienced dangerous 
impacts. About 37 percent of the respondents believe that it will take at least 25 years, if 
ever, until they personally will experience any negative impacts linked to GCC. 
Nevertheless, the majority of the public is concerned about global climate change 
and its potential impacts. In total, 83.7 percent of the participants stated at least some 
concern regarding the possible impacts of GCC.  However, only 33.4 percent of the re-
spondents perceive GCC as a high threat to their family and to themselves. Instead, close 
to 10 percent feels that GCC does not pose any danger to themselves or their families 
over the next 50 years. This supports the argument that the public perceives GCC as an 
issue removed in space and time only effecting future generations in less developed coun-
tries (Leiserowitz, 2005; Ockwell et al, 2009). 
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 Table 18 
Public's Level of Belief regarding the Reality of GCC 












Mean Std. Dev. 
MEX 98.5% 1.1% 0.4% 0.0% 0.02 0.16 
BRA 98.4% 1.1% 0.1% 0.4% 0.03 0.22 
JP 95.3% 2.7% 0.8% 1.2% 0.08 0.40 
ESP 94.0% 2.3% 1.2% 2.4% 0.12 0.53 
GER 93.6% 3.0% 1.3% 2.1% 0.12 0.51 
CAN 93.5% 3.2% 1.5% 1.9% 0.12 0.49 
UK 86.7% 4.9% 3.1% 5.3% 0.27 0.76 
NET 85.0% 6.9% 3.1% 5.0% 0.28 0.75 
USA 80.7% 4.6% 4.4% 10.2% 0.44 0.98 
 
  Furthermore, the data suggest that people who already experienced GCC or be-
lieve they will experience GCC soon are more concerned compared to people who be-
lieve they will not experience impacts from GCC in the near future. The dependent varia-
bles used for the regressions included different additive indexes, based on survey answers 
from various survey questions, as well as single survey questions addressing the public’s 
level of support for mitigation and adaption policies as well as their willingness to pay 
more or commit to behavioral changes in order to reduce GCC. The dependent variables 
were the following: 
 Overall indexes of the public’s support for mitigation policies, adaptation poli-
cies, and  public’s willingness to pay more for mitigation  and changes in behav-
ior  
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 Specific indexes of the public’s support for energy efficiency policies, economic 
incentives, planning or adaptation strategies  
 Specific indexes of the public’s willingness to pay more for renewable ener-
gy/energy efficiency and for taxes to reduce GCC 
 Specific survey questions addressing the public’s willingness to use public transit 
for most of their travel, install solar panels on their home, buy mainly locally 
produced goods, use mainly recycled paper, purchase only energy saving appli-
ances, and insulate their home and apartment 
General support for GCC policies. For six out of the nine countries, the results   
of the regression analysis show a strong and statistical significant relationship between 
the independent variables capturing the public’s attitude and levels of concern towards 
climate change and the dependent variable presenting the public’s support for mitigation 
policies in general. As already discussed in the previous chapter, the dependent variable 
was created from survey questions which asked the survey participants for their level of 
support for different mitigation policies on a 5 point scale ranging from strongly oppose 
to strongly support. As illustrated in Table 19, the results show a strong relationship with 
R>0.5 between the independent and dependent variable for the United States,  Nether-
lands, Spain, United Kingdom, Germany, and Canada. Between 25.4 percent (Canada) 
and 44.7 percent (United States) of the variation in the public’s overall support for miti-
gation can be explained by the independent variables. The stepwise regressions show that 
the level of concern regarding possible impacts of GCC is the strongest of the different 
independent or predictor variables for all six countries.  
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Table 19 
Strong Relationships between the Predictor Variables and Overall Support for Mitigation 
Policies 
Countries 
Standard Regression Stepwise Regression 
Model ANOVA strongest 
two variables 
Model 
R Adj. R2 F Sig. R Adj. R2  
USA .671 .447 128.633 .000 
concern of pos. impacts  .626 .392 
 & level of belief in GCC .653 .426 
NET .636 .401 97.486 .000 
concern of pos. impacts .566 .319 
& pref. general strategy .613 .374 
ESP .596 .350 74.610 .000 
concern of pos. impacts .530 .280 
 & pref. general strategy .575 .329 
UK .570 .320 64.461 .000 
concern of pos. impacts .534 .284 
& impacts exp. on Earth .554 .305 
GER .523 .268 51.280 .000 
concern of pos. impacts .478 .228 
& pref. general strategy .508 .256 
CAN .512 .254 31.528 .000 
concern of pos. impacts .469 .219 
& concern for family  .490 .237 
 
However, when looking at the second strongest dependent variable the stepwise 
regressions identified country specific differences. In the cases of the Netherlands, Spain, 
and Germany the second most influential independent variable is one of the attitudinal 
variables which asked the participants to choose between four general climate strategies. 
For the participants in the United Kingdom the data shows that the survey question ask-
ing how long it will take until GCC will be experienced somewhere on Earth is the sec-
ond strongest independent variable. For Canada the stepwise regressions demonstrate that 
the perceived level of threat of GCC over the next 50 years for oneself and family is the 
second strongest predictor variable for mitigation support, whereas in the United States 




Strong Relationships between the Predictor Variables and Overall Support for Adaptation 
Policies 
Countries 
Standard Regression Stepwise Regression 
Model ANOVA strongest 
two variables 
Model 
R Adj. R2 F Sig. R Adj. R2  
USA .757 .570 209.927 .000 
concern of pos. impacts .706 .498 
& pref. general strategy .731 .534 
UK .675 .451 111.669 .000 
concern of pos. impacts .616 .379 
& pref. general strategy .646 .416 
GER .634 .398 91.709 .000 
concern of pos. impacts .598 .357 
& pref. general strategy .617 .379 
ESP .632 .395 90.148 .000 
concern of pos. impacts .568 .321 
& pref. general strategy .611 .372 
NET .619 .379 88.856 .000 
concern of pos. impacts .562 .315 
& pref. general strategy .602 .361 
CAN .570 .317 42.686 .000 
concern of pos. impacts .519 .268 
& pref. general strategy .547 .297 
JP .524 .274 51.750 .000 
concern of pos. impacts .421 .176 
& concern for family  .470 .219 
 
For the three remaining three countries Japan, Mexico, and Brazil the R score is less 
than .5 indicating no large effect between the independent variables and the level of sup-
port for mitigation policies. 
In terms of the relationship between the attitude and levels of concern towards 
GCC and support for adaptation policies the standard regressions identified strong rela-
tionships for seven of the nine surveyed countries. The dependent variable, the index for 
the public’s overall support for adaptation policies, is based on single survey questions 
which asked the survey participants for their level of support for different specific adapta-
tion policies on a 5 point scale ranging from strongly oppose to strongly support. The fre-
quency distribution and a more detailed discussion of the creation of this index were pro-
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vided in the previous chapter. As shown in Table 20, the results of the country specific 
standard regressions confirmed significant and strong relationships with R>.5 between 
the predictor and outcome variables for the samples from the United States (R=.757 & 
Adj. R2=.570), the United Kingdom (R=.675 & Adj. R2=.451), Germany (R=.634 & Adj. 
R2=.398), Spain (R=.632 & Adj. R2=.395), the Netherlands (R=.619 & Adj. R2=.379), 
Canada (R=.570 & Adj.R2=.317), and Japan (R=.524 & Adj. R2=.274).  
As a result, the variation in the public’s overall support for adaptation policies can 
be explained to 57 percent in United States, to 45.1 percent in the United Kingdom, to 
39.8 percent in Germany, to 39.5 percent in Spain, to 33.7 percent in the Netherlands, to 
31.7 percent in Canada, and to 27.4 percent in Japan by the predictor variables. Again, the 
ensuing stepwise regression identified the level of concern variable as the predictor vari-
able with the strongest relationship to the dependent variable, in this case the public’s 
overall support for adaptation policies. Furthermore, for six of the seven countries who 
showed a strong relationship between the attitude and levels of concern towards GCC and 
support for adaptation policies the attitudinal variable asking the participants to choose 
between four general climate strategies is the second strongest predictor variable. Only 
the Japanese sample identified the perceived level of threat of GCC over the next 50 
years for oneself and family as the second strongest predictor variable for adaptation pol-
icy support.  
Due to the identified strong relationships the previous two overall indexes of mit-
igation and adaptation support were further broken into three more specific thematic in-
dexes. This allowed testing the relationship between the independent variables and the 
public’s support for energy efficiency policies, economic incentives, and for planning and 
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adaptation strategies. All three sub-indexes are based on survey questions also used for 
the creation of the indexes of the public’s support for mitigation and adaptation policies. 
The data found a strong relationship between the predictor variables and the sub-index of 
the public’s support for energy efficiency policies for four of the nine countries. Based on 
the results of the standard regression analysis the answers provided by the participants 
show a strong relationship between the predictor and outcome variable in the United 
States (R=.627 & Adj. R2=.390), in the Netherlands (R=593 & Adj. R2=.347), in Spain 
(R=539 & Adj. R2=.286) and in Germany (R=.530 and Adj. R2=.276).  Unfortunately, the 
standard regression does not show a strong relationship for the remaining five countries 
the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, Mexico, and Brazil.  
On the global scale, however, the regression analyses show a large effect of 
R=.545 and R2= .297 of the predictor variables on the outcome variable with  the level of 
concern variable and the attitudinal variable capturing the public’s preference of 4 differ-
ent general GCC strategies having the strongest impact on the public’s level of support 
for energy efficiency policies. In the cases of the United States, the Netherlands, Spain, 
Germany the stepwise regressions also identified the level of concern variable as the most 
influential variable. In addition, with the exception of the United States, the public’s 
choice regarding the four general GCC policies is the second strongest independent vari-
able. The data from the United States show that the level of belief in the reality of GCC is 
the second strongest variable after the public’s level of concern regarding possible im-
pacts of GCC.  
Furthermore, the data from the United States and the Netherlands also indicate a 
strong relationship between the predictor variables and the second sub-index capturing 
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the public’s support for economic incentives. The data indicates that among the public in 
the United States 29.8 percent (R=.550 & Adj. R2=.298) and in the Netherlands 30.9 per-
cent (R=.560 & Adj. R2=.309) of the variation in the public’s support for economic incen-
tives can be explained trough the predictor variables. In addition, at least the United 
Kingdom (R=.485 & Adj. R2=.229) Spain (R=.480 & Adj. R2=.229), Canada (R=.420 & 
Adj. R2=.167), and Germany (R=.385 & Adj. R2=.142) show a medium relationship be-
tween the attitude and levels of concern towards GCC and support for economic incen-
tives. For both countries, United States and Netherlands, the performed stepwise regres-
sions confirm the level of concern variable as the predictor variables with the strongest 
relationship to the dependent variable. The second strongest variable is for the Nether-
lands the public’s attitude towards four general policies listed in Table 17 and for United 
States the level of believe regarding the reality of GCC shown in Table 18.  
 For the third sub-index, the public’s support for planning and adaptation policies, 
the predictor variables showed a strong effect with R>.5 for the data collected from the 
United States, the United Kingdom,  the Netherlands, Germany, Spain, and Canada. As 
displayed in Table 21 the predictor variables seem to have the strongest effect among the 
public in the United States (R=.756 & Adj. R2=.568), followed by the United Kingdom  
(R=.662 & Adj. R2=.434), Spain =.633 & Adj. R2=.396), the Netherlands (R=.632 & Adj. 
R2=.395) ), Germany (R=.601 & Adj. R2=.357, Canada (R=.567 & Adj. R2=.314), and 






Strong Relationships between the Predictor Variables and Public Support for Planning 
and Adaptation Policies 
Countries 
Standard Regression Stepwise Regression 
Model ANOVA strongest 
two variables 
Model 
R Adj. R2 F Sig. R Adj. R2  
USA .756 .568 208.708 .000 
concern of pos. impacts .704 .495 
& concern for family  .729 .531 
UK .662 .434 104.127 .000 
concern of pos. impacts  .613 .375 
 & level of belief in GCC .634 .400 
ESP .633 .396 90.496 .000 
concern of pos. impacts .562 .315 
& pref. general strategy .615 .376 
NET .632 .395 95.141 .000 
concern of pos. impacts .580 .335 
& pref. general strategy .612 .373 
GER .601 .357 77.168 .000 
concern of pos. impacts .567 .320 
& impacts exp. on Earth .584 .340 
CAN .567 .314 41.995 .000 
concern of pos. impacts .515 .264 
& pref. general strategy .537 .288 
JP .511 .256 48.328 .000 
concern of pos. impacts .400 .159 
& concern for family  .459 .209 
 
Thus, among the public in the United States 56.8 percent, in the United Kingdom 
43.4 percent, in Spain 39.6 percent, in the Netherlands 39.5 per-cent, in Germany 35.7 
percent, in Canada 31.4 percent, and in Japan 25.6 percent of the variation in the public’s 
overall support for planning and adaptation strategies can be explained by the six inde-
pendent variables addressing the attitude and level of concern regarding possible negative 
impacts of GCC. The stepwise regression suggests that for all of these six countries the 
level of concern variable has the strongest relationship with the dependent variable. 
Ranging from R=.704 and Adj. R2=.495 in the case of the United States to R=.400 and 
Adj. R2=.159 for Japan.  
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Based on the second strongest independent variable the seven countries can be or-
ganized into four different groups. The largest group consists of Spain, the Netherlands, 
and Canada for which the stepwise regressions identified the attitudinal variable asking 
the participants to choose between four general climate strategies as the second strongest 
independent variable. The second group includes the United States and Japan. In both 
cases the variable capturing the participants level of concern for themselves and their 
family was the second strongest predictor variable. The third and fourth groups only con-
sist of one country. The second strongest independent variable in the United Kingdom is  
the level of believe regarding the reality of GCC whereas for Germany the data shows 
that the survey question asking how long it will take until GCC will be experienced 
somewhere on Earth is the second strongest independent variable.  
Similar to the precious indexes neither the regressions for Mexico nor Brazil 
shows a strong relationship (R>.5) between the independent variables and the outcome 
variable. This suggests that neither attitudes nor levels of concern seem to be major as-
pects during the public's decision process of supporting or opposing mitigation and adap-
tation policies.  
Willingness to pay more for GCC abatement. The standard regression analyses 
between the predictor variables and the overall index of the public’s willingness to pay 
more for climate strategies did not identify any large effects for any of the nine countries. 
As illustrated in Table 22, the conducted standard regressions only confirmed, at best, a 
medium relationship with R>.3between the predictor and the outcome variables for the 
United States, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Japan.  
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Table 22 
Relationship between the Public’s Attitude and Levels of Concern towards GCC and Will-




R Adj.R2 F Sig. 
United States .429 .184 35.318 .000 
Netherlands .398 .153 26.943 .000 
United Kingdom .393 .148 24.446 .000 
Canada .382 .137 15.191 .000 
Japan .300 .083 13.502 .000 
Spain .259 .060 9.770 .000 
Germany .248 .055 8.956 .000 
Mexico .190 .029 5.101 .000 
Brazil .112 .013 1.682 .122 
 
Among these five countries the public's attitudes and levels of concern can account for 
between 9.3 percent (Japan) and 18.4 percent (United States) of the variation in the pub-
lic’s willingness to pay more for climate strategies.  
Thus, the data indicates that the independent variables do influence the public's 
willingness to pay more for GCC strategies, but are not the main or most important crite-
ria the decision is based on. The public's preference towards four fundamental GCC strat-
egies, the level of believe in the realty of GCC, the perception of how long it will take 
until dangerous impacts of GCC will be experienced on earth and in their region, the lev-
el of concern regarding the possible impacts of GCC, and the perceived the level of threat 
resulting from GCC for themselves and their families does not largely influence the pub-
lic’s willingness to pay more for GCC mitigation or adaptation policies. Instead, other 
factors may explain the public’s willingness to pay more for GCC policies which were 
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not captured by the survey instrument. Subsequently, the regression analyses between the 
six predictor variables and all the sub-indexes such as the willingness to pay more for 
public transit, renewable energy, or taxes did also not show any large effects among the 
nine countries.  
Willingness to change behavior. Another strong relationship was established be-
tween the predictor variables and the overall index for the public’s willingness to change 
their behavior to reduce the causes and impacts of GCC. The outcome or dependent vari-
able is based on the responses to single survey questions which asked the participants for 
their level of willingness to change their behavior in such areas as to use public transit for 
most of their travel, install solar panels on their home, buy mainly locally produced 
goods, use mainly recycled paper, purchase only energy saving appliances, and insulate 
their home or apartment. The global frequency distribution of this index suggests that 
close to 80 percent of all survey participants are in principle willing to strongly willing to 
change their behavior and thus live a more sustainable lifestyle.  
The standard regression analysis indicates a strong relationship of R>0.5 among 
the participants from the United States (R=.573 & Adj. R2=.324), the United Kingdom 
(R=.557 & Adj. R2=.305), Germany (R=.538 & Adj. R2=.284), and Spain (R=.524 & Adj. 
R2=.269). Among the public in the United States 32.4 percent, in the United Kingdom 
30.5 percent, in Germany 28 percent, and in Spain 26.9 percent of the variation in the 
public’s willingness to change their behavior can be explained by the predictor variables.  
As shown in Table 23, the stepwise regressions once again suggest that for all four 




Strong Relationships between the Predictor Variables and Willingness to Commit to Be-
havioral Changes 
Countries 
Standard Regression Stepwise Regression 
Model ANOVA strongest 
two variables 
Model 
R Adj. R2 F Sig. R Adj. R2  
USA .573 .324 76.447 .000 
concern of pos. impacts .547 .298 
& concern for family .561 .314 
UK .557 .305 60.098 .000 
concern of pos. impacts .516 .265 
& pref. general strategy .546 .297 
GER .538 .284 55.481 .000 
concern of pos. impacts .516 .265 
& pref. general strategy .530 .279 
ESP .524 .269 51.334 .000 
concern of pos. impacts .469 .219 
& pref. general strategy .517 .266 
 
This independent variable is followed by the attitudinal variable asking the participants to 
choose between four general climate strategies the in the cases of the United Kingdom, 
Germany and Spain. For the United States the variable capturing the participants level of 
concern for themselves and their family was the second strongest predictor variable.  
The regression analyses for the remaining five countries Canada, Netherlands, Ja-
pan, Brazil, and Mexico showed an R score of less than 0.5 indicating no large effect be-
tween attitude and levels of concern towards GCC and the public’s willingness to change 
their behavior. However, the regressions of the remaining five countries all show a R 
score of R>.3 indicating at the least a medium relationship between the public's attitudes 
and levels of concern towards GCC on the one hand and their willingness to commit to 
behavioral changes on the other. Despite only four individual countries showing strong 
relationships the standard regressions for the global scale with all nine countries com-
bined show an R score of R>0.5.This means that the global sample does show a strong 
119 
relationship (R=.543 & Adj. R2= .295) between the independent variables and the public's 
willingness to change their behavior. Therefore, the data suggests that on the global scale 
29.5 percent of the variation in the dependent variable can be explained by the dependent 
variables. In particular, the answers provided to the two survey questions measuring the 
public's general level of concern and preferences regarding four fundamentally different 
GCC strategies seem to have the strongest impact on whether or not someone is willing 
to commit to behavioral changes.  
Similar to the discussion in section 5.2.2.2 the regressions analyses focusing on 
the relationship between the predictor variables and all the individual survey questions 
making up the index for the public's willingness to change their behavior in general did 
not show a strong relationship of R>0.5.  Thus, the results suggest that the predictor vari-
ables can make a large effect on the public’s general willingness to change its behavior to 
reduce the main causes of GCC but not on specific behavioral changes. 
Summary 
By applying different analytical tools and testing specific hypotheses this chapter 
addressed one of the central research questions to this study focusing on the interrelation-
ships between perceptions, attitudes, policy support, and behavior regarding GCC in nine 
countries. The data support the argument that the lay public perceives GCC as a future 
threat. The results of the analysis also indicate significant differences in the perceived 
level of threat among the nine countries. About 85 percent of the respondents from Mexi-
co and Brazil labeled GCC as a ‘high threat’, more often than any other surveyed national 
population.  In contrast, Japan, the United Kingdom, United States, and the Netherlands 
less than 50 percent of their populations perceive GCC as a high threat. Moreover, people 
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who already have experienced GCC or believe they will experience GCC soon are more 
concerned about it compared to people who believe they will not experience impacts 
from GCC in the future. In terms of the role GCC risk perceptions and attitudes play in 
the public’s willingness to support mitigation and adaptation policies, the analysis identi-
fied several significant relationships for the nine surveyed countries. The data finds 
strong correlations between the public’s support for GCC mitigation and adaptation poli-
cies and their perceived level of consequences from environmental change as well as per-
ceived level of threat from GCC. The data received from multiple countries also indicates 
that if people strongly oppose GCC policies, they also do not expect environmental 
changes such as GCC, worsening of urban air pollution, or an increasing frequency of 
major hurricanes and/or floods to occur over the next 20 years, and generally perceive 
GCC as no threat at all. 
Numerous multiple regressions were conducted focusing on the relationship be-
tween attitudes and levels of concern over GCC and willingness to support GCC mitiga-
tion and adaptation policies, to pay more for climate abatement, and to commit to behav-
ioral changes such as using public transit for most of their travel, installing solar panels 
on their home, buying mainly locally produced goods, using mainly recycled paper, pur-
chasing only energy saving appliances, and insulating their home and apartment. With the 
exception of Japan, Mexico, and Brazil the results of the regression analysis show a 
strong and statistical significant relationship (R>0.5) between the independent variables 
capturing the public’s attitude and levels of concern towards climate change and the de-
pendent variable presenting the public’s support for mitigation policies in general. In 
terms of the relationship between the attitude and levels of concern towards GCC and 
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support for adaptation policies the standard regressions identified strong relationships for 
seven of the nine surveyed countries. Only for the samples of Brazil and Mexico was the 
R value below .5, indicating no strong correlation between the dependent and independ-
ent variables. This suggests that only in the cases of Brazil and Mexico neither attitudes 
nor levels of concern seem to be major aspects during the public's decision process of 
supporting or opposing mitigation and adaptation policies. The standard regression anal-
yses between the predictor variables and the overall index of the public’s willingness to 
pay more for climate abatement did not identify any large effects for any of the nine 
countries. A strong relationship was established between the predictor variables and the 
overall index for the public’s willingness to change their behavior to reduce the causes 
and impacts of GCC. In particular the standard regression analysis indicates a strong rela-
tionship of R>.5 among the participants from the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
Spain. In addition for all of the remaining five countries Canada, Netherlands, Japan, 
Brazil, and Mexico showed an R score of R>.3 indicating at the least a medium relation-
ship between the public's attitudes as well as levels of concern towards GCC and their 
willingness to commit to behavioral changes.  
Furthermore, the ensuing stepwise regressions identified the level of concern re-
garding possible impacts of GCC as the strongest of the independent or predictor varia-
bles for all countries and regressions. However, when looking at the second strongest de-
pendent variable the stepwise regressions identified country specific differences. The data 
identify, in most cases, the one of the attitudinal variables which asked the participant’s to 
choose between four general strategies as the second most influential independent varia-
ble. Other less common independent variables which were identified by the stepwise re-
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gressions as second strongest predictor variables were the perceived level of threat of 
GCC over the next 50 years for oneself and family, the level of believe in the reality of 
GCC, and the survey question asking how long it will take until GCC will be experienced 


















IMPACT OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC, KNOWLEDGE, TRUST, AND RESPONSI-
BILITY FACTORS ON GCC PERCEPTIONS AND POLICY SUPPORT 
This chapter’s focus is on the effects of socio-economic variables as well as the 
trust factors on climate change risk perceptions. It also looks at the role of public trust in 
the communication of GCC risks and information. The overarching research questions 
addressed in this chapter are the following: 
 How do the public perceptions regarding climate change and attitudes toward 
mitigation and adaptation strategies vary by socio-economic factors?   
 What role do level of knowledge and perceptions of trust and responsibility play 
in the public’s level of support for adaptation and mitigation policies? 
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first presents the results of frequency distri-
butions and regression analyses examining the relationships between the socio-economic 
characteristics and perceptions of GCC as well as their willingness to commit to behav-
ioral changes. The second part addresses the relationships between public trust in the sci-
ence of GGC and the different sources of information and risk perceptions of GCC on the 
global scale. This is an important relationship to consider since, as shown in Chapter 5, 
the public’s level of concern has the strongest effect on the level of support for mitigation 
and adaptation policies. The third part examines the relationships between the public per-
ceptions of how responsible different groups are for reducing GCC, the level of trust to-
wards different sources of information, and policy support.  
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The Role of Socio-Economic Characteristics 
This section focuses on whether socio-economic characteristics of the survey par-
ticipants have impacts on GCC perception as well as willingness to commit to behavioral 
changes. In order to identify differences and similarities among the nine countries a fre-
quency distribution analysis was conducted for survey questions relevant to the research 
question stated above (see 6.2.1). Furthermore, to examine the role of socio-economic 
variables the following two hypotheses were tested through regression analyses following 
the same methodology applied in the previous chapter.  
 The general attitude towards GCC is impacted by socio-economic variables. 
 Public risk perceptions of GCC are significantly impacted by socio-economic var-
iables. 
The results of the regression analyses are discussed in the two following subsec-
tions. First, however, the frequency distributions of the key survey questions are dis-
cussed which were used as dependent variables for the regressions and were not dis-
cussed in previous chapters.  
Frequencies of key risk perception questions. As discussed in Chapter 4, the 
data show that the majority of people view GCC as a serious threat to ‘people in other 
countries’, but not necessarily to themselves. Another principal question asked about the 
risk of global climate change possibly causing various negative impacts of GCC over 50 
years. Respondents were given thirteen consequences of GCC and were asked to evaluate 
their level of risk on a five-point Likert-scale. Table 24 shows the results for all nine 
countries combined. Among the possible consequences of GCC, for example are 'more 
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frequent and serious hurricanes', 'coastal damage', 'negative impacts on the global econ-
omy', or 'more people living in poverty'. Responses in the ‘very high’ risk category show 
that the survey participants are most concerned about  GCC causing 'droughts and water 
shortage' (42.4 percent), 'more frequent and serious floods' (42.4 percent), ‘forest fires' 
(40 percent), and 'severe heat waves' (39.7 percent). 
Overall, at least 30 percent of the survey participants stated that there is a very 
high risk for GCC causing each of the thirteen negative events listed in Table 24. Moreo-
ver when the answer categories 'high risk' and 'very high risk' are combined the data show 
not much variation between the risk perceptions of the different negative GCC impacts. 
Instead, between 66.5 percent and 76.9 percent of the surveyed population perceive the 
risk of GCC causing any of the listed impacts as high or very high. On the other hand, 
only a small percentage of the public seems to believe that there is no risk of global cli-
mate change causing any of the different negative events. For example, only 3.1 percent 
stated that they do not expect any negative impacts from GCC on the global economy in 
the near future. In addition, less than 3 percent of the participants do not anticipate an in-
crease in poverty, refugee problems, or loss of farmland due to GCC. As a result, the data 
suggest that on average for all nine countries 71.2 percent of the public perceives the risk 
of global climate change causing one of the thirteen negative events as high or very high. 
Compared to only an average of approximately 8 percent who see ‘no to little risk’ of 






Perceived Level of Risk over the Next 50 Years for GCC causing Negative Impacts 
















 More frequent and serious 
hurricanes 
2.7% 5.9% 23.7% 37.5% 30.2% 3.87 
Greater extinction of plant 
and animal species 
2.3% 5.7% 21.2% 33.7% 37.0% 3.97 
Famines and food shortage 2.4% 5.3% 20.8% 34.3% 37.2% 3.99 
Droughts and water shortag-
es 
2.1% 4.5% 17.0% 33.9% 42.4% 4.10 
More people living in poverty 2.9% 5.6% 21.7% 34.4% 35.5% 3.94 
More refugee problems in 
parts of the world 
2.8% 6.6% 24.0% 35.1% 31.4% 3.86 
Severe heat waves 2.4% 4.8% 19.3% 33.8% 39.7% 4.04 
Forest fires 2.4% 4.8% 18.6% 34.2% 40.0% 4.05 
Diseases/epidemics 2.8% 6.6% 23.2% 30.9% 36.5% 3.92 
More frequent and serious 
floods 
2.4% 4.1% 16.6% 34.5% 42.4% 4.10 
Coastal damage 2.5% 5.2% 20.8% 34.7% 36.8% 3.98 
Extensive loss of farmland 2.8% 5.9% 21.4% 33.3% 36.6% 3.95 
Negative impacts of the glob-
al economy 
3.1% 5.6% 21.7% 32.6% 37.1% 3.95 
 
On the national scale the mean scores for the perceived level of risk of GCC caus-
ing any of the thirteen environmental impacts suggests country-specific differences. As 
illustrated in Table 25 and based on the five-point Likert-scale ranging from no to very 
high risk (5 on the scale), the average mean scores were the highest for Mexico and Bra-
zil. For these two countries, the average mean score was above 4.5 demonstrating that the 
populations from Mexico and Brazil perceive high risk levels of GCC.  The lowest mean 
scores were from the United States, the Netherland, and the United Kingdom. The aver-
age mean score was below 3.7 indicating that a large number of people in these countries 
perceive GCC as a moderate risk for causing future environmental impacts. 
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Table 25 
Country Specific Mean Scores for the Public’s Risk Perceptions of GCC causing Future 
Environmental Impacts 
Mean scores by country for the public’s perception of the risk of GCC causing vari-
ous environmental impacts over the next 50 years 
 BRA CAN GER JP MEX NET ESP UK USA 
 More frequent and se-
rious hurricanes 
4.28 3.91 4.00 3.79 4.53 3.54 3.92 3.51 3.42 
Greater extinction of 
plant and animal spe-
cies 
4.49 4.02 3.97 3.83 4.57 3.59 4.05 3.76 3.59 
Famines and food 
shortage 
4.34 4.00 3.84 4.14 4.56 3.80 3.95 3.77 3.56 
Droughts and water 
shortages 
4.57 4.06 4.00 4.17 4.69 3.85 4.18 3.80 3.65 
More people living in 
poverty 
4.27 3.96 4.05 3.90 4.49 3.64 4.07 3.62 3.57 
More refugee problems 
in parts of the world 
4.14 3.91 4.00 3.77 4.27 3.64 3.85 3.66 3.56 
Severe heat waves 4.62 4.13 4.05 3.98 4.66 3.64 4.08 3.63 3.66 
Forest fires 4.64 4.08 4.02 3.91 4.62 3.77 4.19 3.65 3.62 
Diseases/epidemics 4.47 3.99 3.79 4.04 4.61 3.57 3.93 3.50 3.48 
More frequent and se-
rious floods 
4.55 4.14 4.14 4.02 4.70 3.90 4.18 3.82 3.58 
Coastal damage 4.43 4.03 4.04 3.87 4.54 3.65 4.01 3.77 3.61 
Extensive loss of farm-
land 
4.39 4.03 3.92 4.03 4.64 3.48 4.02 3.56 3.59 
Negative impacts of the 
global economy 
4.40 4.08 3.88 3.98 4.55 3.51 4.03 3.59 3.67 
AVERAGE 4.43 4.03 3.98 3.96 4.57 3.66 4.04 3.66 3.58 
 
Several survey questions addressed the public's perceived level of threat from 
global climate change. As mentioned earlier many people perceive GCC as an issue far 
removed in time and space only impacting people in less developed countries. Neverthe-
less the frequency distribution of the index for the overall perceived level of threat result-
ing from climate change over the next 50 years showed significant differences among the 
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nine countries. As discussed in chapter 5 over 80 percent of the populations in Mexico 
and Brazil seem to perceive GCC as a high threat.  For Japan, the United Kingdom, the 
United States, and the Netherlands people identifying GCC as a high threat is below 50 
percent.  Of interest, is the fact that in the Netherlands the data indicate that only 20 per-
cent of its population acknowledges GCC as a high threat. However, 58% of the Dutch 
participants did identify GCC as a source of some threat. Thus, more than 50% of the 
population in each country agrees that GCC will pose at least some threat over the next 
50 years. 
In terms of the public's willingness to change its behavior (such as in support for 
mitigation policies) the data show that most people are willing or even strongly willing to 
do so. Table 26 shows the frequency distribution for the six behavioral options for all 
nine countries combined.  With close to 80 percent of the participants indicating a will-
ingness or even strong willingness, the survey results demonstrate that the public is most 
willing to use more recycled paper and purchase energy saving appliances. However, on 
the national scale, only 25.1 percent of the participants from Japan indicated a strong 
willingness to mainly use recycled paper. This is significantly less compared to the top  
two countries Mexico with 68.5 percent and Canada with 54.7. Japan also ranked last for 
the three behavioral questions addressing energy consumption at home. When asked 
about the level of willingness to purchase only energy saving appliances, install solar 
panels, or insulate their home or apartment less than 11 percent of the survey participant 





Frequency Distribution for Behavioral Questions for all Countries Combined  















Use public transit for moist 
of my travel 
15.1% 15.7% 14.3% 29.4% 25.5% 3.35 
Install solar panels 9.8% 10.0% 17.3% 33.8% 29.0% 3.62 
Buy mainly locally produced 
goods 
5.3% 9.3% 16.0% 39.5% 29.8% 3.79 
Use mainly recycled paper 3.6% 6.7% 10.0% 38.4% 41.3% 4.07 
Purchase only energy saving 
appliance 
3.3% 6.3% 12.3% 37.1% 40.9% 4.06 
Insulate your home or 
apartment 
5.6% 6.5% 18.3% 36.3% 33.2% 3.85 
 
Overall the data indicate that the public is the least willing to change their travel 
behavior. Over 30 percent of the survey participants stated that they are not willing or on-
ly slightly willing to increase their use of public transit systems. In the United States and 
the Netherlands the amount of people stating that they are not willing at all to use public 
transit for most of their travel is significantly higher compared to the other seven sur-
veyed countries. In the United States over 33 percent and in the Netherlands almost 25 
percent did not show any willingness to use public transit more often.  In addition, a rela-
tively large number of people seem to be undecided in terms of their willingness to install 
solar panels (17.3 percent), buy mainly locally produced goods (16 percent), and improve 
the insulation of their homes or apartments (18.3 percent). The mean scores suggest that 
people are most willing to change their behavior in areas that do not impact their daily 
routine or cost extra money such as using mainly recycled paper and purchasing only en-
ergy saving appliances.  
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Table 27 
Frequency Distribution for the Public’s Overall Willingness to Change their Behavior to 















MEX 0.4% 0.6% 2.3% 31.1% 65.6% 4.61 
BRA 0.1% 2.4% 5.4% 33.9% 58.3% 4.48 
CAN 0.9% 2.2% 11.1% 34.9% 50.8% 4.32 
ESP 1.5% 2.8% 13.0% 39.2% 43.5% 4.20 
GER 2.9% 4.1% 17.5% 39.3% 36.2% 4.02 
UK 2.1% 5.7% 15.2% 42.3% 34.7% 4.02 
NET 2.0% 6.6% 19.2% 44.6% 27.7% 3.89 
USA 4.0% 7.0% 16.6% 41.5% 30.9% 3.88 
JP 0.7% 8.1% 27.7% 45.4% 18.1% 3.72 
 
On the other hand insulating the home and installing solar panels will save money 
in the long run but requires an upfront capital investment first. Changing travel habits is a 
significant change of someone’s daily routine and locally produced goods are often more 
expansive than mass produced products sold by the big-box supermarkets.   
The behavioral questions listed in the previous table were also combined into an 
index capturing the public's overall willingness to change its behavior to reduce the caus-
es of GCC (mitigation). The results of this index for each country are shown in Table 27. 
Based on the country-specific frequency distribution and mean scores, the populations of 
Mexico and Brazil are the most willing to commit to behavioral change. Among the nine 
countries, the survey results for Japan show the least amount willing to change their be-
havior  (63.5 percent),but the highest numbers for people that are undecided (27.7 per-
cent).  In terms of similarities, the mean scores and frequency distributions of Germany 
and the United Kingdom suggest similar behavioral attitudes among the populations of 
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both countries. In Germany 75.5 percent and in the United Kingdom 77 percent of the 
survey respondents seem to be willing or strongly willing to make behavioral changes. In 
general the population of Mexico, Brazil, and Canada seem to be the most willing to ad-
just their behavior in order to mitigate GCC. 
Socio-economic variables & general GCC attitudes. Can differences in general 
attitudes towards GCC among the nine countries be explained to a large degree by socio-
economic characteristics? As discussed earlier, the public’s general attitude towards GCC 
was measured through level of believe in the reality of GCC and their preference regard-
ing the following four fundamental GCC policies.  
 ‘We should not take any steps that would have economic costs until we are certain 
that GCC is really a problem 
 ‘We should take some steps just in case GCC is real’ 
 ‘We only should take steps to address GCC which are low in costs’ 
 ‘GCC is a serious problem and we should begin taking steps now even if this in-
volves significant cost’  
Standard and stepwise regressions were conducted to determine the effect of independent 
socio-economic variables such as age, gender, household income, and education on the 
two dependent variables presenting the public’s attitude towards GCC. The country spe-
cific frequency distribution for both outcome variables were already discussed in previ-





Regression Results for Relationships between Socio-Economic Characteristics and Atti-
tude towards GCC Policies 
Relationship between socio-economic characteristics and preference towards four 
general GCC strategies  





Brazil .188 .030 6.423 .000 
United Kingdom .187 .030 6.438 .000 
Mexico .159 .018 3.544 .007 
United States .157 .020 5.550 .000 
Germany .155 .018 4.145 .003 
Japan .145 .016 3.906 .004 
Spain .134 .012 2.937 .020 
Netherlands .104 .005 1.789 .129 
Canada .095 .002 1.216 .303 
Relationship between socio-economic characteristics and level of belief in the re-
ality of GCC 





United Kingdom .228 .047 9.683 .000 
United States .199 .035 9.045 .000 
Netherlands .174 .024 5.101 .000 
Spain .148 .016 3.628 .006 
Japan .145 .016 3.908 .004 
Mexico .143 .013 2.853 .023 
Brazil .123 .010 2.701 .030 
Germany .109 .006 2.030 .089 
Canada .103 .003 1.421 .226 
 
The regression analysis did not indicate any large effects between the socio-
economic variables and the two dependent attitudinal variables. As shown in Table 28, 
the statistical tests of the standard regressions only, at best, showed weak significant rela-
tionships between the variables with R >.2 and R2≥ .03.  That is, the results suggest that 
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gender, household income, level of education, or age only account for a small percentage 
of the variation in the public’s level of believe and preference towards general GCC strat-
egies. 
Socio-economic variables & GCC risk perceptions. The second hypothesis is  
also not confirmed by the results of different regression analyses. Compared to the hy-
pothesis discussed in the previous section, regression analyses were performed to exam-
ine to what degree the four socio-economic variables (age, gender, level of education, and 
household income) can explain differences in the public’s risk perception of GCC among 
the nine countries. The results show that socio-economic variables are not a strong pre-
dictor of perceived risks of global climate change. Instead, the calculated R and R2 scores 
showed only a small correlation between the independent and dependent variables. At no 
point does the R score reach .3 indicating at least a medium relationship between the pre-
dictor and outcome variables. Instead, the data show that the socio-economic characteris-
tics do not have a significant impact on the way GCC risks are perceived. 
Trust Factors & Public GCC Risk Perceptions  
Studies show that public distrust in individuals, industries, governmental depart-
ments, and other institutions of organizations involved in risk and hazard management is 
strongly linked to risk perceptions (Bord & O'Connor, 1990; Flynn et al, 1992; Jenkins-
Smith, 1992; Mushkatel & Pijawka, 1992). Typically, the more the public distrusts risk 
management and communicators information the more concern they have about adverse 
impacts and potential threats for their own wellbeing (Slovic et al, 1991).  
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Research also shows that the failures in risk communication is significantly influ-
enced by the public's trust in the communicator and in the ability of individuals, indus-
tries, or institutions responsible for risk management (Renn & Levine, 1991; Kasperson 
et al, 1992; Nye, 1997). Where risks are characterized by high uncertainties, as in GCC, 
trust may play a critical role in the success of risk communication and implementation of 
policies. Moreover, trust is not only a necessary precondition for successful GCC com-
munication but it can also be improved by well-developed communication strategies 
(Misztal, 1996). Trust is vital in organizations whose risk management policies impact 
communities and the environment in order to reduce complexity and generate social co-
operation (Cvetkovich & Loefstedt, 1999).   
However, much of this research was not conducted for hazards with high levels of 
uncertainties such as GCC, but in the context of technological risks such as nuclear pow-
er. Being important, this led to the question if such relationship between trust factors and 
public risk perceptions also exist in the context of GCC. 
Therefore, two different groups of regression analyses were conducted. The first 
group of regressions focused on the relationship between public trust in the science of 
GGC, as well as towards different sources of GCC information, and the level of concern 
over the impacts of GCC. This relationship is of great importance for communication ef-
forts in order to improve public policy decision-making.  
As shown in Chapter 5, the public’s level of concern over possible GCC impacts 
has the strongest effect on the level of support for mitigation and adaptation policies 
among all tested GCC risk perceptions. Moreover, as discussed earlier, success of com-
mutation efforts is significantly impacted by the public's trust in the communicator such 
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as family and friends, mainstream media, governmental and environmental organizations, 
scientists and teachers, and corporations. The results of the regressions are discussed in 
the next section. 
The second group of regressions focused on the effect of GCC threat and risk per-
ceptions on trust perceptions in the federal government as a potential communicator and 
risk manager. Due to the government’s capability to implement the needed, comprehen-
sive GCC policies, trust in the government is of significant importance to successfully 
mitigate and adapt to GCC. Furthermore, the survey data show that the public perceives 
the national or federal government as the primary institution responsible to reduce or mit-
igate GCC. The public’s perceived level of responsibility of the federal government to 
reduce GCC was used as a surrogate variable for the public’s level of trust in the GCC 
risk management capabilities of the government. This is based on the rational that the 
public would not perceive the government as responsible to reduce GCC without ac-
knowledging its capability to do so in the first place.  
In addition, two additive indexes were created to present the public's perceived 
risks:1) general level of threat from GCC, and 2) risk of GCC causing negative impacts 
over the next 50 years.  The additive index of the public’s perceived level of threat result-
ing from climate change is based on how the survey participants rated the threat level of 
GCC for plants and animals, people in other countries, people in their country, and for 
themselves and their family over the next 50 years. The additive risk index is based on 
how the respondents rated the risk of GCC causing different environmental and societal 




Standard Regression Results for the Relationship between Trust in Science as well as to-
wards Different Sources of Information and Level of Concern for all Countries Combined 
Model ANOVA Coefficients 
R Adj.R2 F Sig. Ind. Var. 
Unstand.  Stand.  
t Sig. 
B Beta 
.569 .322 314.913 .000 
enough scientific data -.051 -.050 -4.380 .000 
scientific data are 
trustworthy 
.276 .245 18.215 .000 
trust TV weather re-
ports 
.028 .024 1.954 .000 
trust corporation -.017 -.015 -1.171 .241 
trust family and 
friends 
.102 .080 7.588 .000 
trust governmental 
organizations 
-.113 -.106 -7.887 .000 
trust environmental 
organizations 
.345 .342 23.465 .000 
trust mainstream 
news media 
-.013 -.012 -.840 .401 
trust scientists .134 .113 8.002 .000 
trust religious leaders -.016 -.016 -1.391 .164 
trust teachers .032 .027 2.089 .037 
 
Trust factors & level of concern over GCC impacts. As mentioned above, 
regressions were used to test the relationships between the public’s trust in the science of 
GGC, as well as towards different sources of GCC information, and the level of concern 
over the possible impacts of GCC. Table 29 summarizes the results of the standard re-
gressions on the global scale with all nine countries combined into one sample. The re-
sults show a strong relationship (R=.569 & Adj. R2=.322) between the independent trust 
variables and the public’s level of concern over GCC. The data show that 32.2 percent of 
the variation in the public’s level of concern can be explained by their level of trust to-
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wards GCC science and different sources of information. The results also show that the 
relationship between the different independent variables and the one dependent variable 
are not always positive. For example, the data indicate that the more people consider the 
GCC scientific data as trustworthy, or trust environmental organizations the more they are 
concerned about GCC. On the other hand, the more the public trusts the information from 
corporations or governmental organizations the less concerned are they about GCC.  
As already discussed in Chapter 4, the majority of the public is concerned about 
global climate change and its potential impacts; 83.7 percent stated at least some concern 
regarding the possible impacts of GCC.  Regarding the independent trust variables, cor-
porations, governmental organizations, and religious leaders are trusted the least as a 
source for GCC information. Instead, the majority of the public somewhat or strongly 
trusts scientists (66.8 percent), television weather reports (61.3 percent), family and 
friends (56.5 percent), and environmental organizations (56.1 percent) as sources of GCC 
information. The results also show that a large numbers of people are undecided in 
whether or not they should trust certain sources of information. Especially, in regards to 
teachers, 40 percent of all participants chose the answer category 'undecided' followed by 
corporations (36 percent), family and friends (33.1 percent), and the mainstream news 
media (30.5 percent). The frequency distributions among the nine countries also indicate 
an inconsistency between the level of trust towards of scientists and the level of agree-
ment with the sufficiency and trustworthiness of scientific data and expert knowledge. 
66.8 percent of the total sample ‘somewhat’ or ‘strongly’ trusts scientists as sources for 
GCC information. However, the data also indicate that 40.2 percent of the total sample 
doubts that the scientific community actually has enough data to fully understand GCC. 
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Table 30 
Countries with Strong Relationships between Trust towards GCC Science & Communica-
tors as well as Level of Concern 
Countries 




R Adj. R2 F Sig. R R2  
USA .738 .540 101.925 .000 
trustworth. of gcc science .671 .339 
& trust environ org. .723 .522 
UK .640 .402 50.317 .000 
trust environ org .578 .334 
& trustworth. of gcc science .613 .374 
NET .590 .340 41.422 .000 
trust environ org .547 .298 
& trustworth. of gcc science .574 .328 
CAN .550 .288 20.829 .000 
trust environ org .434 .187 
& trustworth. of gcc science .486 .233 
 
On the international scale, the regression analysis shows a strong and statistical 
significant relationship between the independent variables capturing the public’s trust to-
wards GCC science as well as potential communicators and the level of concern about 
possible impacts of GCC.  Table 30 shows a strong relationship of R>0.5 between the in-
dependent and dependent variables for the United States, United Kingdom, Netherlands, 
and Canada. According to the adjusted R2 scores between 28.8 percent (Canada) and 54 
percent (United Stated) of the variation in the public’s level of concern can be explained 
by the independent variables.  
According to the stepwise regressions the two strongest independent variables are 
the level of trust in environmental organizations and perceived trustworthiness of GCC 
science. Both variables have a positive relationship to the dependent variable. Thus, the 
higher the trust in environmental organizations and the scientific data the more concerned 
is the public about the possible impacts of GCC.   
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Impact of GCC risk & threat perceptions on trust in government as source of 
information & risk manager. The second group of regressions focused on the impact of 
risk and threat perceptions on the public’s trust in the federal government as source of 
GCC information and as risk manager capable of implementing successful mitigation and 
adaptation strategies. On the global scale, the regressions show only a weak relationship 
(R<.3) between the public’s perceived level of threat from GCC as well as risks of GCC 
causing negative impacts over the next 50 years and the level of trust in government as a 
source of GCC information.  This shows that how the public perceives the threat of GCC 
and the risks of potential negative impacts does not have a strong influence on the level 
of trust towards the government as a source of GCC information and potential speaker of 
communication programs. Regressions on the national scale for each of the nine countries 
also show no strong relationships of R>0.5. 
As shown in Table 31, the regression  testing the strength of the relationship be-
tween the two risk and threat indexes and the public’s trust in the government as risk 
manger also did not show a strong relationship (R <0.5). However with an R score of 
R=.427 the regression shows a moderate relationship on the global scale. Furthermore, 
the analysis shows a positive relationship for both indexes and the public’s level of trust 
in the government’s capability as GCC risk manager. This indicates that the stronger the 
public believes in GCC risks and threats the more they trust the government to be capable 





Impacts of GCC Risk and Threat Perceptions on the Public’s Level of Trust in the Gov-
ernment as a GCC Risk Manager 
Model ANOVA Coefficients 
R R2  Adj.R2 F Sig. Ind. Var. 
Unstand.  Stand.  
t Sig. 
B Beta 
.427 .183 .182 810.319 .000 
GCC threat 
index 
.289 .232 15.731 .000 
GCC risk in-
dex 
.255 ..232 15.755 .000 
 
On the international scale, the regression analysis shows a strong relationship only 
for the data from the United States. With an R score of R=.553 and a R2 score .306. The 
result shows that the two indexes explain 30.6 percent of the public’s variation of trust 
towards the government as a GCC risk manager. For Japan and Germany the regressions 
showed moderate relationships as well. For the remaining countries the R is below 0.3 
indicating only a weak relationship between GCC risk and threat perceptions and trust in 
the GCC risk management capability of the government.  
Impact of Knowledge, Trust & Responsibility Factors on Public Support for GCC 
Policies & Strategies 
This section focuses on the final research question of this dissertation. 
 What role do level of knowledge and perceptions of trust and responsibility play 
in the public’s level of support towards adaptation and mitigation policies? 
The literature shows that when people have a better understanding of GCC science, 
they tend to be more supportive of mitigation efforts (Read et al., 1994). Table 32  
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Table 32 
Perceived Level of Knowledge about Key Aspects of GCC  












The causes of GCC 7.1% 36.7% 41.0% 15.2% 2.64 
The impacts of GCC 6.3% 33.9% 43.1% 16.7% 2.70 
The ways in which we can reduce 
GCC 
10.5% 37.7% 37.7% 14.2% 2.56 
The various national and inter-
national policies to prevent GCC 
22.7% 46.5% 23.3% 7.5% 2.16 
 
 shows the frequency distribution for all countries combined for their perceived level of 
knowledge regarding different aspects of GCC. Less than 60 percent of the public feels 
‘informed’ or ‘very informed’ about the impacts, causes, and ways to reduce GCC. On a 1 
to 4 scale where 1 is ‘not informed’ and 4 is ‘very informed’ the public’s perceived 
knowledge averages between 2.0 and 3. 0. Moreover, less than one- third (23.3 percent) 
of the surveyed population feel at least informed about the various national and interna-
tional policies to prevent GCC. Another 22.7 percent indicated that they do not feel in-
formed at all about existing GCC policies.  Also noteworthy are the fairly high numbers 
of people who indicated that they only are somewhat informed about these four important 
aspects of GCC. This indicates high levels of uncertainty among the public which can 
lead or enforce already existing misconceptions. The second group of independent varia-
bles, presenting the public’s trust in the science of GGC as well as towards different 
sources of information, was already discussed in detail in chapter 4. The frequency distri-
bution of the last group of relevant independent variables is shown in Table 33 and deals 
with how people perceive responsibilities of different sectors to reduce GCC.  
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Table 33 
Public’s Perceived Level of Responsibility towards different Groups to Mitigate the Main 
Causes of GCC  
















6.7% 23.5% 31.8% 38.0% 3.01 
Environmental Protection 
Agency 
6.8% 22.8% 35.0% 35.4% 2.99 
The United Nations 6.7% 23.1% 32.7% 37.5% 3.01 
Environmental Groups 10.6% 26.6% 34.8% 27.9% 2.80 
Corporations 7.2% 25.5% 33.7% 33.7% 2.94 
State Government 7.8% 26.1% 34.0% 32.1% 2.90 
Local Government 8.8% 28.1% 33.9% 29.2% 2.84 
Your Community 8.5% 29.7% 33.8% 28.1% 2.81 
You Personally 8.0% 29.3% 33.5% 29.2% 2.84 
 
For many hazards the public feels that applicable strategies exist in which they 
can be engaged in (Rotter, 1966). However, GCC is characterized by high uncertainties, 
unfamiliar risks, and other characteristics of hazards which make personal connections, 
responsibility and engagement difficult. Many hope that effective communication efforts 
can foster a personal connection to GCC, raise the level of concern, and thus increase the 
level of support for mitigation and adaptation policies. The data show that the majority of 
people feel personal responsibility to take action to reduce the causes of GCC.  
However, the mean score identifies several groups, agencies, or institutions for 
which the public believes that are more responsible than themselves to mitigate GCC. 
Although, differences are very small, on the global scale the public seems to perceive the 
national or federal government the primary institution responsible to reduce GCC, fol-
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lowed by the United Nations, the country’s environmental protection agency, and corpo-
rations. Among the nine possible groups responsible for reducing GCC, personal respon-
sibility ranks 6th. Thus, the public seems to perceive GCC as an issue that has to be 
solved to large part by the government and other institutions. This poses a significant bar-
rier to the success of mitigation and adaptation strategies, since many of these policies 
require the public’s support and cooperation. 
Following the same structure and methodology discussed in chapter 5, the follow-
ing paragraphs address the regression analysis focusing on the impact of level of 
knowledge, level of trust towards sources of information, and perceived levels of respon-
sibilities of different groups for reducing the main causes of GCC on the public’s policy 
support for mitigation and adaption. In particular, the different regressions analyzed the 
impact of the independent variables on the public’s level of support for adaptation and 
mitigation policies, willingness to pay more for climate change abatement, and willing-
ness to commit to different behavioral changes.   
Support for mitigation and adaptation policies. The results of the regression 
analysis show strong and statistical significant relationships between the independent var-
iables -knowledge, trust, and responsibility- and the dependent variable, the public’s sup-
port for mitigation policies in general (for at least seven out of the nine countries). As il-
lustrated in Table 34, the results show a strong relationship (with R>0.5) between the in-
dependent and dependent variables for the United States,  Netherlands, Spain, United 
Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and Germany. Between 28.4 percent (Germany) and 54.2 per-
cent (United States) of the variation in the public's overall support for mitigation can be 
explained by the independent variables. 
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Table 34 
Strong Relationships between the Independent Variables and the Overall Support for Mit-
igation Policies 
Countries 







F Sig. R R2  
USA .736 .542 43.512 .000 trust environ. org. .626 .391 
NET .653 .426 24.935 .000 trust environ. org. .549 .301 
ESP .646 .417 22.755 .000 trust environ. org. .471 .221 
UK .601 .341 17.692 .000 trust environ. org. .482 .231 
CAN .599 .359 11.990 .000 personal resp. .449 .200 
JP .559 .312 14.579 .000 personal resp. .392 .152 
GER .533 .284 12.657 .000 trust environ. org.  .383 .146 
 
The stepwise regressions identified two independent variables as the strongest: the 
level of trust towards environmental organizations as sources of information and the per-
ceived level of personal responsibility to reduce GCC, especially in Japan and Germany. 
For Mexico and Brazil the R score is less than 0.5 indicating there is no large effect be-
tween the independent variables and the level of support for mitigation policies. In terms 
of the relationship between the same independent variables and adaptation policies, the 
standard regressions identified strong relationships for the same seven countries as in the 
previous regression. Thus, the results show a strong relationship for the United States 
(R=.799 & Adj. R2=.542), United Kingdom (R=.653 & Adj. R2=.449). Spain (R=.661 & 
Adj. R2= .419), Germany (R=.651 & Adj. R2=.405), Netherlands (R=.643 & Adj. 
R2=.396), Canada (R=.611 & Adj. R2=.344), and Japan (R=.594 & Adj. R2=333).  Be-
tween 54.2 percent (United States) and 33.3 percent (Japan) of the variation in the pub-
lic’s overall support for adaptation policies can be explained by the predictor variables. 
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Table 35 
Strong Relationships between the Independent Variables and Overall Support for Adapta-
tion Policies 
Countries 




R Adj. R2 F Sig. R R2  
USA .799 .628 65.004 .000 trust environ. org.  .692 .478 
UK .683 .449 27.351 .000 trust environ. org. .534 .285 
ESP .661 .419 24.668 .000 UN resp. .450 .202 
GER .651 .405 23.440 .000 personal resp. .448 .200 
NET .643 .396 23.687 .000 trust environ. org .488 .237 
CAN .611 .344 12.766 .000 EPA resp. .435 .188 
JP .594 .333 17.518 .000 local govern. resp. .421 .176 
 
As shown in Table 35 the ensuing stepwise regression identified differences 
among the countries in terms of the independent variable with the strongest effect on the 
public’s level of support for adaptation policies in general. Again, in the cases of the 
United States, United Kingdom, and Netherlands the level of trust towards environmental 
organizations is the predictor variable with the strongest relationship to the dependent 
variable, in this case the public’s overall support for adaptation policies. However, for the 
remaining four countries Spain - Germany - Canada and Japan, the perceived levels of 
responsibility of the United Nations (Spain), Environmental Protection Agency (Canada), 
local government (Japan), and personally (Germany) are the strongest independent varia-
bles for adaptation policy support.  
The previous two overall indexes of mitigation and adaptation support were fur-
ther broken into three more specific thematic indexes: public’s support for energy effi-
ciency policies, economic incentives, and for planning and adaptation strategies. The re-
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gression analyses identified strong relationships for all three thematic indexes among the 
nine countries.  
For the first sub-index, the public’s support for energy efficiency policies, the re-
gression analyses show a strong relationship between the predictor variables and the de-
pendent variables for eight of the nine countries. Only the R score for Brazil is below 0.5 
indicating no large effect between the independent variables and the level of support for 
energy efficiency policies. As shown in Table 36, for the remaining eight countries the R 
scores range from .514 (Mexico) to .681 (United States). The adjusted R2 scores suggest 
that the independent variables account for between 24.1 percent and 45 percent of the 
variation in the dependent variable. 
The stepwise regressions identified the level of trust towards environmental or-
ganizations for the United States and Netherlands and the level of trust towards family 
and friends for Spain as the most influential variables.  In the cases of Germany, Canada, 
Japan, United Kingdom, and Mexico the perceived level of responsibility of corporations, 
personally, the Environmental Protection Agency, or the federal government have the 
strongest impact on the public’s level of support for energy efficiency policies. 
In the case of the second sub-index the public’s support for economic incentives, 
the regression analyses show strong relationships between the predictor variables and the 
dependent variables for five of the nine countries. The survey included economic incen-
tives such as the government requiring higher utility rates from using non-renewable en-





Strong Relationships between the Independent Variables and Support for Energy Effi-
ciency Policies 
Countries 




R Adj. R2 F Sig. R R2  
USA .681 .450 31.919 .000 trust environ. org.  .548 .299 
ESP .611 .353 18.894 .000 trust family and friends .420 .175 
NET .597 .338 18.654 .000 trust environ. org. .470 .220 
GER .581 .317 16.284 .000 corporate resp. .383 .146 
CAN .580 .305 10.850 .000 personal resp. .414 .170 
JP .563 .296 14.928 .000 EPA resp. .405 .163 
UK .517 .244 11.450 .000 fed. govern. resp. .362 .130 
MEX .514 .241 11.504 .000 personal resp. .325 .104 
 
The data indicates that among the public in the United State 42.8 percent (R=.555 
& Adj. R2=.428), in the Netherlands 34.8 percent (R=.605 & Adj. R2=.348), in the United 
Kingdom 31.6 percent (R=.581 & Adj. R2=.316), in Spain 31.5 percent (R=.579 & Adj. 
R2=.315), and in Canada 23.4 percent (R=.518 & Adj. R2=.234)  of the variation in the 
public’s support for economic incentives can be explained trough the independent varia-
bles defined at the beginning of section 6.4. According to the stepwise regressions aspects 
such as the perceived trustworthiness of the scientific GCC data, trust in environmental 
organizations, as well as perceived corporate and personal responsibility are the strongest 
independent variables among the five countries.  
For the third sub-index, the public’s support for planning and adaptation policies, 
the predictor variables showed a strong effect with R>.5 for the data collected from the 
United States, Spain, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Canada Germany, Japan, and Mexi-
co. Again, Brazil is the only country with an R score below 0.5.  
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Table 37 
Strong Relationships between the Predictor Variables and Public Support for Planning 
and Adaptation Policies 
Countries 







F Sig. R R2  
USA .804 .637 67.461 .000 trust environm. org. .695 .482 
ESP .677 .442 26.953 .000 UN resp. .467 .217 
UK .677 .441 26.508 .000 trust environ. org. .519 .269 
NET .649 .404 24.433 .000 trust environ. org .505 .255 
CAN .625 .362 13.696 .000 EPA resp. .433 .186 
GER .610 .352 18.911 .000 personal resp. .431 .185 
JP .600 .340 18.052 .000 loc. govern. resp. .420 .175 
MEX .506 .232 10.996 .000 personal resp. .317 .099 
 
As displayed in Table 37 the independent variables combined seem to have the 
strongest effect among the public in the United States (R=.804 & Adj. R2=.637),followed 
by Spain ( R=.677 & Adj. R2=.441),United Kingdom (R=.677 & Adj. R2=.441), Nether-
lands (R=.649 & Adj. R2=.404), Canada (R=.625 & Adj. R2=.362), Germany (R=.610 & 
R2=.352), Japan (R=.600 & Adj. R2=.340), and Mexico(R=.506 & R2=.232). Thus, be-
tween 23.2 percent (Mexico) and 63.7 percent (United States) of the variation in the pub-
lic’s overall support for planning and adaptation strategies can be explained by the pub-
lic’s level of knowledge, level of trust towards GCC  information as well as potential 
sources, and perceived levels of responsibilities of different groups for engaging in 






Relationship between Perceived Levels of Knowledge, Trust, as well as Responsibility 






 F Sig. 
United States .507 .232 12.777 .000 
Canada .499 .214 7.111 .000 
United Kingdom .488 .214 9.795 .000 
Netherlands .476 .204 9.865 .000 
Japan .400 .134 6.111 .000 
Germany .394 .128 5.851 .000 
Spain .367 .107 4.950 .000 
Brazil .302 .062 3.111 .000 
Mexico .266 .042 2.444 .000 
 
Willingness to pay more for GCC abatement. The standard regression analyses 
between the predictor variables and the overall index of the public’s willingness to pay 
more for climate change abatement did only show a large relationship for the data col-
lected form United States with R=.507 and Adj. R2=.232. As shown in Table 38 the re-
gressions only confirmed, at best, a medium relationship with R>.3 between the predictor 
and the outcome variables for Canada, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Japan, Germany, 
Spain, and Brazil. In the case of the United States the independent variables can account 
for 23.2 percent of the variation in the public’s willingness to pay more for climate strate-
gies in general. Furthermore the different regression analyses also show that the per-
ceived trustworthiness of the scientific GCC data is the most influential independent vari-
able for the United States.  With the exception of the United States the independent varia-
bles presenting the public’s level of knowledge, level of trust towards sources of infor-
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mation, and perceived levels of responsibilities of different groups for reducing the main 
causes of GCC do not largely influence the public’s willingness to pay more for GCC 
mitigation or adaptation policies.  
Willingness to change behavior. Another strong relationship was established be-
tween the predictor variables and the overall index for the public’s willingness to change 
their behavior to reduce the causes and impacts of GCC. As already discussed in chapter 
5, the outcome or dependent variable is based on the responses to six single survey ques-
tions which asked the participants for their level of willingness to change their behavior 
in such areas as to use public transit for most of their travel, install solar panels on their 
home, buy mainly locally produced goods, use mainly recycled paper, purchase only en-
ergy saving appliances, and insulate their home or apartment. The global frequency dis-
tribution of this index suggests that close to 80 percent of all survey participants are in 
principle willing to strongly willing to change their behavior and thus live a more sus-
tainable lifestyle. 
The standard regression analysis indicates a strong relationship of R>0.5 among 
the participants from the United States (R=.619 & Adj. R2=.366), Spain (R=.581 & Adj. 
R2=.317 ), United Kingdom (R=.577 & Adj. R2=.311), Germany (R=.572 & Adj. 
R2=.306), Canada (R=.536 & Adj. R2=.254), Netherlands (R=.506 & Adj. R2= .234), and 
Japan (R=.501 & Adj. R2=.228). Thus, among these seven countries with R>0.5, between 
22.8 percent (Japan) and 36.6 percent (United States) of the variation in the public's will-





Strong Relationships between the Predictor Variables and Overall Willingness to Commit 
to Behavioral Changes 
Countries 




R Adj. R2 F Sig. R R2  
USA .619 .366 22.871 .000 personal resp. .491 .240 
ESP .581 .317 16.200 .000 community resp. .380 .143 
UK .577 .311 15.611 .000 personal resp. .434 .188 
GER .572 .306 15.529 .000 personal resp. .368 .135 
CAN .536 .254 8.635 .000 trust scientists .333 .109 
NET .506 .234 11.570 .000 personal resp. .367 .134 
JP .501 .228 10.778 .000 corporate resp. .349 .120 
 
As shown in Table 39, the stepwise regressions shows level of perceived personal 
responsibility has the strongest relationship with the dependent variable in the cases of 
the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands. For Spain the data 
suggests the perceived level of community responsibility and for Japan corporate respon-
sibility as the independent variables with the strongest impact on the public's overall will-
ingness to commit to behavioral changes. In the case of Canada, however, the level of 
trust towards scientists as sources of information is the most influential singe independent 
variable. The regression analyses for the remaining two countries Brazil, and Mexico 
showed an R score of less than 0.5 indicating no large effect between the twenty-five in-
dependent variables and the public’s willingness to change their behavior. However, the 
regressions show an R score of R>.3 indicating at the least a medium relationship.    
The ensuing regression analyses between the independent variables and the single 
survey questions comprising the overall index show strong relationships for some of the 
individual survey questions and countries. Altogether the index was created based on the 
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responses to six single survey questions which asked the participants for their level of 
willingness to change their behavior in such areas as to use public transit for most of their 
travel, install solar panels on their home, buy mainly locally produced goods, use mainly 
recycled paper, purchase only energy saving appliances, and insulate their home or 
apartment. The regression analysis show strong relationships between the independent 
variables and the willingness to install solar panels on their home, use mainly locally 
produced goods, and to purchase only energy saving appliances.  
Table 40 summarizes the significant result and displays the countries for which 
the regression analysis established a strong relationship between the independent varia-
bles and the particular survey questions function as dependent variables. As the table 
shows the regression analysis only established strong relationships between the inde-
pendent variables and three out of the six individual survey questions. In case of the 
United States, the data shows a strong relationships between the predictor variables and 
all three individual survey questions with R scores ranging from R=.522 (willingness to 
install solar panels on home) to R=.581 (willingness to use mainly locally produced 
goods). Data from Spain confirms a strong relationships between the independent varia-
bles capturing the public’s level of knowledge, level of trust towards GCC  information 
as well as potential sources, and perceived levels of responsibilities of different groups 
for engaging in mitegative actions and the two answers provided to the two survey ques-
tions assessing the public's willingness to use mainly locally produced goods (R=.547 & 





Strong Relationships between the Predictor Variables and Specific Behavioral Survey 
Questions 
'Willingness to install solar panels on home' 
Countries 






 F Sig. R R
2
 
USA .522 .252 13.766 .000 personal resp. .393 .153 
'Willingness to use mainly locally produced goods' 
Countries 






 F Sig. R R
2
 
USA .581 .320 18.783 .000 trust scientists .441 .194 
ESP .547 .277 13.573 .000 trust scientists  .349 .121 
CAN .511 .227 7.582 .000 trust scientists .327 .105 
'Willingness to purchase only energy saving appliances' 
Countries 






 F Sig. R R
2
 
USA .560 .295 16.804 .000 state govern. resp. .425 .179 
GER .553 .284 14.088 .000 trust scientists .352 .123 
UK .522 .249 11.709 .000 personal resp. .366 .133 
ESP .516 .244 11.569 .000 trust scientists .340 .114 
 
For Germany and the United Kingdom, the regressions only identified a strong re-
lationship between the independent variables and the survey question addressing the pub-
lic's willingness to purchase only energy saving appliances. In particular, the analysis 
shows a relationship for Germany with R=.553 and for the United Kingdom with R=.522. 
Canada's data confirmed a relationship between the predictor variables and the answers 
provide to the survey question focusing on the public's willingness to use mainly locally 
produced goods with R=.511.  
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Overall, the calculated R2 scores suggest that the independent variables can ac-
count between 22.7 percent and 32 percent of the variation of the answers provided to the 
three survey questions. Moreover, the stepwise regressions identify the level of trust in 
scientists as source of GCC information as the independent variable having most often 
the strongest impact on the dependent variables, followed by perceived personal respon-
sibility to reduce GCC and perceived responsibility for the state government to engage in 
mitegative actions.  
Summary 
Several relationships between survey based independent and dependent variables 
were explored in this chapter. Furthermore the following two research questions were  
directly addressed using frequency distributions, standard as well as stepwise regressions 
as  analytical tools.  
 How do the public perceptions regarding climate change and attitudes toward 
mitigation and adaptation strategies vary by socio-economic factors?   
 What role do level of knowledge and perceptions of trust and responsibility play 
in the public’s level of support towards adaptation and mitigation policies? 
The data show that characteristics such as age gender, household income, or edu-
cation are do not influence someone’s attitude or risk perception significantly towards 
GCC in any of the nine countries surveyed. Nevertheless, approximately one-third or 
more of the surveyed population believes that GCC poses a high risk for causing numer-
ous negative environmental impacts. Furthermore, the data suggest that most people in 
the surveys are generally willing to support GCC mitigation through behavioral changes.  
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Regressions demonstrate a strong relationship between the independent trust vari-
ables and the public’s level of concern over GCC. Roughly one third of the variation in 
the public’s level of concern can be explained by their level of trust towards GCC science 
and different sources of information. However, the regressions failed to show a strong 
relationship, on the global scale, between risk and threat perceptions on the public’s trust 
in the federal government as source of GCC information and as risk manager. On the in-
ternational scale the data only show a strong relationship for the United States between 
the two risk and threat indexes and the public’s trust in the government as risk manger 
Such factors as knowledge, trust, and responsibility show several strong relation-
ships with GCC policy support for the nine countries. Strong relationship are seen be-
tween the independent variables and the public's support for mitigation and adaptation 
policies as well as their willingness to commit to behavioral change for seven out of the 
nine countries with Mexico and Brazil being the exception.  
The ensuing regression analyses between the independent variables and the single 
survey questions comprising the overall index for the public’s willingness to change their 
behavior show strong relationships for some of the individual survey questions and coun-
tries. The regression analysis showed only strong relationships related to the willingness 
to install solar panels on their home, use mainly locally produced goods, and to purchase 
only energy saving appliances. Moreover, with the exception of the United States the in-
dependent variables do not largely influence the public’s willingness to pay more for 
GCC mitigation or adaptation policies.  
The stepwise regressions did not identify any one single independent variable as 
the strongest for all seven countries. Instead the independent variable with the strongest 
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impact on the dependent variable varies by country. However the variables presenting the 
perceived level of personal responsibility to reduce GCC and level of trust towards envi-
ronmental organizations as a source of information seem to be the most influential. 
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Chapter 7 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The following presents a discussion of the research results that places the insights 
gained from the dissertation into the context of existing literature developed in the early 
chapters as well as with the underlying theories, hypothesis, and research questions of 
this study. The final part of this chapter address the meaning and implication of the 
knowledge gained for future communication efforts, emphasize country-specific differ-
ences in the findings, and points to future research questions.   
Public Perceptions of Global Climate Change 
The public is concerned about GCC, but considers it a low priority. The data 
show that on the global level, represented by the nine countries as a whole, the majority 
of the public expressed concern about GCC causing potential adverse impacts. In total, 
over 80 percent of the participants stated at least some concern regarding the possible im-
pacts of GCC and close to 32 percent indicated high levels of concern. 
This leads to the question, why are people concerned about GCC? Very strong 
levels of agreement were observed regarding the rationale that at some point GCC will 
not be able to be reversed anymore. In total, more than three-quarters of the participants 
agreed or strongly agreed with that sentiment. In addition, almost two-thirds of the public 
seemed to be concerned due to the lack of political will to do something about it, and 
close to 50 percent are concerned because of the potential impacts f future generations 
(intergenerational equity).  
However, the literature, especially for the United States, shows that GCC is con-
sidered a low priority in terms of political saliency. Studies show that the American pub-
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lic regards both the environment and climate change as relatively low national priorities 
(Dunlap & Scarcce, 1991; Bord et al., 1998; Leiserowitz et al., 2005, 2010, Ockwell et al, 
2009). The data collected in this study support the existing body of knowledge on the 
global scale and for different countries in regards to GCC as a low saliency issue. We 
found that on the global scale, GCC ranks last among societal issues that government 
needs to deal with.  For the nine countries individually, GCC consistently ranks in the 
bottom third compared to higher priority issues such as increasing employment or im-
proving education. 
The low priority awarded to GCC on the global scale is reinforced by its per-
ceived level of risk compared to other negative environmental impacts that can occur in 
society. Out of seven adverse environmental impacts such as worsening of urban air pol-
lution, increasing frequency of droughts, or deterioration of the ozone layer, global cli-
mate change ranks 5th in terms of the public’s perceived level of risk occurring over the 
next 20 years. Despite these comparatively low perceived risk levels, the public still 
wants the government to engage in efforts to reduce GCC and tends to be concerned 
about the lack of political will to do so. 
Little difference between public risk perceptions of various adverse negative 
GCC impacts. Another aspect important for understanding the public's stand on GCC 
issue involves risk perceptions regarding GCC’s negative impacts. On the global scale the 
data does not show much variation in perceptions of different types of potential negative 
effects over the next 50 years. The survey participants were asked to rate the risk of GCC 
causing different harmful impacts. Respondents were given thirteen consequences of 
GCC and were asked to evaluate their level of risk on a five-point Likert-scale. At least 
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two-thirds of the surveyed populations believe that there are high or very high risks for 
GCC causing any of thirteen harmful effects identified in the survey instrument. Never-
theless, responses in the ‘very high’ risk category show that the public is most concerned 
about GCC causing 'droughts and water shortage', 'more frequent and serious floods', 
'forest fires,' and 'severe heat waves.' On the other hand, only a small percentage of the 
public seems to believe that there is ‘no or little’ risk of global climate change increasing 
the frequency or severity of environmental hazards in general. 
Results indicate high levels of public uncertainty. As pointed out in the litera-
ture (Renn & Levine, 1991; Kasperson et al, 1992; Nye, 1997), the public is more likely 
to support GCC policies if they trust the science behind it and the source of information. 
The data show that scientists are the most trusted source for GCC information, followed 
by television weather reports, family and friends, and environmental organizations. How-
ever past studies in the Unites States also suggest that public GCC perceptions are influ-
enced by various uncertainties which are critical in our understanding of GCC percep-
tions (Seacrest et al., 2000; Leiserowitz, 2005; Smith, 2005; Moser 2006; Kempton, 
1991; Lorenzoni et al, 2005). This study identified several contradictions and hesitations 
among the surveyed population that indicate major uncertainties not only among the pub-
lic in the United States, but also in other countries. 
Although scientists are highly trusted and the most trusted source in all nine coun-
tries, the results also indicate that there is a large number of people who doubt the validity 
and sufficiency of the existing body of knowledge. The uncertainty is further emphasized 
by the high percentage of survey respondents who indicated that they are undecided on 
whether or not to trust any of the listed sources of GCC information in the survey instru-
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ment. Especially, in regards to teachers, 40 percent of all participants chose the answer 
category 'undecided' followed by  corporations (36 percent), family and friends (33.1 per-
cent), and the mainstream news media (30.5 percent). In addition, the public perceives 
GCC as an issue that has to be solved to a large degree by the government and other insti-
tution, but also ranks governmental organizations among the least trusted sources of GCC 
information. In terms of the public’s level of support for adaptation and mitigation strate-
gies, data show strong public support for efforts to reduce the causes and impacts of 
GCC. However, similar to the public's level of trust toward sources of GCC information, 
between a quarter and one-third of the people indicated that they are undecided to wheth-
er or not to support any GCC strategy. With GCC being still a controversial topic in the 
political arena and among some groups of the population, the people who are undecided 
today could make the difference in the future success of various GCC policies.   
Public supports GCC policies in principle, but is less supportive of policies 
that directly affect them. Past studies in the United States show that the public largely  
supports policy action in general the national and international scale, but resists tax poli-
cies that directly affect it (Rosenstone et al., 1997; O'Connor, 1999; Moser, 2006; Leiser-
owitz et al., 2010). This study supports these findings on a global scale and for different 
countries. The results from the survey show ambiguity between the non-binding relative-
ly strong support for adaptation and mitigation policies in general and the public’s sup-
port for specific policies, willingness to pay more money for climate change abatement, 
and willingness to engage in behavioral changes to reduce GCC. The data show that less 
than a quarter of the total sample supports tax hikes as economic incentives to reduce the 
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use of electricity or the use of automobiles. No more than one-third of the public supports 
tax hikes among any of the nine countries for mitigative policies.  
Moreover, compared to past studies this research shows that the public not only 
refuses tax hikes but also hesitates to support any policies that require an initial invest-
ment on their part or changes to their daily routine or consumer practices. The analysis 
shows that the public strongly supports higher investments in public transit systems or 
transit oriented developments, but more than one-third of the surveyed population also 
stated that they are not willing, or only slightly willing to change their travel behavior and 
use public transit systems more often.  The hesitation is also supported by the fact that a 
relatively large number of survey participants stated that they are undecided in terms of 
their willingness to install solar panels or insulate their home which would save money in 
the long-run but require initial upfront capital investment.  
GCC is perceived as a general threat & not as a personal threat. the literature 
(Leiserowitz, 2005; Ockwell et al, 2009), especially based on studies from the United 
States, argues that the low political saliency of GCC reflects a widespread public percep-
tion that the issue is removed in time and space. The data show that people recognize 
GCC as a high threat in general but not necessarily for themselves. Instead, high levels of 
threat are perceived predominantly for plants, animals, and people in other countries, 
which are rarely seen as personal threats. Thus, the percentage of people characterizing 
GCC as a high threat for people in their respective countries, to their family, and to them-
selves is significantly lower in all nine countries compared to the amount of people per-
ceiving GCC as a high threat for people in other countries. When asked how long it will 
take until dangerous impacts of GCC will be experienced 'somewhere on earth' or 'in their 
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region', the majority of the total study sample does believe that impacts are already occur-
ring somewhere on earth, but not in their own region. As a result, this study not only con-
firms the argument that among the public in the United Stated GCC is not perceived as 
pressing or as a personal threat, but also shows similar perceptions among the populations 
in the other eight countries.  
Perceptual Factors & Public Support for GGC Mitigation and Adaptation Policies 
The impact of socio-economic variables. In order to identify potential factors 
that impact public’s risk perception and policy support, one of the research objectives of 
this study was to see how socio-economic characteristics impact the public’s perceptions 
towards GCC. Therefore, regressions were used to test the following hypothesis: “The 
general attitude and public risk perceptions of GCC can be largely explained by socio-
economic variables”. However, the regression analyses do not show any strong relation-
ships between socio-economic characteristics and GCC perceptions in any of the nine 
countries. Thus, the data collected does not confirm the hypothesis and shows that char-
acteristics such as age, gender, household income, or education are not strong predictors 
for some-one’s attitude or risk perceptions towards GCC. This is also seen in numerous 
studies in hazard research using social science methodology. 
Perception factors impact public support for GCC policies & willingness to 
commit to behavioral changes.  Based on the third underlying hypothesis of this study, - 
the public’s position towards climate change is the main reason for 1) low policy support, 
2) willingness to pay for GCC policies, and 3) willingness to change their behavior as 
related to mitigation and adaptation- the impact of different perceptual factors on public 
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policy support were tested through regressions. The first group of perceptual factors con-
sisted of various risk perceptions of GCC and the second group included factors of trust, 
responsibility, and knowledge related to GCC. 
On the global scale, the data confirms a strong and significant relationship be-
tween perception factors and the public’s level of support for GCC mitigation and adapta-
tion policies. The regressions also show significant relationships between the perception 
factors and support for specific policies such as energy efficiency strategies and urban 
planning strategies. In contrast, the regressions do not show any strong links between 
GCC perceptions and the public’s willingness to pay more for GCC reduction among any 
of the nine countries. Thus, even high perceived risk and threat levels, as in the cases of 
Mexico, Brazil, or Germany, do not seem to impact the public’s level of disposition to-
ward supporting GCC mitigation with more private funds, but support for governmental 
policies in general. In contrast, in terms of how well the perception factors can predict the 
public’s willingness to change their behavior towards a more sustainable lifestyle, the da-
ta established strong relationships. 
Perceived level of concern & personal responsibility have strongest impact on 
policy support & willingness to change behavior. The literature does demonstrate that  
perceptions have significant impacts on individual and group behavior and needs to be 
considered when developing global climate change policies and strategies (Slovic, 2000). 
Furthermore, in order to design, implement, and generate sufficient public support for 
policies and planning interventions at the national and international level, it is necessary 
to have a solid understanding of GCC perceptions (Read, 1994; Bord et al., 1998; Moser, 
2006, Moench, 2007). 
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Overall, the findings from regressions indicate that the predictor variables - trust, 
responsibility, and knowledge- have stronger impact on the public's support for GCC pol-
icies compared to the different independent risk perception variables - concern, attitude, 
and threat-. However, to determine which perceptual factors within the two groups has 
the strongest impact on public behavior and policy support related to GGC additional 
stepwise regressions were conducted. In stepwise regressions the predictor variables are 
entered into the model based on their statistical contribution in explaining the variance in 
the dependent variable. Each time a predictor is added to the equation, a removal test is 
made of the least useful predictor, thus identifying the single independent variable that 
has the strongest relationship to the dependent variable. Among the different GCC risk 
perceptions captured by the survey instrument the stepwise regressions identified the 
‘level of concern’ over the impacts of GCC as the strongest of the independent or predic-
tor variables for all countries. Varying by country, other perception factors with a strong 
impact on policy support are the perceived level of personal responsibility to reduce GCC 
and level of trust towards environmental organizations as a source of information.  
Trust factors impact the general concern over GCC.  As shown in chapter 5,  
the public’s level of concern over GCC impacts has the strongest effect on the level of 
support for mitigation and adaptation policies among all tested GCC risk perceptions. 
Typically, the more the public distrusts risk management and communicators information 
the more concern they have about adverse impacts and potential threats for their own 
wellbeing (Slovic et al, 1991). However, much of this research was not conducted for 
hazards with such high levels of uncertainties as GCC. This led to the question of the role 
of trust factors impacting public concern in the context of GCC. 
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Regression results reveal that, on the global scale, approximately one-third of the 
variation in the public’s level of concern can be explained by their level of trust toward 
climate change science and sources of information on GCC. Furthermore, the results 
show that the relationships between level of trust for the science and in different sources 
of information are not always positively correlated with level of concern. For example, 
the data indicate that the more people consider the GCC scientific data as trustworthy or 
trust environmental organizations, the more they are concerned about GCC. This is due to 
the fact that the scientific data and environmental organizations show major adverse or 
catastrophic impacts. In turn, the more the public trusts the information from corporations 
or governmental organizations, the less concerned they are about GCC. Although past 
studies often focused on technological risks, such as nuclear power (Bord & O'Connor, 
1990; Slovic et al., 1991; Mushkatel & Pijawka, 1992), this study confirms similar rela-
tions for GCC trust and concern relationships.  
Differences & Similarities between the Nine Countries  
 Currently international studies on public risk perceptions are limited. Thus, very 
little is known about international perceptions on GCC threats and the perceptions that 
influence support for mitigation and adaptation policies (Leiserowitz, 2010, Schneider et 
al. 2010). Nevertheless, the existing literature does point out that perceptions are socially 
constructed and can vary by culture, human development, affluence, national experience 
with risks, and demographics (Slovic, 2001) Thus, we should expect widespread national 
differences 
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Differences in GCC perceptions. Given that risk perceptions are culturally di-
vided, a key hypothesis was that public perceptions of GCC in terms of threat and risk, 
saliency of the issue, trust in GCC information, and support for public mitigation strate-
gies vary among countries. Approximately 90 percent of the populations of Mexico and 
Brazil seem to be concerned about GCC, perceive it as a high risk, and want their gov-
ernments to take stronger action against the impacts and causes of GCC. In contrast, the 
Netherlands, United Kingdom, and the Unites States always place among the countries 
with the lowest amount of concern for GCC impacts, threats, and risks. In these three 
countries only about 45 to 50 percent of the survey participant are concerned or highly 
concerned about the possible impacts of GCC. Furthermore, the populations of Mexico, 
Brazil, and Canada seem to be most willing to adjust their behavior to reduce GCC im-
pacts. Still, the large number of people in all countries who indicated willingness to 
change behavior is very compelling.  
In the United States and the Netherlands over 24 percent of the people seem not at 
all willing to use public transit for most of their travel. This is significantly higher com-
pared to the other seven surveyed countries. Japan, on the other hand, is last in terms of 
the willingness to purchase only energy saving appliances, install solar panels, or insulate 
their home or apartment. Together with Germany, Japan is also among the countries most 
skeptical regarding the sufficiency and trustworthiness of the scientific GCC data and the 
expert knowledge. Whereas, in the United States with over 10 percent, almost twice as 
many compared to any other of the nine countries do not believe in the reality of GCC. 
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Figure 4. 3D Scatter Plot of public GCC Risk Perceptions among the Nine Surveyed Countries          Own Illustration 
Despite these differences in GCC perceptions the analysis also shows that some 
countries' perceptions are quite similar and the differences are only marginal.  For exam-
ple, Figure 5 shows a country's position with respect to the three principle perception fac-
tors - perceived personal level of threat, level of concern, and level of trust in the gov-
ernment's capability as risk manager in regards to GCC-. As illustrated by the scales of 
the X, Y, and Z axis the country differences among the mean scores of all three factors are 
small. Nevertheless, the differences are sufficient to cluster the countries into factor 
space. The data suggest that the United States, Germany, Japan, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom have more in common in terms of these critical risk perceptions than the differ-
ences. A second group consists of Mexico, Brazil and Canada which perceive the person-
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al threat from GCC higher than any other countries. The Netherlands does not belong to 
any grouping. Although the Netherlands is very similar to the first group of countries in 
terms of personal concern and trust in government, the perceived level of personal threat 
from GCC is significantly lower compared to any other country. The low level of per-
ceived personal threat among the Dutch public can be explained by the fact that the coun-
try is already strongly engaged in adaptation measurements such as levies and flood gates 
due to its geographical circumstances. Most of the country is below sea level and the pub-
lic is used to living with the constant threat of floods and the resulting negative impacts. 
The country groupings are different when based on the public's perceived level of 
personal responsibility, knowledge, and overall trust towards GCC information sources. 
This can be viewed as the ‘trust factor’. As illustrated in Figure 6 the countries can be 
divided into four groups.  Brazil and Mexico have the highest mean scores for all three 
factors and thus can be clustered. The second group consists of Spain, United States, Ja-
pan, and Canada, which are very close together in terms of perceived level of knowledge 
as well as personal responsibility to reduce GCC and only vary slightly regarding the 
general level of trust towards different sources of GCC information. The United Kingdom 
and Germany can be grouped together based on their sense of personal responsibility and 
general GCC knowledge. In addition the difference in the mean scores for overall trust in 
GCC information is only 0.11 between the two countries. Again, the Netherlands is the 
outlier with a low perceived personal responsibility to reduce GCC compared to the eight 




Figure 5. 3D Scatter Plot of Public Perceptions of Factors of Trust, Knowledge, and Responsibility             Own Illustration 
With respect to level of support for adaptation and mitigation policies and the 
willingness to commit to behavioral changes Figure 7 shows the positioning of the nine 
countries. Again, Mexico and Brazil are the most supportive of GCC policies in general 
as well as most willing to change behavior to reduce the causes of GCC. Data from Ger-
many, Canada, Spain, and Japan show strong similarities regarding support for mitigation 
policies as well as willingness to change behavior and only very slight differences in sup-
port for mitigation. The United Kingdom and the Netherlands are very close in terms of 
behavior and among the least supportive countries in terms of support for adaptation pol-
icies. The outlier is the United States for which the public is the least supportive of miti-
gation and adaptation policies.  
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Figure 6. 3D Scatter Plot of Public GCC Policy Support and Willingness to Change Behavior           Own Illustration 
Differences in the relationships between perception factors & GCC policy 
support. Most countries in this study show strong relationships between GCC risk per-
ceptions and mitigation and adaptation policy support. In terms of more specific policies 
grouped by themes, such as: energy efficiency policies, economic incentives, and plan-
ning and adaptation strategies, the country-specific regression results were mixed. That 
is, the strengths of the relationships between the different perception factors and levels of 
support for different GCC strategies are not identical among the countries. The data sug-
gest that the relationships are the strongest among the participants from the United States, 
followed by the United Kingdom, Spain, Netherlands, Germany, Canada, and Japan. In 
the cases of Brazil and Mexico, neither attitude, levels of concern nor factors of trust, re-
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sponsibility, and knowledge seem to explain any variability in the public’s support for or 
opposition to mitigation and adaptation policies. This is not necessarily surprising, con-
sidering that, compared to the other highly industrialized countries in our survey, the per-
ceived levels of risk or concerns regarding GCC are higher, and more people believe that 
impacts are already occurring in their country. 
In terms of the impact of knowledge, as well as factors of trust and responsibility 
on the public’s support for GCC policies, the regressions show significant relationships 
among all the nine countries. The results show a strong relationship between the inde-
pendent variables and the public’s general support for mitigation and adaptation policies 
in seven out of the nine countries, with Mexico and Brazil the exceptions again.  
Contributions to the Underlying Theories of this Study 
As discussed in the opening chapter of this dissertation the research was based on 
the psychometric paradigm (Fischhoff et al, 1978, & Slovic et al, 1984). Since past per-
ceptual research focused primarily on technological risks and natural hazards (Burton, et 
al 1978, Kates, 1982; Short 1984. Slovic, 2001), which are quite different from GCC, we 
do not know very much about the relationship between the different perception factors in 
the context of GCC. By testing he role of heuristics, trust, values (or worldviews), and 
social amplification related to GCC risk perceptions among nine identified countries this 
research contributes to the fundamental theories of of "bounded rationality" (Simon, 1956 
& 1959), and "cultural cognition" of natural phenomenon (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) 
from a global climate change perceptive. 
In the context of GCC the data indicate that the public applies invalid heuristics 
resulting in risk assessments and levels of policy support contrary to the scientific find-
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ings and recommendations provided by the scientific community. The study shows that 
the public underrates the personal risks of GCC, compared to scientists who point out 
that, even in industrialized countries like the USA, GCC is already occurring and posing 
dangerous impacts (Pittock, 2009). As discussed earlier, the majority of the public be-
lieves that GCC is an issue removed in time and space which will primarily impact future 
generations in other countries. This shows that the public does not have sufficient infor-
mation or the cognitive skills necessary to make well informed decisions which would 
confirm the conclusions by the scientific community. Therefore, this study confirms the 
concept of heuristics and the argument that if heurists are invalid for the risk faced they 
can lead to or reinforce existing misconceptions (Kahneman et al., 1982; Makofske & 
Edelstein, 1988).  One important reason for this gap between lay models and expert as-
sessment is the public’s skepticism and uncertainty of the existing body of GCC 
knowledge and the low levels of trust towards key risk communicators such as the media 
and governmental organizations. Furthermore, the low raking of GCC compared to other 
societal issues and other environmental impacts further dampens the public’s missing 
sense of urgency to take action against GCC. As a result, effective policies to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions such as higher taxes related to energy use and behavioral 
changes to travel behavior are the least supported strategies by the public. 
Another theory investigated is that lay people dealing with uncertainties tend to 
over- or underestimate the risks and threats (Slovic, 2000). In the case of nuclear power 
risk perception research shows that the public tends to overrate the risks of radiation ex-
posure leading to large social amplification effects and behavior. This study advances the 
theory of social amplification by examining whether or not current forms of GGC com-
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munication amplify or attenuate the public’s risk perception and by discussing the poten-
tial of social amplification for GCC compared to other environmental hazards.  
The low political saliency and low ranking of GCC compared to other environ-
mental hazards suggests that communication efforts have not amplified the perceptions of 
risk and their manageability. Instead, the data and literature suggest current communica-
tion of GCC, especially by the mass media, has attenuated the public’s perceived urgency 
of dealing with the issue of GCC. According to the data, the majority of the publics do 
not believe that the media’s attention on the effects of GCC is exaggerated which other-
wise could lead to an increased risk perception, nor is the media considered a source for 
GCC information that can be strongly trusted. All current major communicators such as 
governmental institutions or scientist are either not trusted by the public or not capable to 
convey the risks and impacts of GCC in a convincing and easy to understand manner 
(Sheppard, 2012). 
Thus, this research suggests that current forms of GCC communication are not 
very likely to amplify the public's risk perception. However, this might change when im-
pacts of GCC become more obvious to the public, levels of trust towards communicators 
increase, and reporting links highly publicized negative events, such as droughts, hurri-
canes or floods more often to global climate change. Existing research also shows a nega-
tive relationship between risk or threat perception and trust factors, suggesting that as 
perceived risks increases as the level of institutional trust decreases (Slovic et al, 1991). 
Being important, this led to the question if such relationship between trust factors and 
public risk perceptions also exist in the context of GCC. Therefore, the theory tested in 
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the context of GCC is that distrust of the government is strongly linked to the level of risk 
perceived.  
In the context of GCC, the data only show , a moderate relationship at best  be-
tween the public's GCC threat and risk perceptions and their level of trust towards the 
government. Nevertheless, the study confirms the relationship between trust in govern-
ment and level of risk perceived in the context of GCC. Moreover, the analysis shows 
that the stronger the public believes in GCC risk and threat the more they trust the gov-
ernment's capability as GCC risk manager. This marks a significant different  compared 
to the negative relationships between risk or threat perceptions and trust in government 
for other risks, such as nuclear power. Therefore the results shows that the uniqueness of 
the GCC issue with its high uncertainties, mostly invisible causes and slow developing 
impacts also changes the typical type of relationship between risk and treat perceptions 
and institutional trust. 
Cultural theorists argue that our world-views and our values play an important 
role in public risk perception and behavior (Douglas, 1966 & 1970; Douglas & Wil-
davsky, 1982; Douglas et al., 1998). This study  provided empirical evidence to suppport 
the argument that we disagree about GCC because we have different belief systems me-
diated through culture (Hulme, 2009; Kahan et al., 2011) and thus contributes to the theo-
ry of cultural cognition. The previously discussed perceptual differences among the nine 
surveyed countries suggest cultural differences among the survey participants which in 
turn impact the perceptual factors and behavior. Furthermore, the data show characteris-
tics of intergeneration equity among a large number of participants. Moreover, variables 
capturing the concern for family members, as well as perceived personal responsibility 
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for reducing GCC, are confirmed by stepwise regressions to have a significant impact on 
policy support. Thus, the collected data further confirms to the theory of cultural cogni-
tion by showing that cultural background and personal values play a role in public risk 
perception and behavior in the context of GCC. 
Implications for GCC Communication Programs 
Communication efforts can foster a personal connection to GCC, raise the level of 
concern, and thus increase the level of support for mitigation and adaptation policies as 
well as the willingness among the public to engage in a more sustainable behavior. This 
study has identified several aspects that need to be considered in future communication 
programs. GCC is characterized by high uncertainties, unfamiliar risks, and other charac-
teristics of hazards which make personal connections, responsibility and engagement dif-
ficult.  
However, the high levels of uncertainty among the public also presents an oppor-
tunity to increase policy support and foster behavioral changes in the future through well 
designed communication programs. A large number of people are uncertain about the 
danger GCC poses today or for future generations, don’t know which source of infor-
mation to trust, and thus are undecided to whether or not support any GCC strategy. With 
GCC being still a controversial topic in the political arena and among some groups of the 
population, the people who are undecided today could very well  make the difference in 
the future success of various GCC policies. The comparatively high amount of pubic un-
certainty and indecisiveness shows that the public behavior and perceptions can still be 
influenced by objective GCC coverage if they establish a personal connection to GCC 
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impacts and thus increase the level of concern and support for mitigation and adaptation 
policies.   
The study also shows that, perceptual factors of trust and responsibility have a 
great impact on public behavior and policy support and thus need to be acknowledged in 
communication efforts. The level of success of risk communication is significantly influ-
enced by the public's trust in the communicator and in the ability of individuals, indus-
tries, or institutions responsible for risk management. Trust in organizations whose risk 
management policies impact communities and the environment is vital in order to reduce 
complexity and generate social cooperation (Cvetkovich & Loefstedt, 1999). On the one 
hand perceptions of trust have a strong impact on public concern which in turn influences 
public support for GCC mitigation and adaptation. On the other hand, the results also 
show that trust also directly influence public behavior and policy support. With respect to 
the public's level of trust towards different sources of information, scientists seem to be 
most trusted  among  potential communicators in all nine countries, followed by family 
and friends. Analyses also show that the level of trust specifically in environmental or-
ganizations and perceived trustworthiness of GCC science have the strongest impacts on 
perceived levels of concern.  
Nevertheless, the data also show significant barriers to successful communication 
efforts in form of perceptual contradictions among the public regarding trust, responsibil-
ity, and behavior. Over one-third of the participants doubt that the scientific community 
actually has enough data to fully understand the complexity of the issue. This, in turn, 
further explains the widespread skepticism regarding the trustworthiness of GCC find-
ings. The most significant barrier is probably the fact that on the one hand the public 
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views the government as the party most responsible to reduce GCC, but simultaneously 
highly distrusts it. Communication efforts need to acknowledge these contradictions, 
build up trust and motivate the public to be more engaged in reducing GCC by emphasiz-
ing the multiple benefits of many policies outside of just reducing GCC. Levels of skepti-
cism among the public towards the reality of GCC as well as the trustworthiness and suf-
ficiency of the scientific findings varies by country. Thus, communicators need to be 
aware of their audience in order to decide how educational their program needs to be. 
Future Research 
As outlined by the theoretical framework and the feedback loop in particular,  
GCC risk perceptions, levels of policy support, and its interrelationships need to be con-
stantly reevaluated in order to improve communication programs and to decrease the  gap 
between the  recommendations provided by the scientific community and the actual ac-
tions by the public and policy makers. 
Therefore, this study should function as a benchmark for different follow-up stud-
ies adding more countries to the database as well as enabling longitudinal research for the 
countries addressed in this dissertation. For example, time and money constraints did not 
allow surveys in China, Africa, or Australia. In addition, research with larger sample sizes 
per country and more survey questions are needed to further improve the understanding 
of the perceptual differences between countries and what variables can explain them. In 
regard for improving GCC communication programs, future research should also incor-
porate interviews of public officials directly involved with past or ongoing GCC commu-
nication efforts.  Moreover, the data for this study was collected just weeks before the 
Tsunami and the nuclear fallout in Japan. Therefore, a fallow up study in Japan would 
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allow a pre and post disaster analysis examining how risk perceptions and other percep-
tual factors have changed after a significant negative event.  
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